

609 



L A W. 



1* tw Mbjects are more comprehensive than that of 

 ' lw. It has, indeed, in every department of it, 

 been orerloaded and oppressed with a mass of com- 

 mentary, sometimes contradictory, often unintelli- 

 gible, commonly futile, and therefore almost always 

 alike unprofitable to the student, and disregarded by 

 the intelligent practitioner. But, independently of 

 so monstrous an overgrowth, the mam stem and 

 branches of this noble science occupy a large space, 

 and to be adequately conceived, would require a 

 very ample delineation. Besides the principles com- 

 mon, or which ought to be common, to all law, (we 

 mean the immutable principles of morality and religion,) 

 how various and important are the modifications of the 

 different tystems instituted in different countries ! How 

 various the circumstances on which these modifications 

 necessarily depend ! the peculiar genius of the people, 

 from whatever causes originating ; the habits and cus- 

 toms which have insensibly grown up among them ; 

 the inland or maritime situation of the territory ; the 

 greater or leu degree of progress already made in civi- 

 le character of the popular superstitions, 

 whether introduced by accident, policy, or imitation : 

 the nature of the government ; the agricultural or com- 

 mercial facilities of the country ; ana a thousand other 



causes which infinitely diversify the judicial systems of 

 different communities. It is not to be expected, there- v 

 fore, that we should in this place attempt any thing 

 like a detail of so comprehensive a subject. We must 

 confine ourselves to such branches of it as appear to be 

 of paramount importance, or of which a detail, as far as 

 our limits will admit, may be the most generally inte- 

 resting and useful. We mean to submit, therefore, 1st, 

 Some obsrrrations on law in general ; 2rf, An outline of 

 the law of nations ; 3d, An institute or abstract of the 

 latv of England ; and, 4th, A timilar institute or abstract 

 of the hie of Scotland. For the judicial establishments 

 of other countries, with whose institutions it is less 

 necessary we should be intimately acquainted, we refer 

 our readers to what they may find under the different 

 correspondent articles of this work. We only here ob- 

 serve, that, with the exception of certain local customs, 

 the laws of Ireland, and of the various extensive colo- 

 nies dependent on Great Britain, are, with a few occa- 

 sional modifications, similar to those of England ; and 

 that the enactments of the British Parliament reach 

 to every quarter of the empire, either where it is ex. 

 pressly so provided, or where the general tenor of the 

 enactment has indicated such to be the intention of 

 the legislature. 



Law. 



TART I. OF LAW IX GENERAL. 



JP, kit* 1- !*". * applicable to human conduct in general, 

 may be defined a rule of moral action proceeding from 

 a superior having right to command, and directed to in- 

 feriors bound to obey. Of this authority on the one 

 hand, and obligation to obedience on the other, the 

 undatuxi, or principle, is the happineM of those to 



M"" 1 " whom the rule is directed. If the rule does not sub- 

 stantially contemplate this happineM, it has proceeded 

 w ithout the correspondent authority in the superior, 

 and is not obligatory on the inferior. 



2. It it, however, a very different consideration in 

 what manner the prtttxce of this obligatory principle 

 is to be ascertained. To assert that every individual is 

 bound to obedience, according only at he may discover 

 the connection of his happineM with the rule, would be 

 to make ignorance the measure of submission, and to 

 abject order to the blind caprice of inclination, preju- 

 dice, or passion. Kven in the administration of the un- 

 changeable precepts of morality proceeding from the 



teUigent and reflecting, to reconcile the observance of 

 ler some particular circumstances, with the 

 of the individual ; how much oftener to the 

 , who, uninatructed by contemplation, or blinded 

 by the selfishness of vice or passion, so frequently in- 

 dicate by their conduct their ignorance of the pre- 

 sence of the principle, and their practical disbelit- f in 

 the obligatory nature of the rule. But with regard to 

 laws at human institution, this propensity to disobe- 

 dience, so far aa the mere principle in question is con 

 uniad, must be greater. The source from which Iliry 

 proceed, even in their purest state, is ever liable to be 



il.-'ur: . .1 I'T ii,:. '.--t . r t n. r 'I li'-rr i- Ii.i7.inl, thi-rr- 



fore, in every instance, that the obligatory principle 

 vol. ill. FART n 



may be absent, whilst, in some, that absence is obvious 

 and certain. Hence a perpetual occasion to the igno- 

 rant, that is, to the people in general of whom every 

 community is composed, to question the obligation of 

 the laws. The obligations of morality, indeed, can in 

 no instance be denied, even by the intelligent and re- 

 flecting, without involving a contradiction in their con- 

 ception of the divine nature, since the moral constitu- 

 tion sf man, by which he judges of right and wrong, 

 approves and disapproves, proceeds from the same 

 Being who has ordained the precepts of morality them- 

 selves ; but in laws of human institution, such an argu- 

 ment for the invariable presence of the obligatory prin- 

 ciple, can have no place, *nd the intelligent must some- 

 times unite with the vulgar in regarding the rule as 

 wanting the essential characteristic of its authority. 



3. Of what use, then, is a principle which it may be Yet not the 

 often diflicult to discover, and which is always liable to less real. 

 be misunderstood or perverted by those who stand most 

 in need of the restraints of law ? The principle it- 

 self, we answer, is not therefore the less real ; nor is it 

 possible to discover any other reasonable foundation on 

 which, on the one hand, the authority .of him who is- 

 sues the rule, and, on the other, the obligation to obe- 

 dience of him who is to obey, can be rested. In fact, 

 it is for the most part sufficiently obvious, where selfish 

 views of an exclusive interest do not interfere to mis- 

 lead the judgment ; and bad must be that system of 

 law where it is not in most instances recognizable. 

 Yet as it is often found, even where it is sufficiently 

 apparent, to be of too fine or distant an application to 

 popular control, other sanctions more direct and 

 imprc.vive than the mere privation of the good conse- 

 quent upon obedience, are commonly superinduced. 

 4 ii 



