578 



LANGUAGE. 



Yer * 



Language. j s tics of the imperative verb. We may therefore con- 

 > " "V"*' sider ourselves as warranted in assuming the impera- 

 /'i- verb, denoting in general our desire to accomplish 

 an object, either by direct command, if we conceive 

 on ' elves possessed of power to compel it, or by request 

 and supplication, if we can only attain it by the per- 

 mission of another, as constituting the nucleus or radi- 

 cal part of language, from which not only the other 

 branches of the verb, but also the other classes of words, 

 were gradually to be formed. 



Origin of For the accomplishing any object of desire by the 

 he other concurrence of others, it is absolutely necessary, in the 

 pru, of the fj rs t pl ace , that an action of some kind or other should 

 be performed ; action is, therefore, always implied in 

 the use of the imperative sign, whether in the way of 

 command or entreaty. When the person addressed is 

 willing to comply and concur fos the attainment of the 

 desired object, he will naturajily signify this by repeat- 

 ing the sign by which that wish was signified, but by 

 repeating it with such a variation in form, as may at 

 once indicate that he complies with the wish, and that 

 he is willing to concur for accomplishing it. Hence, 

 besides the imperative, another branch of the verb, de- 

 noting the willingness to comply, is formed. That in- 

 tention of compliance may exist in various forms, it 

 may amount to an absolute implied promise or agree- 

 ment of concurrence, either instant or future; or it 

 may amount only to an engagement, to be regulated by 

 some intervening event. It is easy to conceive that 

 each of these would soon come to be denoted by vari- 

 ations of one species or other upon the primitive impe- 

 rative sign. As soon as the action was performed, this 

 too would be communicated, and for that communica- 

 tion another variation would be formed, still referring 

 to the first and radical sign. 



In this manner, we can easily conceive how all the 

 parts of the verb gradually arose from the simple impe- 

 rative sign, merely by following out the communica- 

 tions of thought which the necessity of mutual aid must 

 produce in any society. 



Although upon these grounds verbs may, and indeed 

 must be regarded as the real groundwork, or radical 

 part of language, yet there are other classes of words, 

 also, so necessarily connected with them, that the same 

 principles which formed the different parts of the verb 

 must immediately suggest the necessity of some farther 

 variations. The subject of language, as already stated, 

 is action. Now in the conception of every action, it 

 cannot be doubted, that besides the operation itself, 

 there necessarily must be other three component parts 

 the agent, the subject, and the effect produced; each 

 of these it will soon be requisite to mark by correspond- 

 ing vocal signs. The subject of the action is what first 

 would assume a separate denomination, formed proba- 

 bly at first by taking, as its radical part, the denomi- 

 nation of that particular Action, or class of actions, most 

 commonly directed upon it, or most generally exhibit- 



Origin of- 



nouns, 



ed by it. Hence would arise the class of nouns, the Language, 

 names at first of external objects chiefly, .the usual sub- >< ^r^ 1/ 

 jects of action, and as such for the most part .exciting the 

 emotions and feelings of the mind, afterwards extend- 

 ed to the mental operations themselves, and to the ab- 

 stract conceptions suggested by human actions and hu- 

 man conduct. 



In regard to any specific action, the agent and the sub- 

 ject are certainly completely distinct ; yet, in the course 

 of human affairs, it continually occurs that they, as it 

 were, change places; so that the agent in one operation 

 becomes the subject in another. From this circum- 

 stance, it takes place, that in language, no separate class 

 of words, in general, has been formed fof marking whe- 

 ther an object stands in the one relation or the other ; 

 yet still the distinction is in most cases attended to, and 

 the relation denoted either by a particular, though mi- 

 nute, change in some part of the word, or by such a 

 position in the sentence, as indicates in what relation it 

 is to be held. 



To complete the idea of an action, another part still Origin of 

 is wanting the effect produced that is, the change oc- al 'J tctives> 

 casioned in the subject. Though this is intimately con- 

 nected with it, it is by no means to be viewed in the 

 same light with the subject itself. The subject is con- 

 sidered by us as the permanent material, the effect as 

 merely the form which this material is to assume. For 

 the expression of this, then, a class of words must be 

 devised, nearly allied indeed to those which denomi- 

 nate the subject, yet so far differing, that they may be 

 capable of adaptation to many different objects, and 

 easily referred to any one with which, at the time, they i 



happen to be associated. In this manner is formed the 

 class of attributives, marking a quality or property on- 

 ly, which may be predicated alike of many individual 

 subjects, and thus exhibiting a marked distinction from 

 what is considered a.s permanent and possessed of that 

 principium individuationis, which completely separates 

 one object from every other. * Each of these qualities 

 or properties might be named at first from the view of 

 some object in which that quality was first produced by 

 some particular action; and hence the attributive would 

 still retain the radical part of the primeval word, with 

 particular modifications to mark its new application ; 

 and each attributive, when formed, would, from the 

 natural principle of association, be applied to designate 

 the same quality occurring in any other subject. 



The radical and essential parts of language being Formation 

 formed in the manner described, all the other species of the otho 

 or classes of words, as well as all the necessary varia- P art f 

 tions of the radical parts themselves, would gradually s P eech ' 

 follow in the constant use and habit of speaking. These, 

 in fact, are all nothing more than either modifica- 

 tions immediately attached to the radical words, parts 

 of these radical words themselves, put into a new posi- 

 tion, or abbreviations for the sake of dispatch, easily re- 

 solvable into their constituent parts. The manner in 



* This is not the place to enter into the metaphysical questions which have been started as to our real notions of what is termed tut- 

 stance ; whether, as was long held by logicians, we are to understand by this term an unknown substratum, in which all conceivable qua- 

 lites inhere, or whether, in fact, our notions of substance never go beyond merely a colleclion of qualities, commonly perceived by us unit- 

 ed in the same object. The investigation of this point belongs to METAPHYSICS. In regard to the formation of language, it amounts 

 nearly to the same thing wliich of the two opinions is well-founded. Whether we really conceive a substratum separate from qualities, or 

 only view qualities themselves conceived as united and forming a whole, it is plain, that our giving a specific name to this substratum, or to 

 this assemblage of qualities, implies a conception that something is regarded as permanent, essential to the existence of the object, and 

 constituting its individuality, in opposition to the idea which enters into all our conceptions of mere qualities, that they may equally be- 

 long to many objects, and may be varied without destroying the nature of the object to which they pertain. If, after all, it is only quali- 

 ties which we can conceive, still we shall find, that in the formation and use of substantive nouns, as distinguished from altritutivft, the idea 

 of permanence is for the time conveyed, and the distinguishing idea of qualities, considered merely as qualities, is for the time kept 

 eut of view. 



