M E T A P PI Y S I C S. 



95 



Meuphy- an d immediate cause of every effect cognisable by our 

 *** senses or our reason. It had been -tuted before his 

 time, that we are completely ignorant of the manner 

 c '_ ,\. ' in which phys-'cal causes and effects are connected ; 

 and that we aw nothing but a constant conjunction, 

 and invariable sequence. This i- a doctrine which af- 

 terwards brought considerable celebrity to the name of 

 Hume, who is still by many supposed to have been 

 the first who illustrated and explained it. But it was, 

 in fact, unfolded at great length, and with great inpe- 

 imity, by Malebranche, whose dtictrine of occasional 

 cauift hinge* upon it. He supposed that what we call 

 second causes nave no existence, and that the divine 

 power, incessantly and universally exerted, is the im- 

 mediate cause of all the phenomena of nature. In this 

 conclusion, he went farther than his premises warrant- 

 ed : for though we cannot discover any necessary con- 

 nection between physical causes, and the effects which 

 follow, we are not therefore authorised to conclude that 

 such connections are impossible. At all events, we 

 may safely affirm, that the French metaphysician who 

 introduced the immediate agency of the Deity in every 

 e change that takes place in the universe, is more 

 fully warranted in bis conclusion, than the English 



sceptic, who, from -not 



ving any 



ry link 



Iietween preceding and subsequent plm>uteia, would 

 have wished to persuade his readers, that they had no 

 ground to infer, from any thing which they saw, the 

 existence of an all-powerful in 



In fact, Dr. Clarke seems to have entertained nearly 

 the *ame ideas a* Malebranche respecting the law* of 

 nature. " The coarse of nature," says he, " truly and 

 properly speaking, i* nothing but the will of God pro- 



built a theory of perception on the 

 for as, according to his system, the 

 of the Deity was interposed in carry in: 

 effect every volition of the mind which prompted to 

 bodily action, it was no lew natural to conclude, that 

 every perception was the elect of an immediate divine 

 illumination. Hence he concluded, that the idea* of 

 things exist only in the divine mind, and that wv tee 

 all tkmgi in God; a notion which has often been 

 ruled, and scarcely ever adopted by any succeeding 

 but which bears a strong resemblance to 



of the opinion* of the latter PlatonisU. and more par- 

 ticularly to the system of some Hindoo philosophers, 

 which we have already stated in the words of Si 

 liam Jones. According to this system, the universe is 

 to be considered rather a* an energy than as a work ; 

 by which the infinite mind, being everywhere always, 

 exhibits to the mind* of sentient beings a set of per- 

 ceptions like a wonderful picture. 



Theiy.ttm The occasional cauttt of Malebranche were attacked 

 of Ixitmitx. by Leibnitz, to make way for hi* doctrine of pre-etta- 

 tktktd kanmmy, and tuflSntnt rtaton. It was objected 

 that, according to Malebranche, every phenomenon in 

 the universe was a miracle ; an objection which is ol. 

 viated by the regular course of nature ; the disturb- 

 ance or interruption of which constitutes a miracle. 

 We are surprized to find a modern author*, of great 

 metaphysical acumen, joining in the cry against Male- 

 branche, and opposing his doctrine by such arguments 

 a* these : " Occasional cause* are consistent neither 

 with the omniscience, nor with the omnipotence of 

 God. The acts of the Deity must be supposed a* per- 



fect as possible. It is not to be imagined that infinite M- 

 ]x>wer is continually employed in sustaining and re- *"* 

 pairing the tottering fabric of a crumbling edifice the -""Y"""' 



constitution of the material world. It would, 

 indeed, be to detract from the Divine Majesty, it' we 

 admitted thi> doctrine, and believed that * curintut tt 

 pknui nrvotii /Jew was perpetually busied in correct- 

 ing the errors of his original plan, and in preventing 

 the destruction of his own works." If mi better ar- 

 guments than these can l>e produced against the 

 tern of Malebranche, it may be pronounced to be un- 

 answerable: for they are all drawn from the wont 

 source of reasoning that can be conceived, \i/. that of 

 measuring the omnipotence of Go<i by the limited 

 powers of man. The objectors to Mali 

 tern represent the universe as a machine contrived and 

 set in motion by the wisdom and power of God, and 

 rendered capable of continuing its operations in i 

 quence of the* constitution which it lias received from 

 omnipotence. Tliis is to us inconceivable : we do not 

 pn-tcnd to comprehend the operations of the Almigh- 

 ty ; but we believe his presence constantly necessary 

 for the preservation of every created thing ; and that he 

 could not make any thing capable of ade- 



pendent of his immediate power: for this would be to 

 communicate his eternity and self-existence ; which 

 implies a contradiction : and the principle of cow// 

 lion, according to Wolff, the disciple and expounder 

 eibniu, is the test of truth. 



can conceive an engine, contrived hy human 

 skill, and put in motion by mechanical means, to be 

 perfectly independent of the inventor. A mill, for in- 

 stance, will continue in motion for ever, unless the ma- 

 terials give way, or the supply of water fail. The 

 principle applied by the mill-wright may be said to be 

 of perpetual operation ; and when once employed has 

 no farther dependence on him. But this reasoning is 

 totally inapplicable to the eternal workman, who form- 

 ed the stars of heaven, and laid the Ioun-l.it inns ot' the. 

 earth. The existence of the materials which compose 

 the universe, and of the laws by which they arc mutu- 

 ally affected, depend continually upon the will of him 

 by whom they were created and ord;ii:u-d. He is the 

 only principle of life and motion in the universe; ami 

 wherever the laws which he I, : appointed uru in ope- 

 ration, we perceive his age:; 



Perhaps Malebranche wan precipitate in sonic of IMS 

 conclusions; perhaps) some invi.-. , lie in- 



terposed to link together the pin lure. 



But, even admitting the possibility of this, it is only 

 discovering another link in the chain 

 hangs from the throi irrnal. In t':.-t. th< 



tern of Leibnitz does not appear to be essentially dii- 

 ferent from that which he opposes ; ami, where it doe* 

 differ from it, it seems to be worse, and savours 

 Urongly of fatalism than the other does of i nthusiasin. 

 We pas* over his system of monads, which he has bur- 

 rowed or stolen from Pythagoras and either ancicn' 

 losophers, to consider that part ine which was 



intended to meet the arguments of Malebranche. h 

 may be thus abridged: " As we are always able to as- 

 sign the causes of every event with which we are )>cr- 

 fectly acquainted, so we may assume it as true, th.it 

 every thing exists for a sufficient reason; and that if wr 

 knew all the facts, we could always tell why . 

 thing happens as it docs, rather than otherwise. There 

 being, then, a sufficient reason for every thing, and for 



Sb William DrummoDtL 



