Oi ihe 



Plan of 



OperlK>ns. 



tennined according to tiie circumstances of eac! 

 Among the objects to be accomplished by a surprise, 

 are th( . flowing : Jo ge ; ZL . t |, e cne i : =1; to 



take i of one of his most important provinces ; 



pirate his army, so as to prevent it from being 

 drawn together ; to attack one of his principal 

 and force him to make peace. When none of these 

 most important objects can be accomplished, we must 



vour to obtain possession of the 



the war with advantage, by occup 

 which lead into the enemy's country, 

 selves masters of a river which opens 

 carrying a fortress w 

 In all such enterpr 



MILITARY TACTICS. 279 



If we cannot attack tlie enemy otherwise than in a Of the 



s - 



ing the passes 

 or making our- 

 into it; or by 

 ffords the key to it, &e. 

 ver, wemu-t keep in view 



the means of defence which the enemy can oppose to us. 

 These, in general, are : 1 . Fortresses ; 2. Rivers ; S. De- 

 files ; and 4. The array iticif. In the lir>t ea.-e, the whole 

 undertaking will commence with a siege of tlie mo.-t im- 

 portant fortress. The importance of a fortress depends 

 upon the advantages which the possession of it will af- 

 ford us, or the disadvantages to which the loan of it will 

 subject the enemy. Sieges, therefore, must never be 

 formed, unless, 1. When the fortresses are placed on 

 the passes which lead into the enemy's country, and 

 in wiu-h a manner that you cannot penetrate till you 

 are masters of them. 2. When they are on your com- 

 munication, and the country does not furnish the ne- 

 cessary subsidence. 3. When they are necessary, in 

 order to cover the magazines you form in the country 

 itself, to facilitate your operations. 4. When they 

 contain considerable magazines of the enemy, and such 

 as are essentially necessary to him. .-". When the 

 conquest of them is neceatarily followed by that of 

 some considerable district, which enables you to sepa- 

 rate your armies into winter-quarters in the enemy's 

 country. All fortresses which are of no essential use 

 in our farther advance, or to our safety in case of a 

 retreat, should be demolished as soon as they are 

 taken. 



Rivers and defiles may be passed without difficulty 

 in the case of a surprise ; but they should be passed at 

 sued places a* lead most safely and directly t 

 object, where posts may be established to enable us to 

 advance, or, if necessary, to secure a retreat If the 

 nature of the country be such, that it can be covered by 

 the army alone, that is, if it be an open country, we 

 must immediately push forwards towards that object, 

 which, if attained, will prove decisive of the war, as, 

 for example, the capital ; or, if that be impossible, we 

 aunt begin by occupying some tenable place, for the 

 purpose of establishing magiiinrs. of enabling us to ad- 



(urpriM at 

 the com- 



faCasv 



nHfr 



vance, or to maintain the conquered country," or to se- 

 cure a retreat. 



In the case of a surprise at the opening of a campaign, 

 we never can expect to find the enemy so unprepared 

 *u sit to*? oonuxMnccsncnt of 4% WAT* It is no 

 therefore, that such an undertaking should be pi 



ly well considered ; for as troops are called upon, in 

 such a case, to act at a season when they are exposed 

 to great hardships in the field, we ought to calculate 

 whether the probable success will compensate the cer- 

 tain expence of men and money 

 indeed, when the advantage of a few da 

 emy may be decisive ; and these should 

 looked. But when several weeks are required, it will 

 be found much better in most cases to let the troops 

 net, and wait for the time when the war may be prose- 

 cuted without any such evident waste of our resources. 



pensate te cer- 

 There are """"rrn*. 

 a few days over the en- 

 never be over- 



state of preparation, we must endeavour to penetrate t 



into tlie country in spite of his army. For this purpose, 



it will be necessary for us to force his army at that Attack o7 



point which will lead us most safely and immediately an enemy 



towards the object we have in view. This may be ef- prepared. 



1 . r>y a divei>i<m, that is, by causing an attack to 

 be made in some other quarter, so as to make him draw 

 off his troops, or weaken his army at that point where 

 we wish to penetrate. This method is generally adopt- 

 ed, when the enemy has taken up a strong position 

 which covers the whole country ; or when we wish to 

 undertake a siege, but are prevented by the strength 

 and advantageous position of the army opposed to us. 

 In order to render this method effectual, however, it is 

 necessary that we should have a sufficient superiority of 

 nd that our diversion should threaten great dan- 

 ger to tlie enemy, f . By intercepting and cutting off 

 his supplies. This may be done, by establishing posts 

 on the rivers or passes, by which he receives his provi- 

 sions ; or b jr constant attacks on his convoys and fora- 

 ging parties, which requires a great superiority in light 

 troops, especially cavalry. 3. By means of detachments, 

 whieh is a species of diversion. 4. By manoeuvring, 

 that is, by marching and countermarching in such a 

 manner as- to threaten the enemy in some other quar- 

 ter, and while he make* corresponding movements in 

 order to op|>ose us, to seise the occasion of his weaken- 

 ing the point at which we wish to force him. 5. Hv 

 bringing the enemy to a battle, which is the most sim- 

 ..II methods. But asa battle is, in many respects, 

 more liable to chance than any other military enter- 

 price, and the enemy will naturally always endeavour 

 to take up a strong position ; a prudent general will 

 rather try every other means if possible, unless he per- 

 ceives the probability of obtaining extraordinary advan- 

 tages from tiglr 



To lay down a plan of operations for a defensive TWcn^e 

 war, and to carry it into execution, are matters of much ^ " 

 more difficulty. A skilful general, therefore, will al- 

 ways endeavour to seixe some opportunity of converting 

 a defensive into an offensive war, by striking such a 

 blow as will give him the superiority over the t nemy. 

 As in a defensive war the difficulty consists in our be- 

 ing generally obliged to regulate our movements ac- 

 cording to those of the enemy, of which we cannot al- 

 ways obtain sufficiently early intelligence, it is necessary, 

 in laying down a plan of operations torn defensive war, 

 to anticipate the probable undertakings of the enemy, 

 according to the nature of the country, and to take pro- 

 per measures for opposing them. If, for example, the 

 defence of a country depends upon fortresses, these 

 must be previously supplied with all necessaries, and 

 the positions must be determined from y are 



to receive succour, when threatened. If it depends up- 

 on the defence of a river, or other defile, the positions 

 necessary for its defence, as well as the means of de- 

 fending it, must be previously taken. When tlie de- 

 fence rests upon the army itself, posts and tenable 

 places must be prepared for it ; and much prudence 

 will be required in (electing such as are most advanta- 

 geous ; otherwise the covering army must be made 

 sufficiently strong as to enable it, under a skilful com- 

 mander, to assume an offensive attitude. In a defensive 

 war, the following general rules arc also to be observ- 

 ed : 1 . We roust be in a situation to take the field in 

 such good time as to oppose any enterprise on the part 

 of the enemy. 2. Every precaution must be taken, in 



