100 



METAPHYSICS. 



Metaphy- that this the noise of thunder, that the ringing of bells ; 

 sics. t j,j s t i, e sound of a coach passing, that the voice of ;i 



S """"Y" W friend; these perceptions, and others of the same kind, 

 are not original, they are acquired. But the perception 

 ivhich we nave by touch of the hardness and softness 

 of bodies ; of their extension, figure, and motion, is not 

 acquired, it is original. 



" Experience teaches us, that certain impressions upon 

 the body are constantly followed by certain sensations 

 of the mind ; and that, on the other hand, certain de- 

 terminations of the mind are constantly followed by 

 certain motions in the body ; but we see not the chain 

 that ties these things together. Who knows but their 

 connection may be arbitrary, and owing to the will of 

 our Maker ?" Such are the words of Dr. Reid ; and 

 we think he need have no hesitation in declaring, that 

 every thing which depends on the will of the Almighty, 

 as sensation, and every thing else undoubtedly must, is 

 most certainly arbitrary, and determined by nothing 

 but his own free will. This is nearly an identical pro- 

 position : and it is certainly the most obvious of all 

 truths, that whatever the Almighty does, he does it be- 

 cause he wills it. This is equally true of man : but 

 there is this difference in the general result, that the 

 will of Deity never can be influenced by extrinsic mo- 

 tives ; for he is all-sufficient and independent ; and 

 contingent motives in his case are wholly incomprehen- 

 sible. Every thing is different, in this respect, with 

 regard to man ; he does what he wills, but his will 



sation : habit alone enables us to judge of the quarter 

 from which it conies, and of its being referable to ex- 

 ternal causes. If any man will stand blind-folded in 

 the middle of a room, and allow his most intimate ac- 

 quaintances to walk repeatedly round him, without 

 speaking, and afterwards stand still and address him, 

 he will not know, for several trials, the position of the 

 speaker. It is evident, too, that it is only by experi- 

 ence that we learn to refer smell to odoriferous particles, 

 issuing from external bodies ; and that we might have 

 had the sensations of taste without the application of 

 sapid substances to the palate; for nothing is more 

 common than to have a particular taste in the mouth, 

 without being able to ascribe it to any external cause. 

 Nay, it is habit alone which makes us refer particular 

 sensations to particular senses ; and, were it not for 

 this, we could have no conception of any existences but 

 our own sensations; excepting always the sensations 

 which arise from touch, and which lead us at once to 

 the conception and knowledge of something exter- 

 nal. 



In short, we conceive the mind to possess in itself all 

 those capabilities which are roused by an excitement 

 applied to the senses ; but we cannot tell how : this 

 only we believe, that it is immediate and instantaneous, 

 however complicated the machinery may be which is 

 interposed. Who can tell how many muscles must be 

 put in motion before a smile or a frown can be depicted 

 on the human countenance ? Yet the sensations of 



Metaphy. 

 eics. 



must necessarily be influenced by various motives over joy or anger are no sooner felt, than a visible portrait. 



which he has no controul. 



Those things which appear natural to us, must be 

 arbitrary to God : we call that natural which continues 

 to retain the qualities, and present the appearances 

 which we have been accustomed to observe in it. We 

 refer, then, both the natural signs of our sensations, 

 and our power of interpreting them to the will of our 

 Creator, who had only to say, " Let such things be, and 

 such qualities exist," and forthwith the connections 

 which we see were established ; which may be called 

 necessary connections, inasmuch as they must necessa- 

 rily continue till the will of the Almighty shall change 

 or suspend them. 



Dr. Reid farther observes, that " we know nothing 

 of the machinery, by means of which every different 

 impression upon the organ, nerves, and brain, exhibits 



ure of them is displayed on the countenance. To ac- 

 count for the explosion of gunpowder by the applica- 

 tion of a spark of fire, would require a complete know- 

 ledge of pneumatic chemistry, and of the constitution 

 and properties of the atmosphere : yet, notwithstanding 

 of all this, the ignition and explosion appear simulta- 

 neous. So we believe it to be with the impressions on 

 the senses; t fie sensation they produce; and the perception 

 which acompanies it. in the case of touch they are 

 simultaneous ; and they soon become so, or appear to 

 be so, with regard to the other senses ; for as soon as 

 we have learned that they are excited by external 

 causes, which no man can avoid learning, the impres- 

 sion, sensation, and perception, are produced at one and 

 the same time. 



Perhaps we have gone far enough on the subject of 

 ideas, as our object is merely to give our readers some 



The touch 

 is the only 

 one of our 

 senses 

 which 

 makes us 

 immedi- 

 ately ac- 

 qua nted 

 with the 

 exter 1 

 world. 



its corresponding sensation; or of the machinery by ,._ , 



means of which each sensation exhibits its correspond- notion of the questions generally agitated by metaphy- 

 ing perception. We are inspired with the sensation, sicians ; and, as far as in our power, to furnish them 

 ami we are inspired with the corresponding perception, with the materials for forming clear conceptions, and 

 by means unknown. And because the mind passes accurate opinions respecting them. We have dwelt the 

 immediately from the sensation to the conception and longer on the doctrine of Reid respecting ideas, as his 

 belief of the object which we have in perception, in the writings form, in fact, a new sera in the philosophy of 

 same manner as it passes from signs to the tilings sig- mind in this country ; we mean Scotland, for his works 

 nified by them, we have therefore called our sensations seem to be very little valued, or known in the southern 

 n* of external objects." division of the island. Indeed we cannot help think- 



' ing it a matter of regret, that the fame of Reid is now 

 almost absorbed in that of his pupil Dugald Stewart ; 

 not that we think this philosopher snworthy to occupy 

 the very highest rank among ancient or modern pneu. 

 matologi^ts ; but we are persuaded he himself will re- 

 gret, should even his own fame obscure that of his mas- 

 ter, whose merits and achievements in mental philoso- 

 phy he has blazoned with so much eloquence and 

 affection. 



With regard to Mr. Stewart himself, we have only 



st S' 



We have stated the doctrine a little differently ; and 



have made the impressions on the organs of sense the 

 tiynx by which certain sensations in the mind are ex- 

 cited, and by which its attention is, at the same time, 

 directed to the exciting cause We might have had 

 all the sensations which we now possess, those arising 

 from touch excepted, without any knowledge of an ex- 

 ternal world. By the experiments first made by Che- 

 selden, and subsequently confirmed by many others, it 

 appears that visible objects, when first presented to the 



eye, do not appear exti-mal to it ; they seem to be in to say, that we consider him as the most elegant and 

 k: they present merely a variously coloured picture to juilicious philosophical critic at present in existence, 

 the mind. In the same manner, sound is a mere sen- His merits, as yet, appear chiefly in explaining and 



