MILITARYTACTICS. 



265 



H lt"-T. 



Mtrl- 



Ch,,. , 

 XII. 



w r. 



a general were more complicated and more difficult. 

 Conde, Luxembourg, Marlborough. Eugene, and a few- 

 other generals of transcendent talents, were able to 

 move these masses ; but men of inferior genius sunk 

 under the weight. 



Sufficient justice, we think, has never been done to 

 the talents of Marlborough, unquestionably the first 

 commander of his age. The consummate skill which 

 he displayed in the conduct of large armies ; the cor- 

 rectness of his eotip-faeil in chusing positions, and dis- 

 covering the weak points of the enemy; his quickness 

 in detecting the faults of his antagonists, and the rapi- 

 dity with which he took advantage of them; above all, 

 the uniform and brilliant success which attended all his 

 enterprise*, attest the pre-eminence of his military ge- 

 nius. But neither Marlborough, nor any of the other 

 generals of his time, can be considered as inventors in 

 the art of war. They may have made a more <>; 

 skilful use of the principles already established ; but 

 none of them appear to have introduced any thing new, 

 either in the organization of armies, or in military tac- 

 tics. 



At this period a great schism prevailed in the opi- 

 nions of military men, with respect t the change* ne- 

 cessary to be introduced, in consequence of the use of 

 fire arms. All Europe waa divided on the question, 

 whether the dense order of the am t to be re- 



jected, m exposing the troop* too much to the destruc- 

 tive effects of a This question was discussed 

 in various writings, without producing any settled con- 

 viction. The Chevalier Folard proposed his column*, 

 as the fundamental and almost exclusive order for in- 

 fan try ; and hi* opinion gained many partizans. The 

 army, in short, was on the point of resuming the pike, 

 and forming the phalanx. The war of the Suco 

 and that of 1733, were conducted upon these unsettled 

 principles ; the battalions forming on a depth of from 

 tour to six, and the officers of the old school demanding 

 the resumption of the pike, which Vauban had brought 

 fato disuse. 



We now approach that period, however, when the 

 science of military tactics assumed a more decided and 

 dentine form. Under Charles XII. the Swedish sol- 

 diers were still animated by the same spirit which they 

 had manifested under Gutavus. Hi- infantry, hardy 

 and indefatigable, in a state of discipline as perfect as 

 the Roman legions in their best times, and commanded 

 by excellent generals, who possessed considerable 

 knowledge of modem manoeuvre*, performed actions 

 which ,-tnnihed Europe. But Charles was too limited 

 in respect of his means ; and his career, however bril- 

 liant, wn- to enable us to form a perfect esti- 

 mate of v have been capable of accom- 

 plish : stance* ; and he has even 

 left us in doubt regarding the extent of his knowledge, 

 and the powers of his get 



Meanwhile, a new kingdom was formed nn the tanks 

 flf the Oder and the Spree, whose sovereign* havii.. 

 tber commerce nor maritime jxiwcr. devoted themselves 

 to the creation of a formidable military force, which 

 should enable them to assume an imposing att 

 among the European powers. Frederick 1 1 . completed 

 tin- olnn which h:ul l>een chalked out by his predeces- 

 He not only doublet! the niimlxr of his troops, 

 Ixit irnpr.. line, and invented a sy< 



tactics mlnvxt entirely new. He was perfectly well ac- 

 quainted with the state of the military art among the 

 ancients, and employed his genius in discovering and 

 bringing to perfection such manoeuvres as were best 



TOL. JUT. PAT. I. 



adapted to modem warfare. His efforts were amply Hliton-. 

 rewarded by his first successes in the field. But even '*"~Y"~ 

 during peace these efforts were not relaxed. He form- 

 ed camps at Spandau and at Magdeburgh ; exercised 

 his troops continually in the most scientific and effect 

 live movements ; rectified whatever experience shewed 

 to be defective ; and introduced an incredible degree 

 of decision and celerity in the execution of all the ne- 

 cessary manoeuvre)). 



During the seven years' war, the efficacy of discip- 

 line and tactics, under the conduct of genius, was fully 

 evinced. In the war of manoeuvres, as may easily be 

 conceived, the king "f Prussia was eminently success- 

 ful. He was frequently defeated in pitched battles ; 

 but lie seemed to rise, like Atra-us from the earth, with 

 I'roh vigour and renewed courage ; and it was remark- 

 ed, that he never was more formidable than w hen his 

 enemies believed him to have been effectually crushed. 

 Such was the* state of discipline to which he brought 

 the Prussian troops, that they frequently made forced 

 marches, lost a battle, left In-hind them the greater part 

 of their cannon, and took up a position at the distance 

 of a couple of leagues from the field where they had 

 been defeated. 



But the merit of the king of Prussia does not rest en- 

 tirely on the improved di-ciplinc of his troops ; hii ge- 

 as equally occupied with the scientific principles 

 of military movements; and the Prussian t;i 

 accordingly been considered as forming an a-ra in mili- 

 tary history. Frederic shewed that the movements of an 

 army of 100,000 men may be reduced to rules as simple 

 as those of an army of 10,000 ; and that having once dis- 

 covered the spring which regulates the movements of a 

 single battalion, it is only necessary to combine a number 

 of these spring-, and to handle them with skill. He has 

 been considered as the real inventor of light, or flying 

 artillery; but his inventive genius chiefly distinguished 

 itself by his improvement of the oblique or angular or- 

 der of battle, the principles of which he studied pro- 

 foundly, and cart-fully explained its mechanism to his 

 gei'i raN. 



From the time of Frederick, it does not appear to us 

 that any very important improvements have been made 

 in military tactics. During tin- late wars, indeed, the 

 French adopted a mode of fighting in gome respects 

 new; but this was a necessary consequence of the clta- 

 racter of their troops, and their imperfect state of d 

 line. Instead of lines, that could with difficulty lie pre- 

 served in the face of an enemy superior in discipline to 

 themselves, they formed close, columns. Their battles 

 also were reduced to attacks on certain points, and 

 sometimes on one only. By brigades constantly suc- 

 ceeding each other, and frw-h troops supplying the 

 place of those who had been driven hack, they general- 

 ly succeeded ultimately in forcing the point attacked. 

 In their movements, w-hatever was lost in regularity 

 and precision, was amply compensated by increased ve- 

 locity. To the rapidity, indeed, with which their 

 movements were executed, they were indebted for much 

 of their success. They also derived great advantage 

 from the employment of numerous bodies of lighl 

 troops of various descriptions, and the improved and 

 extended use of flying artillery. In their battles, too, 

 ncrally kept a large body of reserve, composed 

 of the best troops, and commanded by an able general, 

 which, on more than one occasion, was the means of 

 recovering a battle which waa considered as loot. 



The French likewise introduced considerable changes 

 in the subordinate arrangements of the army during a 



