104 



M E T A P H Y S I C S. 



Metaphy. 



sics. 



to suppose an infinity constituted by the endless addi- 

 tion of finite parts. 



This, however, we may know with certainty, that we 

 daily see and feel the operations 6f an infinite eternal 

 being, and this is sufficient for our purpose, and for in- 

 spiring confidence and hope, though the nature of God 

 be unsearchable, and his ways past finding out. We 

 imagine, indeed, that we can form some idea of the 

 manner in which the Almighty actuates and pervades 

 universal nature, by comparing it with the way in which 

 the soul actuates the body, and communicates its influ- 

 ence to its various organs and members. This analogy 

 or illustration has been employed in almost every coun- 

 try where any discussion has taken place respecting the 

 nature and operations of the Supreme Being. Hence 

 he was called the anima nwndi, by the ancient philoso- 

 phers ; and the poets taking up the same idea, repre- 

 sented all things as full of God. Jovis omnia plena. 



It is perhaps a legitimate illustration to say, that as 

 the soul actuates the body, so God actuates the frame 

 of nature. But beyond this we cannot advance a step 

 with safety; for we shall soon find that the comparison 

 must utterly fail. Our souls and bodies are only a 

 part of the general machinery of nature, (if we may 

 use this expression,) put in motion and upheld by the 

 hand of the eternal workman. We may, then, infer 

 with infallible certainty, that he is wise, and powerful^ 

 and good ; in the same manner as we can judge from 

 effects, that these qualities may belong to human 

 agents : but the motives which influence men to the 

 practice of virtue can afford us no explanation of the 

 counsels of God. He works in us to will and to do of 

 his good pleasure : the motives which impel us to ac- 

 tion are exceedingly various, and very often beyond 

 our control : they are often entirely unforeseen ; and 

 the most important events in the history of our lives 

 frequently arise out of circumstances unexpected, and 

 apparently accidental. All this is entirely inapplica- 

 ble to God. He acts of himself alone, and never can 

 be influenced by external motives, since all things are 

 ordered by him, and are dependent on him. 



From what we have already said respecting the na- 

 ture of God, we think it must follow by necessary con- 

 sequence, that there can be but one God. One infi- 

 nite being excludes the possibility of any other pos- 

 sessed of equal or independent power. Hence God, 

 in order to give the Israelites the most impressive idea 

 of the unity of his nature, made himself known to 

 them by his attribute of self-existence. For when Mo- 

 ses asked his name, he commanded him to say to his 

 countrymen, " / am hath sent me unto you." 



As God is infinite, self- existent, and eternal, he is 

 also unchangeable. Every change in any being is a 



Eroof of imperfection, even though the change should 

 e for the better : for a being susceptible of improve- 

 ment cannot be absolutely perfect But God is Ike 

 Immutabi- same, and changelh not. No addition can be made to 

 lity ef God. his knowledge or happiness, he can therefore have no 

 reason to wish to change : and as there is no power 

 superior or equal to his own, there can be no necessity 

 which can compel him to change. None of those cir- 

 cumstances which produce a change in human conduct 

 can have the slightest influence with God. We are 

 often compelled to change our purposes, because they 

 have been planned in ignorance, and circumstances 

 which we could not foresee have rendered them im- 

 practicable. The most pernicious of all absurdities 

 would be laws and regulations which could not be al- 

 tered. Such, we read, was the case with the laws of 



Unity o 

 Gad. 



the ancient Medes and Persians ; and the only conse- Metaphy. 

 quence of such regulations must have been to obstruct sics - 

 the improvement of the human race in happiness and '""""V" 

 knowledge. But nothing can ever occur to induce 

 God to alter his purposes ; for they were not formed 

 after the manner of the short-sighted plans of mortals. 

 They are always founded at first in infinite wisdom, 

 and with a perfect knowledge of every thing that is to 

 come to pass, and therefore there can be no reason why 

 they should ever be changed. When we see a nation 

 at one time prosperous and successful, and at another 

 discomfited and depressed, and when we ourselves ex- 

 perience alternate vicissitudes of gladness or sorrow, 

 we must not suppose that these outward changes of 

 fortune proceed from any change in the counsels of 

 God. He has always the same object in view, viz. 

 the happiness or improvement of men ; and he adapts 

 his dispensations to their circumstances, according as 

 they need encouragement, correction, or assistance. 



We have already alluded to the argument which Dr. Dr.Clarke'g 

 Clarke employs to prove the existence of a God. Itarguracnt. 

 arose out of some sublime metaphysical ideas of Sir 

 Isaac Newton, respecting the nature of the Supreme 

 Being. He had said, non est duratio et xpatium, sed 

 durat et adest, &c. Dr. Clarke conceived, that in 

 space and duration he had got hold of two qualities, 

 which, as they could not belong to any created sub- 

 stance, must be attributes of the necessary self-exist- 

 ent being. We give the sum and substance of his 

 doctrine in his own words. " The supposal of the 

 existence of any thing whatever, necessarily includes 

 a pre-supposition of the existence of space. Nothing 

 can possibly be conceived to exist, without thereby 

 pre-supposing space ; which therefore I apprehend to 

 be a property, or mode of the self-existent substance ; 

 and that, by being evidently necessary itself, it proves, 

 that the substance of which it is a property must be 

 also necessary." 



We most willingly do justice to the many profound 

 and enlightened views which occur in Dr. Clarke's 

 Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God : but 

 we think his main argument rests on a false f'ounda. 

 tion. So far from space being necessary to the exist- 

 ence of every thing, mind, with its affections, has no 

 relation to it: and, with the exception of the ideas 

 which arise from touch, we might have had every 

 other idea, feeling, and affection which can enter the 

 human mind, without being so much as able to form 

 an idea of space. Where was space when there was 

 nothing else but the Deity ? It was then a non- 

 entity ; and it is still so ; never having had any actual 

 existence ; but possessing the potentiality of admitting 

 the existence of every created thing. In short, space 

 is a mere privation ; and we might as well assign a 

 real existence to silence, because it has the potentiality 

 of admitting sound, or to darkness, which has the po- 

 tentiality of receiving light, as ascribe reality to space, 

 which has merely the capacity of admitting the exist- 

 ence of material substance. It has been said, that we 

 cannot conceive the annihilation of space : annihilate 

 matter, and we cannot conceive that space can have an 

 existence. It exists only in our conceptions ; and is as 

 foreign to the nature of God, as the passions and feel- 

 ings of men, which never can be predicated of the di- 

 vine essence. 



Mr. Locke says, that though a man were placed at 

 the utmost conceivable verge of creation, yet he would 

 still be able to thrust out his hand beyond himself: 

 and hence he argues that space is infinite. It would 



