LAW. 



617 



Fu!!l:--:- - ' 



how r r ... 

 nM :.T. 



been taken to express this matter so fully as to leave no 

 room for dispute. 



. 6. Treaties cease to be obligatory when the sovereign 

 power with whom they were concluded ceases to exist, 

 and when the state passes under the dominion of ano- 

 ther power. Sometimes they cease when the state 

 change* its constitution ; and always when a war, on 

 whatever account, breaks out between the contracting 

 parties ; except provisions be contained in them spe- 

 cially in reference to the event of a war. Such provi- 

 sions, for instance, as relate to the treatment of each 

 other's subjects, their vessels, merchandise, &c. in the 

 case of a rupture All treaties, then, existing between 

 belligerent powers, previous to the war, must be re- 

 newed at the peace, if the parties wish to continue 

 them. 



7. In order to secure the observation of treaties, the 

 contracting parties had recourse formerly to a great 

 number of accessary covenants, some of which were ri- 

 diculous enough. They almost always made use either 

 of oaths, hostages, pledges, or guarantees, for which 

 the objects or vassals of the contracting states were 

 often chosen. But now oaths are laid aside in trea- 

 ties between sovereign*. Hostages are yet made use 

 of, but this i> generally in military arrangements, or 

 for the fulfilment of some particular article of a treaty 

 of peace. The custom of choosing subjects and vassals 

 for guarantee* has changed by little and little since 

 the sixteenth century, till it it now become an establish- 

 ed rule to solicit foreign powers to take on them that 

 office : Hence our modem guarantees, which, after all, 

 are perhaps more frequent than useful. 



II. Of Tacit Covenanli, Cmtom, and Analogy. 



Tx-it cart- 1 A* eapiess consent suppose* words, or signs whii-h 

 . have the same value as word*, so tacit consent supposes 

 actions, which, though not the signs substituted for 

 words, ptove the will of the party that make* use of 

 them. By these are formed what we call tacit cove- 

 nants. They have the same force as express cove- 

 nants, with regard not only to the nature of the obli- 

 gation they produce, but to their irrevocability also. 

 There are an infinity of actions from which we may de- 

 duce cooaint to what is of a transitory nature ; and 

 there are lo actions by which a power engages itself 

 tacitly for the future. But for an action to produce 

 this effect, it muster*, have been undertaken or omit- 

 ted freely and knowingly ; trcoml, the party must have 

 believed himself in duty bound to act thus; or, at 

 least, third, the action must be of such a nature that it 

 cannot be omitted, or committed, once, without giving 

 the other petty right to require its continuation fur 

 ever after. 



n these three drcumstancn, or at least the two 

 ret concur, one tingle action is enough to prove a ta- 

 cit consent ; a repetition of it serves only to facilitate 

 mad strengthen the proof. 



2. A unjrU action, absolutely arbitrary, or dictated 

 enK by the common principles of humanity, decency, 

 or politeness, is by no means sufficient to prove that 

 the party making use of it engages to do the same for 

 ever after, when a like occasion present* itself; nor 

 even if, during whole ages, a nation has continued to 

 ifpsat Mich sn action, can that repetition ever amount 

 to ea engeysasiit for the future : nor can it ever take 

 from one nation the right of changing it* conduct in 

 that respect as often a* it think* proper, without con- 

 Mthfair; ny. other. All that can be built on such ac- 



Tll. PANT II. 



tions is, a presumption that the nation will continue to Law 

 act as it hitherto has done as long as it does not de- , f Nations. 

 clare its intention to the contrary, and as long as cir- "^ ~ l ~" 

 cumstances do not change. This presumption may be 

 founded on a single action, if the action be of a pre- 

 sumptive nature. It is naturally strengthened by time ; 

 and a frequent repetition of actions uniformly under- 

 taken, grows at last into an established custom. A 

 custom does not consequently rest on tacit consent, 

 but on the presumed will of the party that observes it. 



One nation having a right to presume on the will of 

 another, implies an obligation on the other side to give 

 timely notice before it abolishes, or deviates from, a 

 custom ; so that no other nation may be induced, by 

 such custom, to take a step that might be contrary to 

 its interests. This obligation, although imperfect in 

 itself, has much weight with nations united by treaties 

 of friendship, and is generally acknowledged and ob- 

 served by all the powers of Europe. 



3. Analogy often forms the basis of decisions in the Anafogr. 

 affairs of nations. It is no more than the application 

 of what has been determined by the treaty or custom 

 in certain cases, to other cases which resemble them, 

 and which have not yet been decided. The weight 

 and justice of ah analogous decision depends, there- 

 fore, on the resemblance of the two eases. 



BOOK II. 

 Or THE STATES OF EUROPE IN GENERAL. 



C'n VP. I. Of the Statct of nhich Europe it compoted. 



\. UPON a view of the stater of which Europe is ofthedit- 

 composed, we see that there are some which are en- Cerent de- 

 tirt-ly free and sovereign, and others which, though g r es of 

 they pretend not to an entire sovereignty, ought ne- overeignty. 

 \ n tin-less to be consiilered as immediate members of 

 the society of Kuropean nations. For a state to be en- 

 tirely free and sovereign, it must govern itself, and 

 acknowledge no legislative superior but God. Every 

 thing which is compatible with this independence, is 

 also compatible with sovereignty, so that mere allian- 

 ces of protection, tribute, or vassalage, which a state 

 may contract with another, do not hinder it from con- 

 tinuing perfectly sovereign, or from being looked upon 

 a* occupying its usual place on the great theatre of 

 Kuro|ie. The limits or strength of a state make no- 

 thing with respect to its sovereignty; if it be totally in. 

 dependent it is sovereign. All subordinate corps, on 

 the contrary, (whether communities, cities, or pro- 

 vinces,) which form but a part of a greater corps, 

 and which, consequently, do not enjoy an entire inde- 

 pendence, are represented mediately by their sovereign 

 in all transactions with foreign powers. It may and 

 does happen, however, that the different members of 

 compound states acquire a right, not only of governing 

 solely in their own internal affairs, but of treating, of 

 their own accord, with foreign powers ; provided al- 

 ways that they adhere to the restrictions which their 

 bonds of union and submission impose. Members of 

 such states have then a right to treat each other, 

 and to be treated by other powers, as independent 

 states ; and ought to be looked upon as immediate mem. 

 bers of the society of sovereign states. Nevertheless, 

 their sovereignty not being entire, the distinction has 

 arisen of sovereign and demi-tovcreign states; but as 

 the law of nations, with some few restrictions ex- 

 il 



