LAW. 



sort, and of giving such as ought to be satisfactory, among them. 



621 



Hence the system for maintainin 



" even to states"lesj powerful ; that is to say, when such balance of power among the eastern powers of Eul of Nations. 



explanations can be given with sincerity, and when rope, among those of the west, or those of the north '"V""' 



they have been asked for in a becoming manner. Very among the states of Germany, or those of Italy; among 



'i a sovereign informs before hand the powers in the Europeans in America, &c. The same principle 



idship with him, that he finds it necessary to take may be applied to commerce, and more particularly to 



such or such measures of security. It is, in general, navigation ; but it never can be carried so far as to hin- 



only when a satisfactory answer cannot be given, that der a state from extending its commerce by lawful means, 



a sovereign pleads that independence of nations which or from augmenting the number of its ve'ssels of war at 



i i__l*i'.i. * 



lists with his giving any at all. 

 On a principle established on this custom, it is un 

 dentood that those powers who take umbrage at the 



, 



least while it does not abuse its power by exercising or 

 extending an usurped empire over the seas. 



5. Every free sovereign state has a right to form Ui R ht of 



-y armaments of their neighbours, should with other powers whatever treaties may appear to be concluding 



i _ I__A?I:.: i__ ____! t_ i . . .1 . _ ' t_;*._:__i * *^*. 



set of 



conducive to its interests, provided such treaties do not treaties 

 violate the rights of another. Foreign powers cannot absolutc - 

 force a treaty upon a free state, nor can they dispose 

 of its rights by treaties made between themselves. 



This liberty is reciprocally acknowledged by all the but often 

 powers of Europe, as far as the theory goes ; but, in controlled 



grandiscinent ; provided that the means employed are practice, first, Modern history furnishes examples by nlore 

 lawful ; that is, that they do not violate the rights of enough of a combination of powers having forced in- P owerfut 

 another. Nevertheless it may so happen, that the dependent states to accede, against their will, to treaties *' 



cede hostilities by an amicable explanation ; 

 and indeed this, to a certain degree, is acknowledged 



law of nature. 



2. Every state ha* a natural right to augment its. 

 power, nut only by the improvement of its internal 

 constitution and resource*, but also by external ag- 



pre 



nde 



of a state already powerful, and the made by the combination ; and even of their having 



put such states among the contracting parties without 

 deigning to consult them before hand. Second, In sur- 



! resulting trrin it, may, sooner or later, 

 the safety and liberty of the neighbouring 



state*. In such case there arise* a collision of rights veying the weaker states of Europe we see that they are 

 which authorise* the tatter to oppose by alliances, and far from being able to exercise that liberty in relation 

 " y force of arms, so dangerous an aggrandize- to treaties which the universal law of nations attributes 

 This right is still more essential to states which to them ; and that there are but too many of these 



form a sort of general society, than to such as are little *- t.:-i. : .: / , 



situated at a great distance from each other ; and this 

 it the reason why the powers of Europe make it an 

 essential principle in their political system, to watch 

 over and maintain the balance of power in Europe. 



8. In ail age* nations have regarded with a jealous 

 eye the diapropertiooaU aggrandisement of any one 

 amongst them. We see that many enterprizes were making treaties, 

 undertaken by aneisnt atiea*, to diminish the over- 



which, enjoying a nominal independence, 

 are really dependent on their too powerful neighbours. 

 Third, Sometimes it happens that nations have them- 

 selves contracted their liberty of making treaties, by 

 treaties they have already made with other powers; and 

 the demi-Sovereign states are subjected to certain laws, 

 which sometimes act as restraints on their liberty of 



grown preponderance of some particular state; but 

 they seem never to have made the maintenance of 

 a balance of power a systematic part of their policy. 

 The greatness of the Romans, and, since the migration 

 of the northern nations, that of Charlemagne, and per- 

 haps that of Henry V. are convincing proofs that it 

 was very long before the nations of Europe saw the 

 necessity of attending constantly to the prevention of 

 dangers of this sort. It was not till the sixteenth cen- 

 tury, when the immense addition to the power of the 

 House of Austria, and to that of the King of France, 

 roused them from their lethargy. They then began t > 

 fear that one or the other of those powers might esta- 



CIIAP. II. Of Commerce. 



I. The commerce carried on with foreign nations or com- 

 l>cing one of the most efficacious means of augment- merce in 

 ing the ease, the riches, and power of a nation, it general. 

 is of the first importance to examine what are the 

 rights of nations with respect to it External commerce, 

 that is, the commerce between nation and nation, has 

 several branches. It consists in selling the superfluity; 

 in purchasing articles of necessity, as well productions 

 as manufactures; in buy ing from one nation and selling 

 to another ; or in transporting the merchandise from the 



monarchy ; and since that time, fol- seller to the buyer, to gain the freight. 



lowing the example of England, the other nations of 

 Europe have never lost light of the system for main- 

 taining a balance of power. Some of them, however, 

 consulting their immediate interests only, have occa- 

 sionally deiated from this system. 



The greatest part of the states of Europe at present 



2. Men being by nature obliged to assist each other Liberty of 

 reciprocally, there exists a sort of general obligation commerce. 

 on them to carry on commerce with each other. This 

 obligation, however, is only an imperfect one ; it does 

 not go to hinder a nation to consult its interests in the 

 adoption of certain conditions or restrictions in the 



look upon this right of maintaining the balance of commerce that it finds convenient to carry on. Sup- 



S-.'.ll -t .1.* , 1 I* 



power, as a right that belong* to them. 



It ii for politicians to determine when this balance 

 dangler, and to point out the means of re-estab. 

 lisbing it: the history of Europe proves how many 

 ' lea it has ndergone since the beginning of the 

 .centmry 



* The principle treated of in the last section, may 

 thorise the fuwt.it of a cert 



authorise 



certain part of Europe to 

 icnt of any state 



pose even that one nation has, for a long series of 

 years, carried on commerce with another, it is not 

 obliged to continue so to do, if there are no treaties 

 or agreements which require it. Still less can one na- 

 tion oblige another to trade with it alone. It is per- 

 mitted to promise one nation not to trade with such 01 

 Filch other nation ; but, this case excepted, if two na- 

 tions think proper to trade with each other, a third has 

 no right whatever to hinder it. In this sense, the li- 



