288 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



Of Battles, be deprived pf our resources, while the enemy would 

 """Y~~ ' still retain his. 4-. In all cases where we can attain 

 our object without a battle. 



When we have resolved upon a battle, we must en- 

 deavour to give it under the most favourable circum- 

 stances. For example, when the enemy are inferior to 

 us ; when his troops are discouraged, and in bad or- 

 der ; when his generals are not agreed, or when we 

 have an understanding with one of them ; when the 

 enemy is placed in a bad position, or when he is ill 

 encamped or entrenched in a position which is other- 

 wise good; when he is ill provided against an unex- 

 pected attack, whether in his camp, or on the march ; 

 or, when his retreat is difficult, and ours easy. 



When an army is desirous of giving battle, it ad- 

 vances towards the other in order to attack it ; but if 

 it wishes to avoid a battle, it selects a position, which 

 must be the stronger, the more reason it has to avoid 

 an engagement, and there awaits the attack of the ene- 

 my. It is possible, however, that both parties may be 

 equally desirous of giving battle, and therefore ad- 

 vance, and attack each other wherever they meet ; or, 

 the army that wishes a battle may await the attack. 

 In the latter case, the army takes a strong position, 

 from which the enemy must expel it, without being 

 able to do so without a battle. 



In a battle there are three things to be considered, 

 each of them in a double relation, viz. to the attacking 

 and defending party. These are, the arrangements for 

 battle, the battle itself, and the pursuit and retreat. 

 Arrange- Among the arrangements for a battle, some are com- 

 ments for a mon to both parties ; some are peculiar to the attack- 

 ing, and some to the defending party. The following 

 are those which are common to both parties. 1 . Every 

 disposition must be made to render a victory as profita- 

 ble as possible, and to diminish, as much as we can, 

 the evil consequences of a defeat. 2. The arms must 

 be accurately inspected. 3. We must have a suffi- 

 cient supply of ammunition, and take care that it be 

 not wanting at any place where it may be necessary. 

 4. We must get rid of all the baggage. 5. We must 

 endeavour by all means to inspire the troops with 

 courage and confidence. 6. The troops must be pre- 

 viously allowed to take sufficient rest and food. 7- 

 We must have a sufficient supply of medicines, ban- 

 dages, and surgeons. 



The arrangements to be made by the attacking par- 

 y, must be regulated, in a great degree, according to 

 lie measures adopted by the defending army; we 

 shall therefore speak of the latter first. 1 .. A good field 

 of battle must be chosen, where we are to await the 

 enemy's attack. The field must be adapted to the 

 number and description of our troops ; besides pre- 

 senting obstacles to the assailants, it should afford us 



battle. 



the 



the means of following up a victory; it should admit Of Battles, 

 of such manoeuvres, as, in case of our being compelled y v""'' 

 to retire, will prevent a total and ruinous defeat ; and, 

 at all events, it should afford us the means of a safe 

 retreat. For this reason, positions with strong pro- 

 jecting angles, or with defiles, especially a riverain the 

 rear, must be carefully avoided, because the loss of a 

 battle in such situations must be absolutely ruinous. 



2. Having chosen our field of battle, we must endea- 

 vour to make the best use of the advantages which it 

 affords ; our cavalry and infantry must be posted in 

 such situations where they can best act, and mutually 

 support each other ; the artillery, in particular, must 

 be placed so as to produce the most decisive effect. 



3. All the posts in front, which are calculated to ob- 

 struct or break the attack of the enemy, or cover a 

 flank, should he attempt to turn our position, (such as 

 houses, villages, heights, &c.) must be rendered at 

 strong as possible, and occupied by the proper descrip- 

 tion of troops, in 'order to produce the expected advan- 

 tage, and to present a powerful resistance to the ene- 

 my's attack. The possession of villages, in front, 

 provided they are at a proper distance to be sustained, 

 is one of the most advantageous circumstances that 

 can occur in a field of battle ; but all the advantages 

 are lost, and turn against you, if you do not sustain 

 them. Villages, when situated as above described, and 

 properly occupied and sustained, are so very advanta- 

 geous, that a general will seldom chuse to attack them, 

 but will rather mask them, and set them on fire with 

 howitzers, and chuse some other point of attack, 

 which, though in appearance less proper, will, gene- 

 rally speaking, succeed better *. 4. All the generals 

 must be well instructed with regard to the nature of 

 the position, especially that part of it, the defence of 

 which is committed to them, and also with regard to 

 their conduct in every event that can be anticipated, 

 and how they are to give and receive assistance. 

 These, again, must give similar instructions to the offi- 

 cers under their command. 



The attacking army endeavours to obtain, by all 

 means, the most accurate knowledge of the disposi- 

 tions of the enemy. If his position be found very ad- 

 vantageous, we must endeavour to entice him from it, 

 or cause him to weaken himself by detachments. For 

 the art of a general, when he is desirous of giving bat- 

 tle, consists in enticing the enemy to ground where he 

 can fight with advantage; but, at the same time, he 

 must take care not to lose in manoeuvring, the proper 

 moment of attack. If the ground be determined upon, 

 the army marches to it in several columns ; the gene- 

 ral being commonly with the advanced guard, for the 

 purpose of reconnoitring the position and arrange- 

 ments of the enemy. This position may be of a four- 



* We have a fine example of this given by the celebrated Maryborough, at the famous battle of Hochstedt, or Blenheim. His 

 Lordship had attacked several times the village of Oberklaw, but was each time repulsed with great loss. He afterwards, very judi- 

 ciously, having left a body of infantry to mask the villages, advanced, and broke the enemy's line, and thus gained the battle. 

 The French had garnished all the villages before their front, particularly Oberklaw and Blenheim, with a prodigious quantity of in- 

 fantry, expecting that the generals of the allies would attack them, and by no means presume to advance and leave them behind ; 

 but they were disappointed, and beaten, with the loss of all their infantry posted in the villages. 



Hence Jomini lays down the following rules respecting positions of this description. 1. That an army, posted behind villages, 

 must protect its front by occupying them. 2. That for this purpose, some battalions of infantry, furnished with artillery, must be 

 employed. 3. That the army must be drawn up at a convenient distance in rear, so as to sustain and be sustained by them; and 

 preserve the means of withdrawing the troops, in case the enemy should threaten to cut them of}', by successful movements in 

 another point. 4. That from the danger of being turned in such posts, and the nature of their defence, only a moderate quantity of 

 iafantry is required ; and that too much importance ought not to be attached to their preservation. 



These ideas are justified by the event of several battles, and in particular by that above named. Had the French generals with- 

 drawn the greater part of their infantry from Blenheim and Oberklaw, when they perceived that their line was threatened upon 

 another point, they might bave brought them to act upon the flank of the assailants, and probably have gained the victory. Ad- 

 mitting they had still been defeated, they would not have lost twenty battalions prisoners in these villages. 



