88 



METAPHYSICS. 



Hume. 



His scep- 

 ticism fore- 

 Been, and 

 obviated by 

 Berkeley. 



than a work, by which the infinite mind, who is pre- 

 sent at all times, an/1 in all pi ices exhibits to his crea- 

 tures a set of perceptions like a Wonderful picture, or 

 piece of mu.-ic, :ilw;ivs varied, but always uniform." 

 And ;>y;ain, The Vedanti-, unable to form a distinct 

 idea of brute matter independent of mind, or to con- 

 ceive that the work of supreme goodness was left a mo- 

 ment to it-elf, imagine that the De ty is ever present 

 to his work, -ml constantly supports a series of per- 

 ceptions, which iti one sense thev c.;'ll illusory, though 

 they cannot hut admit t e nality of all-created forms, 

 as Car as the happiness of creatures can be affected by 

 them." 



Mr. Stewart says, that this creed of the Hindoos has 

 not the most distant affinity in its origin or tendency, 

 to the system of idealism, as it is now commonly un- 

 derstood in this part of the world ; the former taking 

 its rise from a high theological speculation ; the latter 

 being deduced as a sceptical consequence from a parti- 

 cular hypothesis concerning the origin of our know- 

 l"dge, inculcated by the schoolmen, and adopted by 

 Locke and his followers. Whatever difference there 

 may be as to the origin of the ideal system and that of 

 the Hindoos, there can be little doubt that Berkeley's 

 principles led him to nearly the same conclusions. The 

 passage already quoted seems cleaily to prove this ; for 

 he says, " It necessarily follows, that there is an om- 

 nipotent eternal mind which knows and comprehends 

 all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a man- 

 ner, and according to such rules, as he himself hath 

 ord-.iined, and are by us termed the laws of nature." 



On this system of Berkeley was founded the con- 

 temptible scepticism of Hume. We could respect an 

 honest sceptic who erred in his researches after truth. 

 But Hume was not an honest sceptic: he had as little 

 faith in his scepticism as in the creed of his country, 

 and was actuated solely by vanity, in the attempt which 

 he made to unhinge the belief of mankind. It has 

 been beautifully observed by Mr. Stewart, that his aim 

 was, not to intern gate nature with a view to the dis- 

 covery of truth, but, by a en -ss-eiamiiiaiinn of nature, 

 to involve her in such contradictions as might set aside 

 the whole of her evidence as good tor nothing." (Phil. 

 Essays.) Berkeley having said, that matter and all its 

 qualities have no existence but in the ideas which are 

 in our own minds, Hume proceeded a step farther, and 

 endeavoured to shew that nothing could exist but the 

 impressions of our own minds ; by which argument he 

 wished to sweep away the world of spirits, and the Fa- 

 ther of spirits. This is a pitiful sophism, which Ber- 

 keley foresaw and obviated. He introduces one of the 

 interlocu ors in his dialogues ss drawing these very 

 consequences from his principles : " In consequence of 

 your own principles, it should follow, that you are only 

 a system of floating ideas, without p.ny substance to 

 support them ; and as there is no more meaning in spi 

 ritual substance than in material substance, the one is 

 to be exploded as well as the other." To this the other 

 speaker, who supports Berkeley's principles, answers : 

 " How often must I repeat, that I know or am con- 

 scious of my own being, and that I myself am not my 

 ideas, but something else; a thinking, active principle, 

 that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas? 

 I know that I, and the same self, perce've both colours 

 and sounds ; and that a colour cannot perceive a sound, 

 nor ,i sound a colour ; that I am therefore one inde- 

 pendent principle distinct from colour and sound ; and, 

 for the same reason, from all other sensible things and 

 inert ideas. Farther, 1 know what I mean when I af. 



firm, that there is a spiritual substance, or support of Metaphy- 

 ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. *'" 

 But I do not know what is meant when it is said, that *"~Y^ m ' 

 an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it, and sup- 

 ports either ideas, or the archetypes of ideas." And 

 afterwards he says, " My own mind and my own ideas 

 t have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of 

 these, do immediately apprehend the /> >xi.l>iliii/ of the 

 existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther. 'from my 

 being, and from the dependency I feel in myself and 

 my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, uecetiurily infer 

 the existence of a God, and of all created things in the 

 mind of God." 



Dr. Reid (whom we have heard called the Newton 

 of pneumatology ) admits, that Berkeley's system was 

 perfectly incontrovertible, according to the received 

 doctrines respecting the origin of our ideas. He em- 

 ploys a distinction which Berkeley himself had intro- 

 duced, and says, that although we cannot have an idea 

 of matter, as an idea can exist only in the mind, yet 

 we may have a notion of it; as Berkeley himself ad- 

 mits, that though he cannot have an idea of God. yet 

 he can have a notion of his existence. But Reid says 

 this only to combat Berkeley's pretended dtmonstra- 

 tion of the impossibility of the existence of material 

 substances : he does not attempt to prove the actual 

 existence of matter, but assume- it as an axiom which 

 cannot be proved, because there is no trulh plainer 

 than itself. Now. though we do not pretend to say 

 that Descartes was completely successful in his attempt 

 to demonstrate the existence of a material world, yet 

 we certainly do think him completely successful in de- 

 monstrating the pusxi/ii/ily of its existence. He admits Descartes 

 the possibility of Berkeley's "system, though no one had demon- 

 then promulgated it to the world ; for he says he con- s 'r a 'es that 

 ceived it possible, that his waking thoughts and sensa- the exist " 

 tions might be of the same nature with those which matter ; s 

 passed through the mind in sleep, which he knew could p ossi bie. 

 not proceed from external objects. His maxim being 

 to doubt of every thing till it was proved by demon. 

 strat:on, his first ground of doubt as to the existence 

 of the external world is stated in these words : " Quod 

 nulla iinqiiam dum vigilo me senlrre crediderim, (jiice non 

 rt/am inter dormicii'/um jiosxim aliqncindo jmtare me sen- 

 tire : cuniqne ilia qncc sen/ire mihi v/di-or in sumnis, non 

 ere dam a rebus extra me poxitis mild advenire, on adver- 

 iebam quart- id potius crrderem dp iix qiice sentire mihi 

 videor -ig'/amio. Mrdilalio xrjcta." This is certainly 

 giving all due advantage to the system which he was to 

 oppose. He then proceeds to state the arguments which 

 induced him to believe that matter might exist. He 

 says, that whatever we can clearly conceive is possi- 

 ble ; that we are conscious of certain faculties of the 

 mind, such as sensation, imagination, and the like ; 

 but that we cannot conceive these to exist except in an 

 intelligent substance. In the same manner, we are 

 forced to recognize certain powers, sued as motion, 

 change of shape, and the like, which we must also 

 consider as belonging to some substance, otherwise they 

 would be inconceivable. But it is evident these powers, 

 of which we have such a clear conception, must belong 

 to corporeal or extended substance ; for they are incon- 

 ceivable as applied to mind. 



We are not sure that any thing more satisfactory has 

 been written in answer to Berkeley, than these argu- 

 ments of Descartes, which were written so long before 

 he was bom. In fact, they appear to us to give exact- 

 ly the same evidence for the existence of matter, as we 

 have for our own existence ; and this is, on all hands, 



