266 



MILITAEY TACTICS. 



Hiatofy. campaign. Their wants were supplied by requisition ; 



''"""IT*'"' and when they entered a country, they had little or no 

 baggage. By abandoning the old system of forming 

 depots and magazines, they certainly exposed their 

 troops to famine, want, and disorder ; but with all 

 these inconveniences, they appear to have reaped very 

 important advantages from this mode of supply ing their 

 armies. Their movements could not be anticipated 

 from the magazines they had formed, and the position 

 of their depots ; and their route was not liable to be re- 

 tarded by the attention which it would have been ne- 

 tessary to pay to these objects. The inroads of the 

 French armies, therefore, were unexpected, and their 

 progress rapid. They calculated only upon success ; 

 and they generally obtained it by the celerity of their 

 movements, and the boldness and enterprise of their 

 plans. At the same time it must be observed, that as 

 they generally put every thing to hazard, and neglected 

 or despised those precautions which frequently mitigate 

 the consequences of bad success, their defeats were al- 

 most always attended with the most disastrous results. 

 Excepting under Moreau, and one or two other ge- 

 nerals, who were attached to the principles of the old 

 school, we seldom find a French army making a skilful 

 and scientific retreat. 



The apparent want of discipline among the French 

 troops, their frequent abandonment of the ordinary 

 principles of tactics, and their extraordinary successes, 

 have induced many superficial writers to talk lightly 

 of the whole system of tactical rules and regulations, 

 which science has suggested, and experience improved. 

 We suspect, however, that they have not paid due at- 

 tention to the real state of the circumstances. The 

 truth is, that, excepting at the earliest period of the re- 

 volutionary war, the French troops never wanted dis- 

 cipline, but, on the contrary, they possessed that requi- 

 site in a very high degree. They had also the advan- 

 tage of a great number of skilful officers, educated in 

 the very best school, that of actual service. In the 



dressing of their troops, as well as in the execution of History, 

 various manoeuvres, they threw aside every thing that > ~~Y~~* 

 wag useless or unimportant, and retained only that which 

 was essential, frequently simplifying the principles, and 

 accommodating them to the genius of the nation, and 

 the character of the troops. 



The German system of tactics, as established by- 

 Frederick of Prussia, although undoubtedly, in some 

 particulars, susceptible of modification according to cir- 

 cumstances, will still be found to exhibit the funda- 

 mental principles of military science. In this article, 

 therefore, we shall endeavour to present our readers 

 with a compendious view of those principles, following 

 chiefly the order adopted by Mauvillon, in the third part 

 of his Introduction to the Military Sciences. At the end 

 of the article we shall also subjoin a list of writers, 

 whose works we have occasionally consulted, and t 

 whom we would refer such of our readers as are desi- 

 rous of acquiring more minute information on the sub* 

 ject. 



Writers on military tactics have generally divided 

 the subject into two parts. The first, or Tactics strictly 

 so called, relates to the composition and discipline of an 

 army, and to those dispositions which are requisite for 

 its security and regular supply, and to render it efficient 

 for service, without an immediate reference to the ac- 

 tual presence of an enemy. Under this head are also 

 comprehended practical tactics, or the rules to be ob- 

 served in the conduct of detachments, and also castra- 

 metation, or the art of encamping on the field. The 

 second explains the general principles upon which the 

 operations of an army are conducted against an enemy 

 in the field ; or what is technically called Strategics, 

 This division of the subject has been objected to by 

 some ; but for the sake of method, we have resolved 

 to adhere to it, although we are willing to admit that 

 the limits of each division have not been very precisely 

 defined. 



PART I. TACTICS. 



Of the 



composi- 



SECT. I. Of the Composition of an Army. 



^VI11|HJ3I- . 



ticn of an /\ N army consists of an indefinite number of armed 

 Army. m en, assembled together and placed under a certain 

 "HT""' state of discipline, for the purpose of carrying on war. 

 It may be divided into Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, 

 and Engineers. 



The infantry consists of regular infantry of the line, 

 and light-infantry. The infantry of the line was for- 

 merly divided into grenadiers, fusiliers, and musque- 

 tiers. This division was founded upon certain differ- 

 ences in their arms and modes of fighting, and is now 

 no longer in use. The grenadiers, however, are still 

 retained in all services ; they are selected for their size 

 and strength, and are principally employed in enter- 

 prises requiring great force and courage. 



The arms of the infantry consist of the musket and 

 bayonet ; formerly they had also side-arms, but these 

 were found to be more ornamental than useful. The 

 proper length and construction of the musket have not 

 hitherto, perhaps, been precisely ascertained ; the prac- 

 tice of different nations varies in this respect ; but the 

 perfection of this weapon consists in the largeness of its 

 calibre, its durability, its projectile force, and the cor- 

 rectness with which it carries the bullet. The utility 



Army. 



of the musket, as a warlike weapon, has been greatly Of the 

 increased by the addition of the bayonet, which enables c roposU 

 troops thus armed to come to close combat. The use tlo . n .._* n 

 of the bayonet was first introduced by the French, 

 about the end of the 1 7th century, and it has since be- 

 come general. 



To enable the soldiers to use their arms, and at the 

 same time, to render the enemy's artillery less destruc- 

 tive, the infantry is placed three deep, so that they can 

 fire at once and behind each other. Each man occu- 

 pies a space of about two feet in rank and file, a suffi- 

 cient interval being left between the files to admit of 

 the freedom of individual motion. 



As in the case of individuals, all kinds of troops can 

 attack and defend themselves only in front. Every 

 number and description of troops, therefore, must be 

 placed so as to attack in front, and to be liable to be 

 attacked in front only. 



Their arms afford the infantry a twofold mode of 

 fighting. They either endeavour to throw the enemy 

 into confusion by their fire, or they march rapidly upon 

 him, charging with the bayonet, in order to break his 

 line. As the firing generally carries oif so many of the 

 troops, that a part of the line is either entirely broken, 

 or much weakened, before the armies approach near 



