Ol the fa- 



wgcof 

 Kivcrt. and 



De- 

 filet, and 

 the meant 

 of Defend- 

 ing them. 



Of prowl, 

 toft the re. 



ire.it 

 through a 



Mb. 



MILITARY 



tack it at the greatest possible advantage In such a 

 case, we may either conceal our intention, or we must 

 ,t in the f: iv of the enemy. The following are 

 the general ruii-s applicable to both cases. 1. All the 

 bagj; artillery, and all the carriages that can 



be dispensed with, should be sent far before us, to 

 some secure place. 2. A strong position should be 

 taken, clo-etothe river; and the more close, if we can 

 conceal the time only, and not the place where the 

 passage is to be effected ; but, at all event*, in such .1 

 manner that we may be able to march upon several 

 l>int- of it. 3. Behind this position, bridges should 

 be thrown, shortly before the march, and secretly, if 

 we wish to conceal the place; but otherwise, at the 

 most convenient points, and without any attempt to 

 conceal our intentions. 4. If there be positions on the 

 opposite tank of the river which can cover the passage, 

 they should be occupied with troops and artillery, and 

 strengthened, if necessary, by redoubts. 5. The pas- 

 sage should be made in a continued and orderly man- 

 ner, but w itlmut hurry, until all have passed, except 

 the detachment which' is destined to break down the 

 bridges, and which must afterwards pass over in boats, 

 6. In case of being attacked by the enemy, we must 

 make a proper u^ of all the means of defence which 

 we have prepared, without engaging with him further 

 th ..n i* necessary to secure the passage. Besides, we 

 murt endeavour, in the first cae, to seixe the first fa- 

 vourable moment to effect the pasage, and, if possible, 

 reive the enemy by fallacious movements, with 

 respect to the real |x>int. When this cannot be done, 

 we should endeavour to conceal the time, by breaking 

 up during the night, or in the midst of a thick fog. a 

 otorm, &c. and employing all kind* of warlike rtrata- 

 gem*. Notwithstanding all these precautions, we must 

 not neglect to take every measure for securing the pas- 

 sage against accidents. The rear-guard must occupy 

 all the post* that can cover and protect it, and all must 

 be prepared to assist it in case of nece- 



When it is not possible to conceal from the enemy 

 either the place or the time of the passage, and he has 

 it in hi* power to attack us at any time, it will be ne- 

 cessary to adopt the additional precaution of entrench- 

 ing ourselves in several line*, *o that when the army 

 ha* been weakened by the pauage of a part, the rot 

 may not have too extensive a line of defence. No- 

 thing should be neglected that can tend to conceal the 

 retreat. In the case of other defiles beside* riven, 

 there is tittle difference in the disposition*, except that 

 the precautions employed to cover the passage at the 

 opposite side are unnecessary, and all our attention, 

 therefore, must be turned to the rear- guard, which can 

 only be slowly succoured. 



It i* unnecessary for us to say any thing of the 

 mean* of pawing a defile, when the enemy is master of 

 both side*, and the army in attempting the passage, 

 must cut it* way through ; because this is quite a des- 

 perate situation, out of which it is almost impossible tn 

 extricate ourselves, and into which no general can fall 

 without gross errors and incapacity. In such a case, 

 we should have to contend with the twofold difficulties 

 of a retreat, and the forcible pastage of a del 

 ce** in such a case must be ascribed to good fortune, 

 and not to good conduct. 



In order to prevent the retreat through a defile, it 

 i* necetaary, 1. That we should b vigilant, to pr. 

 the enemy from effecting the passage secretly. '2. That 

 we have an accurate knowledge of the enemy'* situa- 

 tion, that we may regulate our project of attack K- 



TACTICS. 



87 



cordingly, and carry it into execution before lie has 0.' the Pa*- 

 time to effect his object ; lor which purpose we must "gof 

 drive him :i* ch.-seto the river as possible, in order that Rlvt: ". n d 



he may rot be able to conceal from us the point where ' 



* iiiiii- alci. ana 



he means to pass. 3. I hat we should make such dis- , he raeall , 



positions as will enable us to make ;in ;:ttack every O f Defend- 

 nioment. especially during the night, by keeping the m? them. 

 troop*, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, constantly in " -v^ 

 readme**, 



SECT. VIII. OfBaltlet. 



A combat between two entire armies is called a bat- Of Battles, 

 tie; when a jxirt only of the one army is engaged 

 with a part of the other, it is called an action. It is 

 not necessary for us, however, to make any such dis- 

 tinction here, as the dis|x)sitioii and arrangements for 

 both are the same, and the number of the combatants 

 makes the whole difference. U'c shall only observe, 

 that one is more easily induced to risk an action than a 

 battle, because the former is not to decisive. 



In this section, we propose to consider the reasoni 

 which should induce us to give or n fuse battle; the 

 arrangements for battle, including the order of march 

 and disposition of the troops ; the different modes of 

 attack and defence, and the consequences of victory 

 and defeat 



It is general rule, that we should never give bat- Reuonifor 

 tie, unless when we have no other means of attaining ic'iog bt- 

 our object ; or when we have much to gain, anil little tle - 

 to lose by it. The following urc some of the principal 

 raaaoni which should induce us to give battle. 1. To 

 relict c some in.portant place. 2. To enable us to be- 

 siege come important place belonging to the enemy. 



3. To cover a sie^e which has been already commenced. 



4. To drive the enemy out of a country, or, 5. To de- 

 fend a country against him. 6. To deprive the enemy 

 of an ally, or, 7- To induce an alliance with other*. 

 K When the army i* on the point of getting into an 

 awkward situation, from which it can only be saved 

 by successful battle 9- 1 f we foresee, that if we do 

 not give battle now, a jH'riod will come, in which e 

 shall be compelled to it under much more unfavoura- 

 ble circumstances. JO. \Vhen we perceive, from tin- 

 situation of the enemy, or from some errors w hich he 

 has committed, that we have it in our power to beat 

 li.ni 



To avoid a battle is to place ourselves in such a si- Reisonifor 

 tu.it ion as to make it impossible, or at least very dan- (voiding 

 gerous for the enemy to attack us. \Vc act in this baltl *- 

 manner. 1. \Vht-n it js more probable that we shall lose 

 than that we shall gain the battle. For instance, if 

 our troops are not in a good state of discipline ; if we 

 re posted on ground which is not adapted to the kind 

 of troops of which < nr ;<ri!iy < (insists; if we are weaker 

 than the enemy, or if the enemy has taken a very 

 strong position. 2. If we foresee a future opportunity 

 of giving battle in more favourable circmn-taiices ; as, 

 for example, when we expect a reinforcement our- 

 selves, or that tlir net ill !> diminished; 

 or that tli' ! to take up a bad 

 position. .". It', in general, we ran cx|)ect less advan- 

 tage from gaining the !>aitle, than we should sufler in- 

 jury by K.-ing it ; n. when the enemy's fortresses are 

 in a better state of drfenrt than our own ; when every 

 step which he n ikes in advance is laborious and ex- 

 pensive, ut iic successful battle would lay every 

 thing open to him ; when his retreat is easy, while 

 ours is dangerous ; or when, by defeat, we thouM 



