METAPHYSICS. 



93 



this conduct he threw away many solid advantages, 

 without gaining the shadow of a benefit in return ; and 

 his conclusion does not seem necessarily to follow from 

 his own premises. : i allowing the soul to be 



material, why -hould it, on that account, be mortal ? If 

 the Almightv could endow matter with the power of 



_', thinking, &c which Mr. Locke seems to think 



nut imply an absolute absurdity , and which Dr. 



ley reaions upon as a thing ascertained, we do not 

 see why we should > -icli a substance to be na- 



turally mortal ami perishing. In fact, we believe 

 ter to be as imperishable in it nature as mind 

 We see no process which c:ui give us any idea of the 

 annihilation of matter. We see alteration, decimiposi- 

 . lissolution, and all this without the loss 

 of a single integrant particle of the original mass. We 

 do not, however, mean to say, that either mind or mat- 

 ter are naturally and independently immortal ; but this, 

 we say, that nothing but the same power which called 

 them into existence can reduce them to annihilation. 

 Yet we hold it ab*urd to talk of any created niostfcnce 

 M naturally and essentially immortal ; for, if we might 

 presume to assign any bounds to the power of tl 

 mighty, we would say it was limited by this, that he 

 could 'not make any created substance independent of 

 UnstM. 



We hare perhaps said more than enough of Priest* 



ley, who is unworthy of notice as a metaphysician ; 



and whose character as philosopher must rest on hi* 



physical researches. He had an acute mind ; but he 



he error which has misled many incipient me- 



teians ; for he thought that he needed < 

 draw from his own resources ; and that, the province 

 of mind being always accessible, he might find in his 

 own store* those materials of knowledge which others 

 eek by painful study in the works of the learned. 

 Such a tern per has its advantages ; but the}- are near. 



unterbalanoed k>y opposite inconveniences For 

 whilst, on the one hand, the fcstfWssness of discussion 

 which distinguished Priestley may occasionally strike 

 nut new light*, and lead into a path Cation 



hitherto uiuttempted ; there is, on the other hand, a 

 danger that the I unacquainted with what 



"then have already done, may be wasting its strength 

 . rning phantom * which have alre.i mtfd 



down. i,r to erect a fabr: . already 



been comtnsctr , inrtsj|ihisrisn should be ac- 



nli the labours of hts predecessors : and 

 with their knowledge, combined with his own 

 pendence of thinking, he may hope to extend the 

 boundaries of <-icn earn welUdeservrd Inu- 



reN. in the ample field presented to him by \\wjirtt 



Metaphy- 



sic*. 



C*adiiijc Of all the French philosophers, Condillac has obtain- 

 ed the highest applause a* a commentator <>n I 

 and indeed it seer' 

 Locke's writing* arc known in I .at leant all the 



opher ' . without ex< 



adopted hi* interpret. it" . ; though 



they are very far from being agreed as to the conse 

 quenccs which may be deduced from it. " Give me 

 matter, and nii.tion," said Descartes, " and I will make a "Y"" 

 world." " dive me sensation," (.'ondillac seems to eay, 

 anil I will make a man." In his Essay on the Origin 

 of Human Knowledge, there is often much ingenuity, 

 but there is fully as much of confident assertion. He 

 lav* great stress on attention, and makes it a principal 

 in .riimert ill transforming his ideas of sensation into 

 those which we are accustomed to call ideas of reflec- 

 tion. He seems to have given the cue to Mr. Stewart, 

 and some other succeeding philosophers, to consider 

 iil/i-iiti'.n as an original power of the mind ; though we 

 think it is neither more nor less than a natural or arti- 

 ficial interest lent to the affections. Condillac lias also 

 made great use of the principle of association, as the 

 means of effecting a transmutation of sensations into 

 ideas the most recondite and profound. This was also 

 :-and arcanum of Hnrtley's system, -which was 

 |M:I .i-lu-il alter Condillac's Ettui sur I'Origine del Con- 

 Hniitancft Hnmaine* ; yet we do not mean to say that 

 it was borrowed from it. It seems to form an unavoid- 

 able article in every system which assumes sensation 

 alone as the origin of human knowledge, and therefore 

 may be claimed as common property by all who hold 

 this creed. 



This coincidence between the opinions of Condillac 

 and Hartley has been observed by Mr. Stewart ; but 

 there is a still more striking resemblance between their 

 physiological theories, which he ha* not noticed. " I 

 suppose here, and in other places," says C'ondillac, 

 that the physical cause of the perceptions of the 

 mind, is the concussion of the fibres of the brain ; not 

 that I look upon thin hypothesis as demonstrated; but 

 that it seems the best adapted for explaining my 

 thought. If this is not the way they are produced, 

 it must be m some other, not very different manner. 

 f-'nr I/if brain can he oaed vix> only by motion. There- 

 fore, whether we suppose the perceptions are octv 

 e<l In the concussion <>t tin- fibres, or by the circula- 

 tion of the animal spirits, or by some other cause, it is 

 all tile name t-> tin purpose of this discourse." Nu- 

 gent's Translat 



lint the truth is, that the more we extend our know- 

 ledge of the hi-tory of philosophy, we will be the 

 more struck with tin- -iinilarity of opinion*, and the 

 apparent want of originality among the different au- 

 thors In most cases, these ooincioWces are tl" rllirt 

 of ignorance a* much as of imitation : for, not know- 

 ing what has been done before them, many writers 

 ne to tread in the track of their predi < e,sors, and 

 think, all the while, that they are enlightening the 

 world with original deliveries. 



Mr. Stewart le.m* towards the opinion of Cudworth, Stewart. 

 and others who maintain that certain ideas, which ne- 

 ver could enter the mind by sensation, are generated 

 by a process of reasoning, or spring out of the natural 

 !* tit' the understanding, Cudwurth compares 

 the visible universe to a well-written book, which con- 



" We hare the idoa of moltn- and Mmtl*, 

 ao ' it being arpoMiUe fur u, by the eootempla 

 > MM iTKetnt of nutter fitlt dtipoaed. power 

 rial atomec, it beiig. in nwfitl to oar notion*, 

 aprndd M matter a laruli T of thinking, than tli 

 | f t. We think wme at the idra. adrancrd ii 

 th w can be >uti of any ilium, bccaoac we do n 

 : ie a contradiction, tlial a thing c 

 , or hot aadc 



ich impl 

 dmuldb 



il>h iliall ncrrr be able to know, whether my mere material King thinki or 



- .. t ,'..':!". r i ; :; "' : '" i li' < 1"" n 



f and think, IT die joined. Mid fixed to matter o disputed, s thinking imnmte- 

 MH irrnco from oar romprrb*n<ian to caaeeife, that (itxl ran, if he pleues 

 Id wpcndd to k iMthtr sofavtooe*. with a faculty of thinking." Book IV. t !,.:!. 

 igs nnwunht of Ixicke. Aeoonling to tin. wajr t' reaaoniog, we can DPTCT aaj 

 extent of A Inu^lit j power. We are lurrly warranted to uy, that notliing can 

 .ng at the aame time ; and we on just ueauly conceive, that 

 J sad lulid, at the HUM instant, u that """ ibould be matter, or that matter 



