280 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



Of the order that the army may find supplies at every point 



oLruioL l which the - v m *y be calletl b y the ^my's move. 



^^^^ ments, which is often a matter of great difficulty. Last- 

 ly, We have already observed, that a prudent comman- 

 der must avail himself of every good opportunity to 

 convert a defensive ir.to an offensive war ; the various 

 possibilities of such an event, therefore, must be antici- 

 pated, and all measures taken to make the most of such 

 an opportunity when it occurs. 



SECT. III. Of Collecting, or Droning the Army together. 



Of Collect- AN army is drawn together, either for the first time, 

 ing,- or at the commencement of a war, or during a war, at the 

 Irawing opening of a campaign, with the view of acting either 

 t (. rmy ^ ens ' ve 'y or defensively. 



"' If it be intended to surprise the enemy, at the com- 

 fensive mencement of an offensive war the troops are marched 

 War rapidly out of their quarters towards the appointed 



place of rendezvous. This place may be either on our 

 own frontier, in order to penetrate, with our combined 

 force, into the enemy's country ; or in the enemy's ter- 

 ritoryitself. in which case the troops march into it at once 

 in columns, or in divisions following each other. The 

 first plan is generally adopted, when the enemy is not 

 strong enough to oppose our combined force, but might 

 annoy particular portions of the army. In other cases, 

 the latter plan is generally preferred. 



If, at the commencement of an offensive war, a sur- 

 prise is impossible, the troops are drawn together gra- 

 dually, for their convenience, to accustom them bv de- 

 grees to the hardships of war, and to enable us to com- 

 plete our measures for the campaign. It is often ne- 

 cessary, too, to conceal the real point of attack ; and 

 for this purpose the army is drawn together in several 

 separate corps, which can be united at any time ; or ti 

 considerable extent is given them in their quarters in 

 order to unite them on any part of the line at pleasure. 

 In these measures, we must be yuided very much by a 

 skilful calculation of the distance of places, the nature 

 of the roads between them, and the capability of the 

 troops in performing marches. 



For a De- ^ n drawing an army together for a defensive war, 

 fensive we must be guided by the means we possess for con- 

 War, ducting it, and by other peculiar circumstances. 1. If 

 the post to be defended has been determined upon, we 

 may then advance towards it, strengthen it, if necessa- 

 ry, by the labour of the troops, or of peasants, and 

 cause it to be occupied by a detached corps ; or it may 

 be occupied by the whole army, whether the enemy's 

 army be united or not. 2. The choice of the post de- 

 pends upon the measures of the enemy. In that case 

 we must follow his movements, and keep our quarters 

 as much extended as is consistent with the possibility 

 of concentrating whenever the enemy's motions render 

 it necessary, and with the safety of the army. If the 

 defence of the country depends upon fortresses, the ar- 

 my may be drawn together in the following manner : 

 1. A post is chosen from which the investment of 

 each fortress may be prevented, or from whence, at 

 least, it may be succoured. In this case, however, it is 

 necessary that the army be in a condition to cope with 

 that of the enemy. 2. The army may be divided into 

 several corps, occupying strong camps under the can- 

 non of the fortresses, in order to prevent the enemy 

 from besieging them. In such a case, the cavalry is fre- 

 quently formed into a separate corps, and endeavour, 

 by constant enterprises, to put every kind of obstacle 

 in the way of the enemy. 



But if the defence depends upon a river, or other de- Of Collect- 

 file, a central post is generally chosen and occupied, ' n g. or 

 from which the passage may always be opposed ; or, if drawing 

 there be no such post, the movements of the enemy 

 niu>t be accurately observed and followed, from the -^5^ ^- 

 first approach of the quarters, until the entire junction 

 of the army ; or separate corps are drawn together in 

 front of the defile, which must always bo able to unite 

 sooner th^sn the enemy, or at least to maintaiii their 

 ground until they receive assistance; and which rr.u-t 

 be occasionally reinforced in proportion to the means 

 employed by the enemy. 



The same rule may be applied to the drawing toge- 

 ther of an army at the opening of a new campaign. It 

 must be observed, that the attacking party is generally 

 the first to collect his army : while the party acting on 

 the defensive must almost always wait to see the ene- 

 my's object before he can do any thing. On some oc- 

 casions, however, the latter party may be the first to 

 collect his army ; jf, for example, he wishes to consume 

 the provisions in a district, before the enemy comes in- 

 to the field, in order to frustrate the enterprize he may 

 have in view ; or when he is going to perform some 

 work necessary for his defence, which must be covered 

 by the army. In drawing an army toijrethpr, attention 

 must be paid to the season of the year, and also to the 

 comfort of the troops, who ought not to be exposed to 

 great hardships, until they have become habituated to 

 active service. 



SECT. IV. Of Lines of Operations'. 



Modern writers on the art of war have denominated Of Liner of 

 the chain of magazines established at the commence- Operations, 

 ment of a campaign, the Basis of military operations ; 

 and the roads by which an army receives its supplies 

 from the magazines, are called Lines of' operation. The 

 situation of the principal magazine, and the length 

 and direction of the lines of operation, are considered 

 of the highest importance. 



Single lines of operation are preferable to double Single and 

 ones, especially when the latter have an eccentric di- double, ex- 

 rection, which exposes the different parts of an army .'*' 

 to be attacked and beaten in detail. It is always of J" n J"^ f r 

 advantage, therefore, to give to our own operations an ra tion. 

 interior direction, and, if possible, to induce the enemy 

 to adopt exterior lines of operation. If it be neces- 

 sary to form two interior lines, in order to oppose two 

 lines of operation of the enemy, we ought not to sepa- 

 rate them too far; because the army acting upon that 

 which is weakest, might be attacked and beaten, with 

 such effect as no advantage obtained on the other line 

 could compensate. For a similar reason, a double line 

 ought not to be presented against a single line, nor an 

 extended line against one that is concentrated. In 

 forming lines of operation, the chief object to be at- 

 tended to is, the facility of conjunction and simulta- 

 neous co-operation. Lines of operation ought to be 

 direct, consequently such as will enable our troops 

 to march with greater rapidity towards any point that 

 is in danger, than those of the enemy, and thus to pre- 

 sent a mass to isolated parts. 



A twofold line of operations may be considered 

 good, when the enemy shall likewise have formed a 

 double line; provided the parts of his line have an ex- 

 terior direction, while yours have an interior one; 

 and his divisions being at greater distances than your 

 own, cannot unite without being previously attacked 

 by yours in mass. An army possessing lines of ope- 



