MILITARY TACTICS. 



S97 



f BatUw. cover the retreat ; we should rather sacrifice them than 

 """"V ^ expose ourselves to the lew* ot'a great number of troops : 

 but we should aNo consider how the enemy can use 

 them when he has got them. For if he cannot imme- 

 diately turn them against the retreating troops it it the 

 less neceuary to hesitate to sacrifice a few pieces of can- 

 non to the (afety of the army. 4. The troops follow 

 the artillery ; and in broken ground the cavalry inarch 

 off first; on plain ground, t:ic battalions which have 

 been engaged in fighting fall back and march off, and 

 the cavalry, in the meantime, take up a position, from 

 which they can fall upon the fl.xnk of the pursuing ene- 

 my. When the infantry have thus marched off, under 

 of the cavalry, the Utter also retire ill the best 

 possible order. 5. A rear-guard, as in every march, 

 mutt be formed of those troops which have suffered 

 ; but much stronger than upo i ordinary occasions; 

 and they must proceed with much more caution. The 

 infantry of the re.ir-guard occupies all that can cover 

 the retreat ; and calls in all its posts u it proceeds. 

 The cavalry always marches in such a manner, that it 

 can easily form in order of battle ; it retires, therefore, 

 tranter, or in such other order as the nature of the 

 ground will permit ; so as to combine rapidity with or- 

 der When an obstacle occurs in a retreat, the rear* 

 guard forma in order of battle, and take* up the best 

 position for covering the army, by which it roust be sop- 

 ported should it be too violently attacked. 



. ly the same rule* must be observed by an army 

 which has been attacked and beaten : only that it must 

 commence by again forming in lint-, before proceeding 

 in the retreat, at least if it is to be conducted with or- 

 der. For the line of an army acting on the defensive, 

 and beaten, is always broken ; although this doe* not 

 hold in the caw of an army acting on the ofemive. .11 

 Mich a retrograde movement, the points where the army 

 is to form, and upon which it is to lean its flanks, roust 

 have been previously determined. If from this position 

 it be possible to deprive the enemy of his advantage by 

 general attack, a spirited commander will not hesitate 

 to attempt it Otherwise the enemy must U- kept in 

 check, in the new position, until all our dispositiona are 

 made for the retreat 



Both parties, after the loss of a battle, must immedi- 

 ately endeavour to take up and maintain a strong posi- 

 to repair the lo-w they hare suffered, and then pro- 

 ceed again to the execution of their design. The far- 

 ther we retmt, we not only lose a greater tract oi 



ut the army become* more discouraged, a circum- 

 stance which is always of much greater consequence 

 than the loss of a battle. 



General Lloyd, the celebrated commentator on the 

 military occurrence* of the seven years war, has laid it 

 down a* a rule, that an army retreating ought to U- di- 

 vided into as many strong corps as the nature of the 

 country will admit of; because, in this case, the enemy 

 !o you no very essential damage. If he separate* 

 his army likewise into many corps, none of them will be 

 ig enough to undertake any thing of consequence ; 

 p too close, they may receive some con- 

 siderable check. Another advantage ariiting from tins 

 method of retiring is, that the enemy cannot intercept 

 any of your corps ; because he can neither push be- 

 tween them, nor go so far about a* to come befon 

 without exposing hi* own troops to be hemmed in be- 

 tween your different corps. If he follows you with hn 

 whole army, one divi,j,, n only can be in danger ; which 

 may be easily avoided by forming a strong rear-guard, 

 vho will get time for the Tffffnindfr to inarch off in 



VOL. XIV. PAHT I. 



safety ; and the more so, as a small corps marches much Of Battler 

 more lightly than an army. Care must be taken not to "Y"' 

 engage the whole corps ; because, if the enemy is near, 

 and acts with vigour, it will be entirely lost. 



These ideas of Lloyd, which are contrary to the prin- 

 ciples upon which most of his own maxims are esta- 

 blished, have been wrought up into a system by Bulow, 

 under the title of rjctntric retreat*, in opposition to 

 concentric mm-fmeiiU. A contrary system, however, is 

 with greater propriety, we think, maintained by Jo- 

 mini. We have already observed, that an army inferior 

 in numbers to its antagonist, ought always to endea- 

 vour to act in a body ; because it is only by so doing 

 that it can hope to obtain any advantage over the ene- 

 my. It cannot be disputed, that an army compelled to 

 retreat, is already sufficiently weak, without being be- 

 sides divided. All the divisions, indeed, cannot be 

 ruined when thus separated ; but one or two will cer- 

 tainly meet with such a fate; and the most disastrous 

 concentric retreat cannot produce any thing more cala- 

 mitous. When we shall have compared the system of 

 Lloyd and Bulow with events, and, in particular, with 

 the result of the concentric retreat of the Archduke 

 Charles of Austria, in 1796, we have no doubt but the 

 propriety or drawing opitoeite conclusions to their's will 

 be universally admitted. Lloyd, indeed, is already in 

 contradiction with himself ; for he allows that the di- 

 viding of the pursuing forces exposes them to defeat. 

 How then can he advise the pursued to commit the 

 same fault? 



SECT. IX. Of Canlonmenli and tfinler Quarlert. 



\Vnrx the weather become* so bad that the body of rlntoll _ 

 cannot withstand it, the troops ought not to be exposed rmiiti and 

 to it in the open field, but should be placed in quar- winter 

 ten, where they may find shelter and protection. And, quarters. 

 as active service in the field is extremely fatiguing, 

 they ought to be placed at the end of a campaign in ex- 

 tmsive quarters, where they may find subsistence and 

 comfort, in order to refresh themselves. Hence arise* 

 a twofold mode of placing troops in quarters : 1. When 

 the only object is to shelter the troops from the wea- 

 ther. 2. When they are distributed in extensive quar- 

 ters, with a view to their subsistence and comfort. The 

 former are called cantonments, the latter winter quar- 

 ters. 



As the army is incapable of withstanding the enemy 

 in its quarters, the general principle, whence all the 

 rules for the distribution of the troops in quarters is de- 

 rived, is this: That in case of an attack from the enemy, 

 we should always have it in our power to draw the 

 army together in order of battle, upon an advantageous 

 field, before the enemy can attack us. 



itain and nightly cold force us first to place the ca- 

 valry, on account of the horses, in the villages. Their 

 quarters must be to disposed, that the camp of the in- 

 fantry completely covers them, and the enemy cannot 

 fait upon them from behind ; and that either the dis- 

 tance of the out-post! , or the obstacles which the ground, 

 or the resistance of the infantry presents to the enemy, 

 should leave time for the cavalry to unite and assist in 

 beating off the attack. The same principles must be 

 followed, when we are compelled to place the infantry 

 in quarters. 



We place our troops in winter-quarters when we pre- 



ceive, 1. That we ourselves can no longer undertake 



any enterprise of importance ; and 2. When the enemy 



cannot attack our troops in their quarters. The first 



2 p 



