82 



METAPHYSICS. 



Metaphy- mensity of nature, and the majesty of God ; but he 

 ' thinks that his researches may contribute to enlarge and 

 W "V ' correct his notions, that they may teach him how to 

 reason with precision, and that they may instruct him 

 in the knowledge of himself. His time, he believes, is 

 seldom employed to greater advantage, than when he 

 considers what may be the nature of his intellectual 

 being, examines the extent of his moral duties, investi- 

 gates" the sources of happiness, and demonstrates the 

 means by which it may be more generally diffused." 



We readily grant, that metaphysics have often been 

 crossly abused "; they have been disgraced by the un- 

 couth and fantastic dress in which they have been ex- 

 hibited, or by the perverted purposes to which they 

 have been directed; they have been rendered contempt- 

 ible by the quibbling of the schoolmen, and by the so- 

 phistry and scepticism of Hobbes, Spinosa, and Hume ; 

 and we may justly despair of redeeming their credit 

 with those who argue against the general use of any 

 thing from its occasional abuse. Such persons might 

 argue against the benefit of the solar heat, because it is 

 often the cause of pestilence and disease. But we are 

 firmly convinced, that in proportion as intellectual or 

 metaphysical studies are neglected, taste will degene- 

 rate, and the general energy of mind will be impaired. 

 That man is a genuine metaphysician, who dives into 

 the nature of things, who methodizes seemingly ano- 

 malous farts, and reduces to simple and perspicuous 

 rules those appearances which present to others no- 

 thing but a mass of disjointed and incongruous mate- 

 rials : the man who does this is a benefactor of the hu- 

 man species, and his memory will be honoured as such, 

 while the names of the grovelling herd, who laughed 

 at his pursuits, will be covered with sudden and ever- 

 lasting oblivion. 



How would those who pretend to despise metaphy- 

 sics have been able to stand before the acuteness of the 

 celebrated sceptics, whose names have been already 

 mentioned ? It was necessary that such men as Locke 

 and Berkeley should oppose the dangerous doctrines of 

 Hobbes and Spinosa, on politics, morals, and religion ; 

 and that such men as Reid, Campbell, and Stewart, 

 should encounter the dangerous sophistry of Hume. 

 If it should be said, that an instrument so convertible 

 to the best or worst of purposes had better be kept 

 out of the hands of the generality of men, this is as 

 much as to say that the power of reason should never 

 be exercised, because it is equally the means of disse- 

 minating truth, and of giving currency to error. If 

 any evil consciences have ever resulted from metaphy- 

 sical discussions, it is only a farther illustration of what 

 has generally been regarded as an axiom, that the cor- 

 ruption of the best things produces the worst effects. 

 Whatever has much power to do good, must, if abused,' 

 have much power to do mischief j and if metaphysics 

 have occasionally been employed to unhinge belief, or 

 to unsettle the foundations of virtue, it should be re- 

 membered, that we derive the means of cure from the 

 tarn? source ; and employ the same instruments, but 

 differently handled and applied, to erect the temples of 

 truth, happiness, and virtue. 



Ifm.nkind knew but where to stop in their re- 

 searches, metaphysics would appear the most useful, as 

 well as the most sublime science that ever engaged the 

 faculties of the human mind. But they are often 

 brought into discredit, not through any inherent defect 

 in themselves, but from '.hu restless and insatiable de- 

 sire of the mind to comprehend all mysteries and all 

 knowledge. As this attempt must necessarily prove 



unsuccessful, we may expect to see the blame laid on Metaphy. 

 the science, which has been employed as the means of sic *' 

 investigation. Let man be blamed for attempting im- "" 

 possibilities ; but let the science be respected, which 

 will carry him as far as he can go with pleasure and 

 with safety. 



Let all the absurdities, then, that have ever proceed- 

 ed from the brain of a bewildered or sceptical metaphy- 

 sician, be mustered up to sustain the arraignment against 

 the utility of ontological science, the whole host must 

 instantly give way, before the immortal works which 

 have put them down, by the judicious application of 

 the same principles which less sober or less viituous 

 men had abused. Is it not in the highest degree ungene- 

 rous, then, to remember only the evils which the abuse 

 of the science has produced, without acknowledging 

 the benefits which it has conferred, and feeling grate- 

 ful for having laid the sure foundations of taste, reason- 

 ing, and knowledge ? No man wrll doubt the utility 

 of metaphysical studies, who knows any thing about 

 them, and who is disposed to conduct his researches 

 with that coolness, and philosophic caution, which is 

 necessary to ensure success in any investigation. Let 

 no one then, be deterred from entering on this study 

 by the outcries of ignorance or prejudice ; or by the 

 misrepresentations of those who rail at what they do 

 not understand. Sicul canes ianotos semper allatranl. 

 Let those abstain from metaphysics who think that 

 they never ought to grapple with any thing that is pro- 

 found : let those avoid them, who think that there is 

 no knowledge but what is apprehended by the outward 

 senses: but let those continue to maintain the honour 

 of the science, who wish to explore the recesses and 

 resources of their own minds, who seek to be acquaint- 

 ed with the nature and essential qualities of things, or 

 who wish to know any thing of substance, its attri- 

 butes, and its adjuncts. 



Un&e anima, atque animi constet natura, vidcndum, 

 Quafiant rations et qua vi qiiaquc gerantur 

 In territ. 



But we admit that metaphysics have not only been 

 abused by faulty investigations and unwarranted as- 

 sumptions, they have also frequently been brought into 

 disrepute by the ridiculous pretensions of some of 

 their advocates. Were we to give credit to Mr. Har- 

 ris or Lord Monboddo, we should scarcely believe that 

 a man could be confident of the number of his own 

 fingers, unless he were instructed in the metaphysics of 

 Aristotle. What can be more puerile than the observa- 

 tions of the Scottish senator, when he says, that " a 

 mechanic who applies a foot or a yard to the length of 

 two bodies, and finds that both agree exactly to that 

 measure, and are neither longer nor shorter, can give 

 no reason why he believes the bodies to be of equal 

 length, not knowing the axiom of Euclid, that two 

 things which are equal to a third thing, are equal to 

 one another?" (Ancient Mdaphysics, vol. v. p. 15i.) 

 Is it not evident, that the mtchanicknew the axiom as 

 well as Euclid, and could give just as good an account 

 of it? When he knows the fact he knows the axiom ; 

 and he knows with infallible certainty, that what he 

 has observed in one measurement is applicable to all si- 

 milar ones : he, therefore, instantly and intuitively 

 adopts the fact as a general principle of knowledge. 



We do not know that our readers would thank us, 

 were we to attempt to give a complete system of meta- 

 physics. But, in truth, notwithstanding all that has 

 been done, the attempt is too vast for any individual. 

 Many have elucidated with peculiar success, particular 



