METAPHYSICS. 



103 



Mctaphv- nal, self-existent principle, which is also absurd ; for if 

 **** change and chance be essential to it, they should ope- 

 ^""V"*' rate always, which is not the case. 



The philosophy of Epicurus is atheistical, though he 

 himself, and many of hi* followers, admitted the exist- 

 ence of a God. But this was merely to save appearan- 

 ces, and to escape the inflictions of the law, which was 

 particularly severe sgainst Atheism in all the heathen 

 states ; indeed, the prevailing error was quite of an op- 

 posite description, snd ran into the extreme* of Poly- 

 theism and idolatry. This error, pernicious as it u, 

 is, nevertheless, infinitely more excusable than Athe- 

 ism : for Polytheism may easily arise out of wrong con- 

 ceptions of the attributes of God, whilst Atheism can 

 only spring oat of the most criminal inattention to the 

 evident displays of the divine power, goodness, and 

 wisdom. 



Epicurus and his followers, whilst they admitted a 

 God, denied his providence, and endeavoured to shew 

 bow the world could be made without Him. This they 

 achieved by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which, 

 moving from all eternity, were, at last, by some mira- 

 culous accident, jumbled into the present goodly order 

 of thing*, (see Alomkal Philosophy.) This hypothesis 

 i* too absurd to have any supporter* in modern time*, 

 snd yet it i* as rational a* any other system which ex- 

 clude* the agency of Deity in the formation and go- 

 vernment of the universe. 



Another Atheistical hypothesis is, thst the present 

 order of thing* i* eternal, and that one thing has pro- 

 duced another in infinite succession. An infinite suc- 

 cession a partepoit, might, in one sense, be admitted, 

 lor we can easily connive an order estabhshed by the 

 :ghty which shall never have an end. But an in- 

 finite loecession a farie ante, i* absurd, fur it would im- 

 ply thst infinity i* made up of finite part*, and that it 

 nay be increased or diminished, which i* a contradic- 

 tion. If the series of cause* and effect* was infinite 

 thousand years ago, it is more infinite now, for it ha* 

 numberless additions. Here, then, would be 

 which is not yet infinite. Or, viewing it 

 the infinite series was complete a thou- 

 tar* ago, then, in that case, we have an infinity 

 which is already terminated, which involves an abaur- 



But, leaving the absurdities snd impieties of Athe- 

 ism, let any man out hi* eyes on the visible creation, 

 and on the various object* of nature, and without en- 

 tering into any speculations ss to the uses and end* of 

 particular parts, U t him ask him wit this plain question, 

 cnce arose this order of things?" To (oppose them 

 eternal, would be to make them self-existent, immuta- 

 ble, indestructible ; in other words, it would be to sup- 

 pose that they had necessary existence, snd that the 

 very (apposition of their destruction would involve an 

 impossibility. But how ill do any of these attributes 

 apply to any of the objects of the visible universe ? In- 

 stead of being immutable, we see them every moment 

 ahU to change ; instead of being indestructible, we 

 have no difficulty in conceiving their utter annihilation : 

 indeed, we cannot conceive bow they should be kept 

 from it, but by the sustaining influence of Him who 

 created them, lor God himself cannot make any thing 

 independent of himself. 



U hence, then, had the world its beginning ? It could 

 not exist without a cause ; for this is the property of a 

 self distent snd necesrwy being, which, as has already 

 been seen, the world i* not, neither could it be the cause 

 of its own existence, for, ia that case, it must have act- 



ed before it was, which is impossible. It must owe its Metaphy- 

 existence, then, to a being, self-existent, uncreated, eter- "'", 

 nal : and this being we call GOD, who created all things ""V"" 

 by the v/ord of hi- jxiwer, and who has informed us in 

 the records of inspiration, that a time shall come when 

 the elements shall melt with fervent heat, and all things 

 shall be dissolved into their original non-entity, or 

 moulded into new forms and modes of existence, by the 

 Jiat of the Almighty. 



All the ancient philosophers held creation, in the Tbeancknt 

 sense in which it is now generally understood among phikwo- 

 thristians, to be impossible. It was an axiom with them, P heni be ~ 

 that nothing can be produced o*t of nothing ; nihiljtt ft '**" 

 IM'/IJ/U. On this principle all that they allowed to the tlerna i. 

 agency of the Deity, was the arrangement of pre- exig- 

 ent materials, and the moulding of an eternal material 

 substance into the form which it now exhibits in the 

 visible universe. This is liable to all the objection* 

 which we have already stated. It gives to matter a ne- 

 ceeawy existence, and, of course, represents its destruc- 

 tion as impossible. The doctrine of Spinoza is the le- 

 gitimate offspring of this axiom of the ancients. He 

 saw, that to make matter eternal, was to invest it with 

 the essential attribute* of Deity ; but, instead of being 

 staggered by this consequence, he made it the founda- 

 tion of his theological system ; if that can be called theo- 

 logy which i* founded on the notion of a material 

 Drily. He held, lhat no being can communicate any 

 thing but its own nature to another ; taking it, there- 

 fore. for granted, that the material world exists, he 

 thought that it followed, of course, that it must have 

 proetedsd from a material origin. 



There cannot be a grosser mistake than to suppose, 

 that the Supreme Being can be compared to any thing 

 which we obseie in the visible universe. Aristotle, 

 though no great theologian, yet avoided such an unphi- 

 lusuuhkal notion as this. For, whilst he admitted that 

 the Deity was the first mover of all tliini:-, he laid it 

 down as n incontrovertible maxim that he himself ws* 

 iinnssrvsid, prusouu esnst nulia eti origo. Instead of 

 being essential to hi* nature to posses* the qualities of 

 -ible substance, his essence i* to be conceived as 

 directly opposite to e\ cry tiling that is cognizable by 

 our sense*. Every object in nature may be increased 

 or diminished, but God is infinite, and admits of nei- 

 ther increase nor diminution : every tiling that we see 

 .ililc, but n-it/i dd thrre it no variableneu nor 

 tkaJom u/ turning ; in short, hi* essential attributes can- 

 not be imparted to any created being : the very idea of 

 a creature exclude* the possibility of such communica- 

 tion, for, if it is created, it cannot be sdf-exitent and 

 eternal. None of our faculties can enable us to form 

 any thing like an adequate conception of the nature of 

 God ; nny, they necessarily lead us to form wrong con- 

 ceptions of Him. We can judge of tilings only l>v com- 

 parison, by number, measure, or weight, lint to what 

 hall we compare God ? We may compare the flame of 

 a candle to the light of the sun, or a grain of sand to 

 the globe of the earth, or to the masses of matter whic'i 

 compose the heavenly bodies ; for, however vast the 

 difference may be, there must be definite proportions 

 among all created thing*. But God is infinite, and can- 

 not be compared with any object which we liave ever 

 seen, or with any standard which our minds have ever 

 conceived. The only idea that we form of infinity, is 

 by adding continually till the amount exceeds our 

 powers of comprehension, and then we fancy that we 

 have a conception of something which is infinite. But 

 it i* a contradiction in term*, u has already been shewn, 





