296 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



or Ratlin*. 4. It may be horizontal (G) upon the heads of the 

 > "'Y"' enemy's columns, without being oblique. 



G 



There are several modifications of these different or- 

 ders ; as, for instance, of the third. The flank may be 

 reinforced by an angle, or potencc, perpendicular to the 

 front, such as the Austrians adopted at Prague and 

 Kollin. 



C 



The potence A, being perpendicular to the enemy's 

 line C, reinforces the right wing of the line B, without 

 being oblique. The same observation is applicable to 

 an angle towards the rear. 



It is probable, that the ancients, in general, preferred 

 the parallel order, reinforced on a wing, to the oblique 

 order. Among the moderns, Turenne employed the 

 former at the battle of Ensheim, and the latter at Sin- 

 sheim ; but these manoeuvres being executed by one 

 division only, without celerity, and in sight of the ene- 

 my, they had time to form a parallel line, and to rein- 

 force the point attacked. The king of Prussia seems 

 justly entitled to the honour of having first appreciated 

 the advantages of such an order of battle as he display- 

 ed at Leuthen, because, until that moment, it had ne- 

 ver been applied in a similar manner. 



or a paral- A parallel line, strongly reinforced on the most im- 

 lel line re- portant point of attack, is unquestionably good, and co- 

 inforced on j nc i(] es w ith the principle which we consider as the 

 in " basis of all operations. It may therefore conduce to 

 victory, but is nevertheless subjected to several incon- 

 veniences. The weak part of the line being so near 

 the enemy, may be drawn into action against the inten- 

 tions of the commander, and'be defeated, and thus frus- 

 trate the advantages which might have been gained on 

 the opposite flank. The reinforced part of the line 

 may defeat its opponent ; but it cannot, on that ac- 

 count, take the enemy's line in flank and rear, without 

 making an extensive movement, which would cause a 

 separation from the other divisions if they happened to 

 be engaged. But if those divisions were not engaged, 

 and therefore enabled to follow the movements of the 

 reinforced part of the line, still, as this manoeuvre would 

 be circular, the enemy, by marching on the chord of the 

 arch, would oppose to it a direct and more rapid coun- 

 ter-movement, which would place the offensive on his 

 side, and bring his mass of forces first on the principal 

 point of attack. But the disposition of the king of 

 Prussia at Leuthen has quite a different effect ; not on- 

 ly is the extremity of the attacked wing overpowered 

 by a whole line, but the flank of that whig is turned, 

 and its rear taken in reverse ; and all this is performed 

 without manoeuvre, or prolonging the diagonal direc- 

 tion, by simply marching the whole front from its 



oblique position straight forward. The divisions not Of BatiU-i 

 destined to form the first attack, cannot, from their dis- *"""V 1 

 tance, be engaged with a superior enemy. They incur 

 no such risk, and yet they are in a situation to render 

 successively their support to the wing which is engaged. 



Having thus attempted to explain the arrangements Measures 

 for battle, and the different modes of att.ick,we shall now to be ta- 

 proceed to consider what measures ought to be taken kt ' n (> y 

 after the termination of the battle, by the victorious, bulh '! ar 

 and by the defeated army. The army which has at- 

 tacked and beaten its opponent should observe the fol- 

 lowing rules: 1. The light and other detached troops, 

 must instantly pursue the enemy, with the view of in- 

 creasing his disorder ; the whole army follows more 

 leisurely, and in good order. 2. As soon as we can 

 perceive the direction of the enemy's retreat, we must 

 determine what is to be done to increase his loss ; as, 

 to cut off the retreat of a part of his force, or to place 

 artillery in such a manner as to obstruct the retreat, and 

 render it more confused and bloody, and prevent the 

 enemy from rallying. 3. All the posts which have been 

 placed for the purpose of covering the retreat, must be 

 instantly and vigorously attacked, in order to avail our- 

 selves of the panic among the troops. 4. We must pur- 

 sue the enemy as long as day-light and the strength of 

 the troops will permit, in order to push our victory to 

 the utmost. For the maxim, that we ought to make a 

 golden bridge for a flying enemy, is only to be put in 

 practice when we can do no better. 5. As every bat- 

 tle is fought on account of some ulterior object, we 

 should immediately proceed to the accomplishment of 

 that object, as soon as we have made the necessary ar- 

 rangements for the care of the wounded, &c. For every 

 thing ought to be previously in readiness for the main- 

 tenance of the troops in their farther advance; and we 

 must be prepared to take advantage of all the errors 

 which the enemy may commit in his retreat. 



If the victory has been gained by the army acting on 

 the defensive, the same rules, upon the whole, are to be 

 observed, but with more caution. For the same rea- 

 sons which forced it to select a position, and there await 

 the attack of the enemy, generally prevent it from pur- 

 suing him, and following up the victory farther. They 

 must beware, indeed, of leaving their position too 

 soon, and pursuing too keenly, because the enemy 

 might otherwise turn round and attack the troops which 

 had given up their advantages, beat and pursue them, 

 and enter the position along with them. 



If the attacking party have been beaten, the following 

 rules are to be observed: 1. So long as there is any 

 chance of victory, the repulsed troops must be formed 

 again, and led on anew to the attack ; or their place 

 supplied by fresh troops ; and the moment must be 

 accurately determined, beyond which the retreat can. 

 not be delayed without danger. 2. As soon as this mo- 

 ment arrives, the dispositions previously determined up- 

 on must be made. These consist in occupying with 

 troops and artillery all tenable pieces, such as villages, 

 houses, woods, heights, &c. lying at the distance of a 

 short gun-shot from the roads along which the army is 

 to pass, in order that the troops may securely retire un 

 cler their fire. These places must be so much the 

 stronger, if the retreating troops have a defile to pass. 

 And, if possible, the retreat of the troops which have 

 been thrown into them must not be allowed to be cut 

 off, after they have accomplished their object. 3. When 

 these dispositions have been made, the cannon are to be 

 marched oft' the field of battle, in order to save our ar- 

 tillery. But should there be decisive batteries, which 



