METAPHYSICS. 



Deficiency 

 f Locke's 

 doctrine 

 printed out 

 bj Leibnitz 



Extended 

 view of per 



tffl'lOR. 



both pleasure and information to a cultivated 

 mind, but is totally unintelligible to an ignorant per- 

 son, or a brute. " To the eyes of both, the same cha- 

 racters will appear ; but the learned man, in those cha- 

 racters, will see heaven, earth, sun, and stars ; read 

 profound theorems of philosophy or geometry ; learn 

 ,H pr.it deal of new knowledge from them ; and ad- 

 mire the wisdom of the composer; while to the other, 

 nothing appears but black strokes, drawn on white pa- 

 i>er. The reason of which is, that the mind of the 

 one is furnished with certain previous inward anticipa- 

 ul instruction, that the other wants." 

 ' In the room of this book of human composition, let 

 us now substitute the book of nature, written all over 

 with the characters and impressions of divine wisdom 

 and goodness, but legible only to the intellectual eye. 

 To the sense both of man and brute, there appears no- 

 thing else in it, but, as in the other, so many inky 

 scrawls ; that is, nothing but colours and figures. But 

 the mind which hath a participation of the divine wis- 

 dom that made it, upon occasion of these sensible de- 

 lineations, exerting its own inward activity, will have 

 pot only a wonderful scene, and large prospects of 

 other thoughts laid open before it, and variety of 

 knowledge, logical, mathematical, and moral, display- 

 ed ; but also clearly read the divine wisdom and good- 

 ness in .every page of this great volume, as it were 

 written in large and legible characters.'' This passage 

 contains nearly a summary of Mr. Stewart's doctrine, 

 which he thus briefly explains in his Philosophical Es- 

 says. " All our simple notions, or, in other words, all 

 the primary elements of our knowledge, are either 

 presented to the mind immediately by the powers of 

 consciousness and of perception, or they are gradually 

 unfolded in the exercise of the various faculties which 

 characterize the human understanding. According to 

 this view of the subject, the sum total of our knowledge 

 mat/ undoubted!!/ be said to originate in sensation, inas- 

 much as it is by impressions from without, that con- 

 sciousness is first awakened, and the different faculties 

 of the understanding put in action." At the same 

 time, he admits that this enunciation is liable to the 

 grossest misconstruction, as is exemplified in the crude 

 notions of Locke's French commentators. 



That many important truths, which cannot be trac- 

 ed to sensation, in the sense in which Locke under- 

 stood the word, gain admission into the human mind, 

 is perfectly apparent, when we consider that mathema- 

 tical truths are eternal, and necessary, and are forced 

 on the mind by an intuitive conviction, and not in con- 

 sequence of the experience which we have had of their 

 certainty. Tliis was early perceived by Leibnitz, who 

 says, that if Locke had been careful to distinguish be- 

 tween necessary or demonstrative truths, and those 

 with which we become acquainted by experience and 

 induction, he would have perceived' that the former 

 could only be proved by a power of intuition inherent 

 in the human mind ; and not by a reference to any 

 knowledge already acquired by the senses. This is a 

 commentary rather than a translation ; but we think it 

 sufficiently expresses the sense of the author. Si 

 Lockius discrimen inter verilates neccssarias sen demon, 

 stratione perceptas, ct eas qua; nobis sola inductions in. 

 nolescunt, satis considerassel ; animadvertissct nece.isa. 

 rias non jv.xse comproliari, nisi ex principiis mcnli insi- 

 tit ; cum sensns quidcm doceant quid Jiat, ted non quid 

 necessario fiat. 



For our part, though we certainly do not think that 

 mathematical truths can be referred to sensation in the 



sense in which Locke understands the word; for they 

 derive no confirmation from experience, being as con- klcs - 

 vincing the first time they are presented to the mind, "* ""V^ 

 as after a hundred repetitions ; yet we think they may 

 find easy access to the mind by perception, in the ex- 

 tended view whk-h we are disposed to take of it. For 

 we maintain, that perception not only makes us ac- 

 quainted with the existence of external objects, but 

 with those circumstances which, in process of time, 

 come to constitute mathematical science. By percep- 

 tion, we not only discover the primary qualities of 

 matter, such as extension, figure, &c. but we discover 

 proportion, equality, resemblance, number, relation, 

 analog}', and the like. When equal objects are pre- 

 sented, we see that they agree ; when unequal, we see 

 that they differ : and out of a few incontrovertible 

 axioms, which the mind admits the moment they are 

 presented to it, we erect that fabric of mathematical 

 Knowledge which is supposed by many to constitute 

 the chief glory of the human understanding. Dr. 

 Reid, on several occasions, seems willing to extend the 

 boundaries of perception, and to allow it all the hiflu- 

 ence which we contend for ; and we have only to re- 

 gret, that he does not prosecute his views to their le- 

 gitimate consequences. Towards the conclusion of his 

 Inquiry into the Human Mind, he says, " Every oper- 

 ation of the senses, in its very nature, implies judg- 

 ment, or belief, as well as simple apprehension. Thus, 

 when I feel the pain of the gout in my toe, I have not 

 only a notion of pain, but a belief of its existence, and 

 a belief of some disorder in my toe which occasions it ; 

 and this belief is not produced by comparing ideas, and 

 perceiving then- agreements and disagreements ; it is 

 included in the very nature of the sensation. When I 

 perceive a tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives ^ 

 me not only a notion, or simple apprehension of the 

 tree, but a belief of its existence, and of its figure, 

 distance, and magnitude ; and this judgment, or belief, 

 is not got by comparing ideas, it is included in the 

 very nature of the perception." 



In the rapid sketch which we have attempted to give Descartes 

 of the progress of metaphysical science in modern tl.e father 

 times, our attention was necessarily led to Descartes as of meta- 

 the founder of the modern school of metaphysics. phyi- 

 Those who came after him, and who have taken the 

 lead in such discussions, have done little more than 

 modify or alter some subordinate points ; whilst the 

 grand pillar of the system, the doctrine of ideas, re- 

 mained untouched : and Dr. Reid has very justly ob- 

 served, that the system which, till his time, was gene- 

 rally received, with regard to the mind and its opera- 

 tions, derives not only its spirit from Descartes, but its 

 fundamental principles; and after all the improve- 

 ments made by Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and 

 Hume, may still be called the Cartesian system. The Male- 

 first of these philosophers must always be mentioned tranche, 

 with respect as an original and profound thinker, and 

 as a valuable contributor to the philosophy of mind ; 

 though we have not brought him forward in chronolo- 

 gical order, having been Carried along with the cur- 

 rent of dominant opinion, which has thrown his writ- 

 ings aside, and consigned to neglect many elegant and 

 valuable speculations. Indeed, he is so independent 

 that he could scarcely be brought into the train of any 

 other author : and he is so singular that he has had few 

 followers, and has failed to establish himself as the 

 head of a sect. The leading feature in his doctrine is, 

 that the .causes which philosophy investigates are only 

 occasional causes, and that God himself is the efficient 



