E T A V II V S I C S. 



91 



- knowledge, being mere 



-_-**'_- sensation in its origin, should ever become any thinsj 

 """"*" bat sensation, t>y any after process. .Such a trs: 



would not be a change, but a magical transformation ; 

 in consequence of which, sensation must hare been anni- 

 hilated, and a new set of ideas must have sprung out of 

 nonentit ing can be more decisive than this: 



yet this author is not a materi .'. ,t. 1 fe seems to adopt 

 the opinion of Berkeley ;*rithout, however, mentioning 

 his name, or all ml ; Tor, in a subse- 



quent part of the same paper] he makes the following 

 observations. ' The materialist* believe that the 

 ground i* all their own, when we admit that all the 

 faculties of the smil may be reduced to the sense* ; and 

 the tfhilHmlitU think their cause essentially injured by 

 this concession. In this instance, both parties are un- 

 der tlie influence of prejudice ; for what is that matter 

 of which the one is so fond, and the other so much 

 afra any lkig tltt Hum am tttrmUagr of ten- 



mii-ntal error of matrrialnm lie* in 

 confounding the sentient substance with some of its 

 particular sensation*: and the state of the soul with 

 the soul itself. It would be absurd to say that the soul 

 is white, or black, or cold, or hot : t leas 



absurd to say, thar These are 



all sensations which the soul frls, but they are not the 

 aoul itself: and every one of these sentation* I m*y 

 cease to feel, yet my soul will not, on that account, 

 eeae to exist t." 



TZZlL. Tb * * ernr * ** rnch 

 "-"'-> from thriTexcessiv. love of g, 



ld snnplified th. phfloaophv of,h. 

 'all 



p 



S*JM 



i !, :,. , 



- MM mm .1 UBI 



Hclmiu*. 



grand inlet of knowledge ; and 

 h have thus barn '"*4*ml 



into the mind, various com|v>und* art formed, the con- 

 Mnent parts of which have ,. 



The doctrine venr evidently points out a farther aim- 

 plification ; ,f, since Locke's ideas of reflection are on- 

 ly mollifications of the ideaa received by sensation, it 

 naturally enough follow* that every idea of the human 

 mind may nllaaaiilj be referred to sensation, 

 these principles Helvetius constructed his system, and 

 referred all the phenomena of n. 

 aanaation, which he calls . 



logins, very iniphaosophicanyWr.!.* be per- 

 mitted to think, to prove that memory i* only auction 

 ned. We hava elsewhere called 

 a kind of ctmlinmmt merrtftiom, by whi> 



the retention of the original kba ; but we 

 to ineroory much more important purpose* than 

 it aippua* the place of inatinct ; ai J when variou* 

 object, at* printed to the mind, if they have ever 

 in review before it at any other time, the me- 

 by Frmilattmg the qualities of each, nubias the 



Metdphy- 



iir*. 



mind to form an immediate decision respecting them, 

 liut in all Uiis there is no sensation : on the contrary, 

 memory and sensation cannot exist together, on any " 7* "~ 

 principle of philosophical propriety: the memory, we memot'v 

 believe, merely exhibits the signs of past sensations; tadjudg. 

 and when these happen to excite an uncommonly live- mem with 

 ly interest, so that the original feelings are reproduced, sensation, 

 we could not, in strictness of speech, call that memory ; 

 intense feeling ; it is, in the strictest sense of the 

 word, senation. 



mpiele his plan, he has only to prove next, that 

 judgment is a modification of sensation. And he makes 

 supposition : A quec tion is agitated, the object of 

 which is to decide, whether Justice or Generosity 

 be the most useful qualities in the ruler of a state ? 

 And he attempts to prove, that this moral question 

 is decided on the principle of sensation. For how, 

 say* he, would the orator, or the poet, represent 

 this subject? The orator, he remarks, will present 

 to the imagination three pictures: in the one he will 

 exhibit a just king condemning a criminal, and causing 

 him to be executed : in another, he will represent a ge- 

 nerous prince, opening the door* of the prison, nd 

 striking off the fetter* from the criminal : and, in the 

 tlurd picture, he would shew the same criminal, imme- 

 diately on his escape from the prison, arming himself 

 dagger, and murdering fifty citiicns. These rc- 

 ^ntation* would instantly enable anv man to decide 

 that Justice was the most valuable quality in a nil, 

 and that it was real mercy to sacrifice one for the nafety 

 '' '"": H. ,s ai Uaiiaj tbjMaadb/MsXaslMthBkfl, 

 e sentiment which ought to arise in tle mind, by ex- 

 hibiung the visible sign* employed to represent it, he 

 tells us, in conclusion, that all this is mere sensation. 



There is, certainly, here, a groat abuse of language, 

 and a great want of philosophical precision. For our 

 part, were wa even to aaa the assassin plunge the knife 

 into the breast of hi* friend, we should scarcely think 

 that the sentiment of horror which would arise in th* 

 could be ascribed to nntibdde phyiiqur. We 

 would ascribe it to a moral sensibility ; anil are inclined 

 to think that the physical sensibility of Helvetius is a 

 phrase scarcely admissible in philosophy. 



But both he, and many other* of the French philo- Word. 

 opbers, have been misled by the material origin of the hich re- 

 words, in which even the most refined, moral; and spi- P*n P" 

 ritual idea* of the mind are expressed. We have en- r " u ' lde " 

 deavourad to shew (see Looic) that every word of ?" drawn 

 which language is composed, i* originally . picture, 1 ,' T" 

 drawn from matem! object. ; and Uut a. mind can on- Sa7 

 ly be known by certain sensible effects, its operations 

 never can be explained but by sensible image* There 

 is an obvious analogy hetwaen the progress and culture 

 of the mind, and many of the obiects of external natur, 

 between the growth of our bodies, for instance, and th 



: il M mm. rate mTun i 

 X "ras* d'abonl < 



