KANT. 



425 



we hare nothing except the mere form of the conclu- 

 ~ - ' sions. From whence does reason derive the contents, 

 i. e. the matter ? The former may be quite accurate, and 

 vtt the latter entirely 'tippositious. Reason cannot be- 

 get this matter in it can produce nothing 

 but the mere form. Is it innate ? Impossible. Matter 

 is an object ; and objects cannot be innate in the mind. 

 Reason, therefore, must derive it from some other quar- 

 ter ; and from whence but from the understanding ? 

 The understanding furnishes the matter, that t 

 judgments and notions. Reason works up these ma- 

 terials, by taking two notions, to which it seeks a third , 

 which third notion is assumed as unconditional ; or, if 

 not. then the further conditions must be sought, even 

 to the last possible. This notion of the unconditional 

 is originally peculiar to reason, and indispensable to its 

 exercise. Now, if the judgments and notions of the 

 understanding are the materials of reason, and if these, 

 as we have already shewn, are only the marks of cer- 

 tain relations existing between the objects and our cog- 

 nitive faculty, then the working up of these materials, 

 the combination of these judgments ami notions, can 

 us no farther information with regard to the ob- 

 jects ; consequently, we can neither obtain nor extend 

 our knowledge by means of reason alone. The ob- 

 jects, therefore, with which the science of metaphysics 

 has been conversant, are not cognizable. They are no- 

 thing but ideas of reason ; that is, certain representa- 

 tion? of the unconditional, of the highest unity and to- 

 tality, which spring from the essence of reason ; which 

 serve to render the fit- Id of experience a comprehensible 

 whole ; and are, therefore, merely conditions of the ex- 

 ercise of our reason, and not real external objects. 



What fort of a science of metaphysics, then, can we 

 possibly have We have already shewn, that there are 

 in the mind certain forms of cognition given a priori, 

 through which alone our knowledge of objects is pos- 

 sible. The exposition and develops >-<e forms 

 of the forms of perception, of our notions, and ideas 

 the eviontial aivl a yrmr, determined charn 

 all that can be known, and of all that can be thought 

 or r .-nmprehrnded tinder rules and general 

 laws, will give u* a science of metaphysics, certain in 

 its principle*, in. I secure against all objections. And 

 -e find the limits atlixed ^nitive faculty. 

 On the one hand, it has been shewn, that we can have 

 no science of raper-tenoible thing* ; and, upon the 

 other, that all the laws of the <. rig are not deri- 

 ved from mere accidental acquired experience, and con- 

 sequently neither necessary nor certain ; but that they 

 I, rr-ultm- from the nature of our under- 

 dnperwably Decenary to all possible CXJK-- 

 'if a knowledge of given objects true 



.in- rr.il 



d theory of Kant, as develo- 

 rn l'ernu*ft. Nutwith-* 

 t at once a compendious and 



familiar view of this theory, we fear that much of what 

 we hare said on the subject will not be very intelligible 

 to those, who have not previously been, in some degree, 

 conversant with the principles of the transcendental 

 philosophy. We have, "however, purposely a\- 

 reiulering it still more obscure, by entering into any 

 discussion of the more abstruse doctrines peculiar to this 

 theory ; such as the possibility of synthetic judgments 

 a jirirri. the critical notions of space and lime, the de- 

 ' . :':!<: .'oHlJI ,N c. 'Ilit-c ilortrinrs upon 



which the stability of the whole system mainly depend*, 

 have, therefore, been treat e.l at great length 

 11. 



in the works of Kant and his commentators we must 

 leave to the study of such as are desirous of becoming > 

 more minutely acquainted with the principles of tran- 

 scendental metaphysics. The results of the Kantian 

 theory may be stated, we conceive, in a few words. 

 The first principles of our speculative knowledge are 

 mere subjective forms, i. e. forms derived from the con- 

 stitution of the thinking being ; Jirsl, the forms of sense, 

 or pure perception-, (space and time) ; and secondly, 

 the forms or notions of the understanding, (the catego- 

 ries). These intellectual forms, or notions, however, 

 only acquire reality by their application to our percep- 

 tions, with reference to possible experience ; and, there- 

 fore, we can hav? no speculative knowledge of things 

 beyond the sphere of experience. 



Having dwelt so much on the speculative part of the 

 critical philosophy, we have left no room to enlarge 

 upon the subject of its practical principles, or those 

 which relate to the theory of morals. Our practical 

 reason, according to Kant, is aufonomic ; it determines 

 merely the form of the will, and postulates freedom as 

 a necessary condition. The moral law appears as an 

 absolute imperative, and dictates, with rigid necessity, 

 universal legality as the general rule of all rational vo- 

 lition, without regard to any motives resulting from pa- 

 thologicaJ feelings. The ideas of freedom, immortality, 

 and Ueity, which are placet! entirely beyond the reach 

 of speculation, receive from practical reason reality and 

 certainty, not as objects of theoretical knowledge, but 

 of rational faith. 



Besides the critical investigation of speculative anil 

 practical reason, and of the faculty of judgment, which 

 fie considered as merely preparatory to a new meta- 

 physical rystem, Kant, towards the latter end of hi-; 

 life, executed some detached parts of the system itself, 

 with great originality, acuteness, and consistency. Some 

 time before his death, he meditated a work, which was 

 intended as the key-stone of his whole system, and 

 which was to have been entitled, The Transition from 

 Mtlaphyrict to Physics, in which he proposed to demon- 

 strate the general application of his principles. The 

 decline of his faculties, however, prevented the execu- 

 tion of this meditated work. 



In this country, the writings of Knnt appear to be 

 very little known ; and consequently, his character as 

 a philosopher is very imperfectly appreciated. Tho r 

 whose curiosity has prompted them to inquire into the 

 merits of his system, have generally been content to re- 

 ceive their information at second hand, through the 

 medium of expositions and translations, not always very 

 perspicuous or very faithful. Hence it is not uncom- 

 mon, to hear the name of the author of the critical phi- 

 'ty associated with those shallow pretenders to sci- 

 ence, who have occasionally started up. and contrived 

 to impose upon the world, and to acquire an ephemeral 

 reputation, by the display of crude, inconsistent, and 

 ab-urd theories. We shall, therefore, conclude this ar- 

 ticle with the testimony of two authors to the merits of 

 Kant, whose names are both celebrated in the literary 

 annals of their native country; who hnd both studied 

 the writing", and enjoyed the personal acquaintance, of 

 the eminent metaphysician in question ; and who are 

 the less liable to the suspicion of partiality, because they 

 are both known to have been hostile to the principles 

 of his system. The first relates principally to the me- 

 lit* of hi* theory ; the latter, to his character as a man 

 and a philosopher. 



" The distinctions, 1 ' says Oarve, " which Kant h* 

 drawn between the beautiful and the sublime, in hi* 

 3 u 



Kant. 



