424 



KANT: 



*m. culcstes, will long remain as a monument of the vast 

 V"' intellectual powers of its author. In order to convey to 

 our readers some notion of the principles which this 

 theory proposed to establish, it will be necessary for us 

 to present them with a short abstract of the process 

 of reasoning, adopted by the author in the work to 

 which we have alluded. This abstract, indeed, can be 

 but a mere skeleton, our limits will admit of nothing 

 more ; but we think it will exhibit the peculiar doc- 

 trines of the Kantian system, in a much clearer point 

 of view than the method which some have taken, of se- 

 lecting a few of the detached principles and definitions 

 of the critical philosophy, of which the application and 

 consistency cannot possibly be perceived, without exhi- 

 biting them in connection with the whole theory. With 

 the view of rendering the following outline more ge- 

 nerally intelligible, we have endeavoured to divest it, 

 as much as possible, of all technical phraseology. 



That all our knowledge commences with experi- 

 ence, is a fact which cannot admit of a doubt. But it 

 does not follow from thence, that all our knowledge is 

 derived from experience, as its only source. For it may 

 be, that even those notions which we derive more im- 

 mediately from experience, are made up of that which 

 we receive through the medium of our senses, and that 

 which our cognitive faculty, called into exercise by our 

 sensual impressions, produces of itself; which latter ad- 

 dition it is difficult to distinguish or separate from the 

 original matter, without long and constant habits of re- 

 flection. 



If experience, in a philosophical sense, be the per- 

 ception of objects as existing in a certain connection, 

 we must have a faculty of perceiving simply,and a power 

 .of representing our perceptions in a certain (necessary) 

 connection. The former we call sense ; the latter intellect, 

 or understanding. All that we perceive, must be present- 

 ed to our senses under certain conditions, without which 

 our percipient faculty cannot be exercised. These are 

 the necessary conditions of all perception, as the eye is 

 the necessary condition of all vision ; and, as such, they 

 are not first called into being with the objects, but must 

 have existed previously, otherwise the objects could not 

 have been perceived. These conditions are space and 

 time ; the former of the external, the latter of the inter- 

 nal sense, and of all our perceptions whatsoever. All 

 that is perceived by the senses, must be perceived un- 

 -der these conditions ; which must, therefore, be neces- 

 sary, and have existed previously to all perception, al- 

 though first evolved, or, if we may use the expression, 

 called into activity by external objects. That which is 

 perceived under these conditions, however, is yet no 

 experience: it must be represented, or conceived by 

 the mind, as existing in a necessary connection. This 

 depends upon the operation of judgment. A judgment 

 is an operation of the understanding, by which two re- 

 presentations, those of subject and predicate, are 

 immediately combined with each other. Of such com- 

 binations there are four species ; indicating the relation 

 of the subject to the predicate, of the predicate to the 

 subject, of both together, and of both to the conscious- 

 ness. To every judgment, one out of these four classes 

 of forms must apply; each must be determined according 

 to these four modifications. If all thought (or concep- 

 tion) depends upon the faculty of judgment, so does all 

 conception of objects. Through the above mentioned 

 forms of the judgment, therefore, we derive the possibili- 

 ty of conceiving objects. Objects may be conceived in as 



many modes as there are forms of judgment. Objects Ka'- 

 in general, therefore, may b conceived, \. as one, as V """V*' 

 mam/, as all; 2. as something', as nothing, as. limited; 



3. as substance or accident, as cause or effect, as common ; 



4. as possible, as rea/, as necessary. All that is conceiv- 

 ed, must be conceived under these forms. But these 

 forms, as we now view them, are not applicable to any 

 objects. To say that something is possible, real, &c. 

 has no meaning, unless something is added which ren- 

 ders these notions sensible. This something is TIME. 

 That something is possible, then, means that something 

 can exist at a particular time ; and so of the other forms 

 of thought. But even these forms of thought, thus ren- 

 dered sensible, are still empty and without meaning, un- 

 less objects are given us, to which they may be applied. 

 The forms, possible, real, &c. convey, of themselves, no 

 information whatever. I must have something given 

 me, which I can cM possible, real, &c. ; in short, I must 

 have objects to subject to the operation of thought. But 

 objects can only be given me through the medium of , 

 perception ; therefore the forms of thought can only be 



used with reference to objects of perception. As the 

 form of our perceptions renders these perceptions pos- 

 sible ; so likewise do the forms of thought render it 

 possible for us to represent these perceptions in a cer- 

 tain connection. They are, therefore, both a priori ; 

 the objects of perception, i. e. our experience makes 

 them real. 



Hence we derive the following important results. It 

 is in experience alone, that we can have true and real 

 knowledge. All the objects which I would know, must 

 be perceived under the forms of sense, and conceived 

 under the forms of the understanding ; and, as such, 

 they are called phenomena, i. e. objects of exnerience. 

 Whatsoever objects cannot be perceived under the forms 

 of sense, are incapable of being conceived under the forms 

 of the understanding ; such, therefore, are called nou- 

 mena, or things in themselves. These noumena, or 

 things in themselves, cannot be subjected to the forms 

 of sense ; and, therefore, we cannot conceive or know 

 them at all. The possibility of experience is the first 

 principle of all our speculative knowledge. Whatever 

 we cannot perceive under fhe forms of sense, and re- 

 present in that necessary connection, which is deter- 

 mined by the constitution of our understanding, is ab- 

 solutely beyond the sphere of our knowledge. That 

 which is so perceived, and subjected to the forms of the 

 understanding, is known. That which is thus known 

 is true. Our perceptions correspond with the objects : 

 for the objects can only excite these, and no other per- 

 ceptions in us ; because, from the constitution of our 

 nature, we are susceptible of no other impressions. 



What becomes, then, of our boasted speculative know- 

 ledge from pure abstract reason ? Things in themselves 

 are not cognizable ; yet, to convey information with re- 

 gard to these, was the professed object of metaphysics. 

 Now, if we can acquire any such speculative know- 

 ledge, it must necessarily have its origin in the nature 

 of our reason. But in what does reason consist ? In 

 the faculty of drawing conclusions. A rational con- 

 clusion is the deduction of knowledge from some prin- 

 ciple of the particular from the universal of the con- 

 ditional from the condition. In the principle of every 

 conclusion, there is a relation between the condition and 

 the conditional. This relation may be threefold : as 

 that of the subject to the predicate ; of the principle to 

 the consequence ; of the whole to the parts. But here 



