278 



Strategics. 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



PART II. STRATEGICS. 



Strntegict. 



SECT. I. Of the Knowledge of the Country. 



Of the As no military enterprise can well succeed without 



Knowledge a knowledge of the country in which the operations 

 Country are to ^ e carr ' ec ^ on > ** ' s necessary that we should say 

 something respecting the best means of obtaining this 

 information. The knowledge of a country embraces 

 three things, viz. its political, economical, and mili- 

 tary circumstances. All the three are in some measure 

 useful to the soldier ; the last may be considered as in- 

 dispensable. 



This information may be obtained by means of print- 

 ed, manuscript, or verbal descriptions ; maps, charts, 

 or drawings ; or by personal enquiries. There are few 

 printed descriptions of countries, indeed, so minute 

 and accurate in their military details as is requisite for 

 warlike operations ; but in other respects they are of. 

 ten extremely useful ; and should be studied on ac- 

 count of the other material points of useful information 

 which they contain. Historical works, especially such 

 as are written with a view chiefly to military operations, 

 and also the lives of celebrated generals, are of much 

 use, and should be studied with great attention. 



No opportunity should be neglected of collecting 

 written and oral accounts of lands, whether in time of war 

 or peace. It must be observed, however, that, during 

 . war, the sources of oral accounts are frequently suspi- 

 cious, and little to be depended upon, either from igno- 

 rance or design in the individuals from whom the infor- 

 mation is obtained. To expiscate the truth, therefore, 

 requires much care, skill, and knowledge of human 

 nature. 



Maps, Maps and charts, plans and sketches, are of singu- 



charts, &c. lar use in a military point of veiw. Their value must 

 depend much on the greatness of the scale upon which 

 they are constructed, and the accuracy and minuteness 

 with which the objects are laid down. Maps afford a 

 view of entire countries, their limits, the position and 

 distance of the principal towns, the course of the rivers, 

 &c. and are indispensably necessary towards obtaining a 

 general knowledgeof the relative situation of all the parts. 

 Plans and sketches are more limited,- and when accurate- 

 ly constructed, they should give a faithful portrait of the 

 objects. A good military sketch should represent every 

 object in its real position and proportion ; it should dis- 

 tinguish the nature of the ground, the position and form 

 of the heights, the size of the plateau, the woods, ri- 

 vers, with their windings, bridges, fords, &c. Also the 

 roads, defiles, towns, villages, churches, and even single 

 buildings, &c. The name of each individual object 

 should likewise be marked. The more minutely the 

 nature of the several objects is described, the more use- 

 ful will the sketch be; because an apparently trivial 

 circumstance is frequently of importance in a military 

 point of view. 



Individual investigation may consist in the prepara- 

 tion of a sketch or description of the district, or merely 

 in making a.reconnoissance. In both cases, a practised 

 eye, and a knowledge of the military application of ob- 

 jects, are essentially necessary. 



SECT. II. Of the Plan of Operations. 



OS the plan Before an army takes the field, it is necessary to draw 

 of Opera- U p a general plan of operations, otherwise much time 



would be lost at every step in deliberating upon what 

 was to be done next. The perfection of a plan of ope- 

 rations, depends almost entirely upon an accurate know- 

 ledge of the country in which the war is to be carried 

 on. 



War may be conducted either offensively or defen- 

 sively. The former plan is generally adopted by the 

 stronger power, the latter by the weaker. 



The strength and composition of the army to be em- strength 

 ployed, must be determined according to the strength and compo- 

 of the enemy, the nature of the undertaking, and also sition of 

 the nature of the country. If it be intended to act of- the -Army, 

 fensively, the force employed must be stronger than 

 that of the enemy the more so the better. But even 

 in a defensive war, the force employed ought never to 

 be so small as to be incapable of contending with the 

 enemy. In an open champaign country, it is necessary 

 to have a considerable force of cavalry, especially to 

 enable us to carry on defensive operations with success, 

 In mountainous districts, on the contrary, a numerous 

 and effective infantry are required ; and light infimtry 

 will be found particularly serviceable. In general, ac- 

 cording to circumstances, the cavalry form from an eighth 

 to a fourth part of the whole army. The quantity of 

 artillery must depend upon the nature of the undertak- 

 ing. If there are many fortresses, a large battering 

 train will be required ; and in a country possessing 

 many tenable posts, it is necessary to have a numerous 

 field train, which must be drawn by good horses, in or- 

 der not to detain the army in its movements. An ar- 

 my should always have a large body of light troops ; 

 and although the nature of the ground may make some 

 difference necessary in the proportion of these to the 

 troops of the line, yet it is not easy to determine the 

 proportion according to any precise general rules, be- 

 cause light infantry are useful on many occasions, and 

 light horse may be extremely serviceable even on bro- 

 ken ground. 



In conducting offensive operations, two cases are to oftensive 

 be distinguished. In the first place, the object may be War. 

 to surprise the enemy, either at the commencement of 

 the war, or on the opening of a campaign. Secondly, 

 it may be intended to make an attack upon an enemy 

 who is prepared to receive us. The first case is evi- 

 dently the most advantageous ; but, in order to insure 

 success, it is necessary to keep the enterprize secret, 

 and to execute it with the greatest possible celerity. 



When it is proposed to surprise the enemy at the Surprise at 

 commencement of a war, it is necessary not only to the corn- 

 have a considerable number of troops constantly on nencemen| 

 foot, but that these troops should be in a state fit for 

 immediate service. Baggage and artillery horses must 

 be in readiness ; a large store of war ammunition must 

 be prepared in the neighbourhood of that quarter where 

 the war is to be commenced ; and magazines must be 

 formed for the maintenance of the troops. All these 

 preparations, too, must be made with such care that 

 the enemy may not be able to discover the object. 

 When all the necessary preparations have been made, 

 it must then be determined what are the most decisive 

 measures that can be accomplished by a surprise ; how 

 far we can get the start of the enemy ; and whether we 

 shall have sufficient time to execute the most decisive 

 measure, or must be content, from %vant of time, with 

 something less decisive. These questions must be de. 



