291 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



Of .Battles, flank and rear, as to make it impossible for him to take 

 '*~~Y~* m *' any effectual measures of resistance *. Besides, the 

 angle at B offers an excellent mark for the artillery to 

 enfilade and beat in reverse. In this manner a great 

 army may be so compressed by an inferior force, as to 

 seem totally surrounded. 



Attack of The principles of the oblique attack on an enemy's 

 an enemy, flank may be farther illustrated, by considering the 

 tnarch effects of an attack directed against an army while 

 marching. To attack an army on the march, indeed, 

 is advantageous, for the same reason that it is desira- 

 ble to engage an extremity of an enemy's line ; be- 

 cause the army attacked on the heads of its columns is 

 placed, relatively to its opponent, in the same situa- 

 tion with that assailed in flank. This is demonstrated 

 by the following figure. 



15 



lions successively into action, while the attacking force, Of Battles, 

 pressing forward with vigour, is enabled to overthrow x **- "V ' 

 them one after another. In order to secure this re- 

 sult, it is not enough to attack an army on march, but 

 the corps A must, besides, move in a corresponding <li. 

 rcction; that is, by prolonging the march horizontally, 

 if the advance of the hostile columns be perpendicular, 

 and prolonging the perpendicular movement, if that of 

 the enemy be horizontal. The object of these :lir -c- 

 tions must be, to present a whole Sine to the head of.' a 

 column, and, consequently, to a Dingle cxtremiu of 

 the enemy's line. It is obvious, that if the h< 

 two hostile columns were to meet in similar directions, 

 and began reciprocally to deploy, the co< sequence 

 would produce a parallel order of battle, and - .Lock 

 between two equal fronts, totally devoid of combina- 

 tions. 



A 



Supposing both armies in line ; B will be found to 

 be attacked by a perpendicular line, with one of its 

 extremities outflanked, in the same manner as the 

 heads of its columns would be, if the army were on 

 march. 



Both manoeuvres produce similar advantages ; which 

 are, that the army attacked can only bring its batta- 



C 

 JS 



C 



u 



The army A, marching in two columns, is met by 

 B, moving in a similar direction, (both perpendicu- 

 larly) the first will immediately deploy, for fear of be- 

 ing attacked ; and if the second do not instantly per- 

 form the same evolution, it will be defeated, as appears 

 from the former figure. A consequently will form the 



* Jomini allows that these views, originally suggested by Tempelhoff, nre sufficiently just ; but adds that he is grossly mistaken 

 when he asserts, that two columns being brought close together, by a change in their direction, will be enfeebled, and on that ac- 

 count more easily defeated. Besides, it is not absolutely necessary to make this change of direction, in the case above supposed. 

 Two brigades might be made to change front, am) thus the two lines would not crowd upon each other. 



Jomini and Tempelhoff are not quite agreed with regard to the effect of an angle or potcnce, in resisting a flank attack. The lat- 

 ter observes, that to protect a flank by apotence, against an active and manoeuvring enemy, is to employ a remedy more dangerous 

 than the inconvenience intended to be avoided ; and that it should never be adopted, unless the flank can be securely posted upon a 

 point which the enemy cannot turn. Another disadvantage, he adds, attends projecting angles; namely, that the troops forming 

 the point cannot make a retrograde movement, without crowding and causing confusion ; nor can they advance, but by leaving such 

 an opening in the position, as the troops posted to the right and left can with difficulty close ; and this they can only perform by 

 movements which producing a fluctuation in the whole line, are apt to cause general disorder, if attempted in the presence of 

 the enemy. To conclude, an angle is the object upon which an experienced enemy will endeavour to accumulate a raking fire of 

 artillery. Jomini, on the other hand, admits, that an army manoeuvring with ability, will he able to turn the flank of an angle, 

 as well as of a straight line; but he observes, that it will be necessary to make a more considerable movement; that this move- 

 ment will require lime, and give the enemy an opportunity to change front, and present his whole line on the point where his 

 flank only was expected. The one, in short, will march on the arch of a circle, while the other moves on the chord; and, there- 

 fore, the army acting on the straight line will have completed its movement, before the other which describes the curve. Thus, 

 while checked in front by the angle, the flank and rear will be turned by the line, and the enemy will be compelled to lose 

 ground. 



A is the army attempting to turn the 

 left flunk of B, which forms the angle C; 

 and the columns D are immediately pro- 

 longed in the direction E, by which means 

 they turn the right flank of A. If it be 

 objected that the tnrmy will not allow the 

 manoeuvre to be executed, it is answered, 

 that to prevent it, he must either fallback 

 or charge front. This latter movement 

 will not he eaiy, in the presence of the 

 angle, and under the momentary expecta- 

 tion of the columns wheeling into line. 



E.-- ,.' 

 ,' 



Hence are deduced the following maxims. 

 1. Between armies equally well versed in 

 manoeuvres, an angle may be used with 

 success, against attacks directed upon a 

 Hank. 2. In order to make this movement 

 witlu ut detriment, the angle or potcnce must 

 be used only as a momentary resource ; the 

 army must follow it up by changing front, 

 in the same direction, in order to be prepared 

 to repulse the enemy wi'h it>> whole line. 3. 

 If the army attackeu he sunViemly strong 

 to act offensively, after forming an angle 10 



