METAPHYSICS. 



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tion between the object and the mind. Correctly speak- 

 ing, we can form no conception of any connection txct-pt 

 between the outward object and the bodily sense*. Hear- 

 ing is produced by undulations or pulsation* of the air on 

 the ear; taste by the application of sapid substance* to the 

 palate; vision by a picture on the eye, &c. Here, then, 

 we perceive an evident connection between external 

 object* and the organs of sense: but still the distance 

 between the impression* on our organs, and the sensa- 

 tion* of our minds i* immeasurable ; and we consider it 

 s* perfectly unphilosophical to talk of either an object 

 or any image being present to the mind. \\ ho can fix 

 the locality of a spirit, or say that it can even be in 

 contact with a material substance ? Or how can a spi- 

 ritual substance be affected by any thing but a spirit ? 



These are question* which no man can answer ; yet 

 we see that particular objects produce, with infallible 

 certainty, particular sensations in our minds. But these 

 impressions on oar IMIMI are merely signs t-"Htrit 

 by the author of oar nature to call oar attention to ob- 

 ject* which it is our interest to pursue or avoid, and 

 which may promote or impair our happiness. 



By following the train of oar own conceptions, we 

 hswe been led to BOOM condations not very remote, we 

 apprehend, from the opinion* of Malebranche and of 

 Leibnitz : for though their system* are professedly op- 

 posed to earn other, we do not f tee that they differ 

 widely on the point m question. But all that we mean 

 to say i* this, that after examining, with the utmost 

 minuteness, the mechanism of the senses, sad snowing 

 the organic affection which talus place when a sensa- 

 tion is produced, we are s* far M ever from being able 

 to connect mind with matter, or to ascertain the way in 

 which they mutually affect each other. Such an inter- 

 course, however, i* ntshHshlJ by the author of our na- 

 ture: but there is no chance that we shall ever get be- 

 hind the scenes, so as to be able to discover every part 

 of the machinery, till me Atnw tfcritW oftku mortal coil; 

 and oar soul* are disengaged iron the 

 brancet, which at present dog an 

 rations. 



All that we know for certain, i*, that when impres- 

 sions are communicated to the senses, they are at the 

 same instant imparted to the mind : and we conclude 

 - done immediately, how complicated soever 

 the machinery may be which is pat in motion by the 

 external impression. When, for instance, we handle a 

 cube, or a (lobe, we receive immt&mlt intimation that 

 we are handling an extended substance, distinct from 

 oar own bodies. There is not the most distant founds- 

 tion for the supposition of any image being interposed 

 to make the object apprehensible by the mind ; and we 

 do not tee that H makes any material difference, though 

 the objects be placed at a distance ; they are still con- 

 nected with the tenses by certain sensible intermedia, 

 which bring then into contact, when an immediate per- 

 Motion is produced in the mind. We conclude, then, 

 without the smallest hesitation, that external etuUmct it 

 Of ieisissVifi object of perception, and not the result of 



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99 



. or of the interposition of images or ideas, 

 of which no man was ever sensible. 



In short, we do not think that there ever was a phi. 

 l"*P aiu * d*f which, with such a slight foundation, 

 exerted socfa mflswnce orer the himai understanding, 

 it least, a. old a. Plato, perfectly conformable to 

 hi. poetical genius, which delighted in analogical and 

 netaphorical illustrstion*. He suppose* s man to be 

 lying bound in a dark cave into which some rays of 

 B**t swi isdrnmsd through an aperture. These wv, 

 fall on the side of the cave to which the eyes of the 



prisoner are directed. In the meantime, a number of Mcta|*y. 

 persons or objects, in passing, intercept part of the *'<* 

 li^ht, and their shadows are cast on the opposite side of S ""V~ > ' 

 the cave. These shadows, and not the things them- 

 selves, are perceived by the prisoner. In the same 

 manner, Plato conceived that the senses perceive not 

 the things themselves, but only the image* pf them. It 

 is evident that all this is mere fancy ; yet we do not 

 think that the doctrine of idea* has any better founda- 

 tion to support it. 



Descartes, like all the old philosophers, took it for 

 granted, that what we perceive must be either in tla- 

 mind itself or in the brain, to which the mind, as he 

 supposed, i* immediately present : for this purpose, he 

 fixed the seat of the *ouf in the piu,iil gland. 1 f objects 

 are perceived in the mind, Hume argue* fairly enough, 

 that the mind must be extended ; for we cannot con- 

 ceive how the idea of extension, (which, according to 

 Descartes and his follower*, i* an image of the original, ) 

 can ever be in an unextended substance. And, as for 

 the teal of tkt toal, were not the subject now exploded, 

 we would recommend it to the ridicule of the poet, ra- 

 ther than to the discussion of philosophers. At <>m- 

 time, however, it occupied no tmall space in their spe- 

 culations, and it thus ridiculed by Prior in hi* Alma. 



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llrrt Matthew aud, 

 , in pras the mind 



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Tl-T ssjr. (for. b SMdmitfa. ibe> nsk 

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And, foot that seal rf iboagbt, diapenses 

 Her oracsn pkstuic to the senses.** 



Dr. Reid had the honour to be the first who called in Dr. Reid 

 question the Cartesian doctrine of ideas ; and, in our the fir.i 

 opinion, his success ha* been complete. We have adopt- mho c lled 

 ed his conclusions without adhering to bis train of ar- in I"**' " 

 gument ; for we think his opinion* need only to be r 

 known, to derive illustration from a thousand different 

 sources. We make no pretensions, then, to any disco- 

 veries of our own on this subject : we were trained in 

 hi* doctrine* under his illustrious pupil ; we therefore 

 lay claim to nothing but the illustration, and even this 

 coincide* in many instances, as might be expected, with 

 that of lit id. 



We have said that the impressions made on the tense* 

 sre merely signs which the mind interprets with infal- 

 lible certainty. These sign*, Dr. Reid remark*, are the 

 lsn(nK* * ""ture to man : and, a* in many respect* it 

 ha* great affinity with the language of man to man, so 

 particularly in this, that both are partly natural and 

 original ; partly acquired by custom. Our original 

 or natural perception* are analogous to the natural 

 langMBgr of man to man ; and our acquired percep- 

 tion* are analogous to artificial language, which, in 

 our mother tongue, is got very much in the same 

 manner with our acquired perceptions. When we per- 

 ceive that this i* the taste of cyder, that of brandy ; 

 that this i* the smell of an apple, that of an orange ; 



