MILITARY TACTICS. 



281 



Of Line* of ration more contracted than those of the enemy, can 

 Operators, by strategical increments overpower the enemy's di- 

 "^V* visions successively, by alternately collecting the mass 

 of its forces, and attacking them one after another. In 

 order to injure the success of these movements, it will 

 be necessary to leave a small division to oppose that of 

 the enemy, which it is intended to keep in check ; 

 with orders not to engage, but to use every art to ar- 

 rest or suspend its advance, by defending the defiles, 

 heights, and rivers ; and lastly, to fall back towards 

 the army *. Hence it follows, that a twofold line of 

 operations, embracing the extremities of a more con- 

 tracted line, will inevitably be ruined, if the army, 

 acting on the shorter space, know how to profit by the 

 advantage of its situation, and the rapidity with which 

 it can act within its own line. A twofold line of ope- 

 rations, opposed to a single one, will be exposed to 

 still greater danger, if its parts are several days' march 

 sunder, because the difficulty will then be much 

 greater of uniting to resist any concentrated effort of 

 the enemy. All interior and single lines of operations, 

 therefore, will be the most secure. They offer no ad- 

 vantage to the enemy, but, on the contrary, should he 

 have the imprudence to adopt a contrary system, are 

 calculated to bring their whole mass into action against 

 his isolated divisions. 



Two interior lines of operation, possessing the means 

 of reciprocally sustaining each other, and destined to 

 face, at a certain distance, two exterior lines of an ene- 

 my, must avoid being encompassed by him within a 

 pact to contracted as to enable his divisions to act 

 simultaneously; and they must equally avoid the op- 

 posite extreme, thst of pushing their operations too 

 far asunder, because the enemy would have time to 

 crush that division which has been weakened to rein- 

 force the other, and might then make such progress 

 and conquest* as might become irresistible. 



Let us suppose an army, equal in force to its oppo- 

 nent, but acting in two or three isolated corps, upon 

 lines of operation having an exterior direction, while 

 the enemy operates in a body upon a single line ; the 

 army so divided will never gain any real advantage, 

 unl- the several corps can attack simultanr< 

 because the enemy will always have it in his power to 

 oppose double or triple the number of troops to each 

 of their separate corps. Hence, two interior lines are 

 advantageous because they can concentrate their forces 

 at will, and with greater rapidity than the enemy, and 

 consequently double their numerical stn 

 the same reason, single lines, such as have their parts 

 united, and can mutually sustain each other, are to 

 be preferred 4*. 



From these observations we may deduce the gene- 

 principle, ral principle upon which all combinations in war ought 

 to be constructed. This principle consists in congra 



gating upon the most important point of a line of ope- Of Lines of 

 rations, or of a field of battle, a number of forces supe- Operation*. 

 rior to that of the enemy. To effect this on lines of "^ "Y"*' 

 operation, marches and strategical movements must 

 be employed ; and on fields of battle, we must adopt 

 proper mana-uvres, or select judicious modes of at- 

 tack. 



As the principles we have just laid down respecting 

 lines of operation are also applicable to the manoeuvres 

 on a field of battle, we shall have occasion to illus- 

 trate them still farther in a subsequent section. Mean- 

 while, we shall only observe that lines of operations 

 have their keys as well as fields of battle; upon these 

 lines, there are decisive strategical points which com- 

 mand the remainder, and have the same influence on 

 operations, as certain points of ground have on battles. 



SICT. V. Of Position*. 



We have alceady had occasion to lay down some gene- or Pou- 

 nd rules on the subject of positions, while treating of lioni. 

 the principles of castramctation. A camp, however, may 

 be in itself exceedingly strong, and yet totally useless 

 with respect to the object in vii-w. The science of po- 

 sitions, on the other hand, exhibits the principles ap- 

 plicable to the choice of a camp the U-*t adapted, ac- 

 cording to circumstances, to the proposed object. 



In the case of an offensive war, combined with a sur- In an of. 

 prise, there is no great difficulty in chiding positions, fi-i^u.- 

 An attack in these circumstances pre-supposes superi- wlr ' with 

 ority, and all the art, therefore, which is necessary, con- * ur P ri ' e ' 

 sists in the ordinary precautions for the safety and sup- or< 

 ply of the troops, which are determined by the disposi- 

 tions of the enemy ; and with respect to positions, there 

 is almost nothing farther required, than the art of se- 

 lecting the best routes. 



Hut the art of positions becomes much more difficult against an 

 and important, when we have toact offensively against enemy prc- 

 an enemy who is fully prepared. It is then necessary P" d - 

 to determine the best means by which we may be en- 

 abled to break into his parallel. 1. If this is to be ef- 

 fected by a battle, the art of positions is of less impor- 

 tance ; because, in that case, we must attack him in the 

 poaiiiun which he has chosen ; or, if it be too strong, 

 we must endeavour to force him out of it by skilful 

 manoeuvres. 2. If it is to be done by cutting off his 

 forage and supplies, we must establish ourselves in a 

 strong position, near the enemy if possible, quite on 

 his flank, but, at all events, somewhat obliquely, in or- 

 der that our light troops may get into his rear, and in- 

 |aiU|ll his convoys. No pains should be spared in pro- 

 curing intelligence respecting his foraging parties, 

 which must be constantly annoyed by all possible meant. 

 At the same time, we must beware of exposing our 

 own parallel, which should always be secured by for- 



The wan of Frederick of Prussia aBbrd miineiuus illustrations of this principle. Bonaparte, too, almost constantly manoeuvred in 

 ato mmnn, and with Almost invariable success. He practised it at the battles of Quatre Bnu. Ligny, and Waterloo f but failed, partly 

 I naniil|.sj i of bad calculations, and partly from the activity, dull, and counge of his adversaries. 



+ Had the French Directory beta awar of thai ftmshfjisalal combination, and appreciated it* importance, their eimies of the Rhine, 

 and tbe Alcuse, would not bar* been expelled from Germany in 17fi. because they would not ban formed a twofold line of 



tot 



operation, acting in exterior dilutions. The armiea of lot Danube and 'of Italy would hkawite not bare been sacrificed in 1 709 to an 

 s. Had Wurmen reflected on the miblime lawn, of Frederick, be would not hare divided bu army by a 

 defeat of each eorpa in detail ; nor scattered bu force* to com every thing, while the enemy made the dcci- 

 upon Trent and Bassano. Had Alrinii, C'obourg, the Prince of 1 .ornin, and Brown, not mistaken these precepU, and ope- 

 rated without namHaalhm, they would not ban been beaten in detail. Looking to mil more recent ertnti, we find that the aame causes, 

 ban uniformly produced the aame eflects. The aajesupauila ban eonetaatly caused than- armiea to act on the ame erroneous principle*, 

 and she results wen aecojdincly web a* might bare been anticipated. Thus, Mack was uoUted at Ulmt the increment, at Austerlilt 

 were Mo exteaaiTe ; the three corps of Prussian*, at Jena, Weimar, and Auerstadt. were without connection ; Buxbovden and Bcnning- 

 sen woe not united at Poltaak ; the Austrian, were divided at Abendtbenr, KckmuhJ, and JUtubon. These instance*, afford meet con- 

 rnxfa, pro* of tb. troth and inpsrtaacc of tfas above obsemtiaas. 



VOL. ZIT. PART I. J M 



