MILITARY TACTICS. 



299 



Of Canton- tain the place, and does it open to us the way to fur- 

 mentf tnd ther entcrprizes ? or finally, are ire so certain of suc- 

 cess, that the hope of making prisoners is sufficient to 

 '' induce us to undertake it i 2. Is it probable that we 

 ""V , hall succeed ? This probability must result t'roin the 

 bad disposition of the quarters which enables us to 

 approach them undiscovered ; from the neglect of pro- 

 per measures on the part of the commander to prevent 

 a surprise. The situation and circumstanres must be 

 such, as to afford us the means of a safe retreat. When 

 the attack has been determined upon, the same ru'es 

 are to be observed as in the case of all other detach- 

 ments ; and we may also observe, that it is almost ne- 

 cessary to success, that we should pet into the rear of 

 the quarters, either with the whole or a part of the 

 detachment ; partly because the attack from thence will 

 be more unexpected by the enemy, and therefore have 

 a greater chance of success ; and partly, because we 

 may thus attack him on more than one side, raise his 

 whole quarters, and cut off his retreat. 



A general attack upon the whole quarters of an ar- 

 my is, in all points, similar to an attack on an enemy's 

 country, in order to surprise it. The following reasons 

 may induce us to make surli an attack. 1. A bad dis- 

 position of the enemy 'x quarters. 2. Measures ill taken 

 among bis troops for the performance of their duty. 3. 

 A well founded hope, that we shall be able to drive the 

 enemy out of the country in his possession, either im- 

 mediately, or upon the opening of the campaign. This 

 may be the case, if the enemy have neglected some te- 

 nable places, and left it in our power to make ourselves 

 masters of them ; or if he has enclosed some f our for- 

 rithin his quarters, which the lateness of the 

 i prevented him from taking, and which will serve 

 us aa point* tfappui in our advance ; or, Lastly, if his 

 whole quarters consist of an open country, from which 

 we can drive him behind defiles, which he will after- 

 wards in vain endeavour to pas. 4. The success of 

 such an entcrprize will be greatly promoted by a skill- 

 ful disposition of our own quarters, by good and secret 

 arrangements within them, by which we shall he ena- 

 bled to draw them rapidly together, and move into 

 those of the enemy. 



SlCT. X. Fundamental Prj'nct/J* in Military 

 Combination*. 



In this concluding section, we propose to lay before 



cntial prir 



Funda- 

 mental our readers a summary of the essential principles of mi- 

 principle Jitary combinations, extracted from Jomini's excellent 

 lir J Trtat'at on Military Optraltont. 



The fundamental principle which ought to regulate 

 all military combinations, consists in operating, n itH 

 the gre.it mat* of our force*, a c-.mlnned effort on ike de- 

 point. We may easily conceive, that a skilful ge- 

 neral may, with 60,000 men, beat an army of 100,000, 

 if he can but contrive to bring 50,000 men into action 

 upon one part of the enemy's line. The numerical su- 

 periority of the troops not engaged, in such a case, is 

 more hurtt.,1 tfi in advantageous, because it only tends 

 to increase the disorder, as was proved at the battle of 

 Leu then. The rules for applying the principle above 

 laid down are by no means numerous, and we shall en- 

 deavour to point them out. 



I. The first rule is, to originate, or take the lead in 

 all movements. The general who succeed* in placing 

 thi advantage on I AS it in his power to em- 



ploy hi f-ircci hrrcvrr hr thirks it most advisable; 

 on the other hand, he who waits for the enemy cannot be 



master of any combination, because his movements are 

 subordinate to those of his adversary, and because he 

 has no longer the power of arresting them when they j 

 are in full execution. The general who takes th.; lead, ' 

 knows what he is going to do ; he conceals his march, 

 surprises and overwhelms an extremity, a weak part. 

 He who waits, is beaten on one of those parts, even be- 

 fore he has been informed of the attack. 



II. The second rule is to direct our movements on 

 that weak part which can be most advantageously at- 

 tacked. The choice of this part depends upon the ene- 

 my's position. The most important point is always 

 that of which the occupation would procure the most 

 favourable chances, and the greatest results. Such, lor 

 example, would be the positions which should enable 

 us to gain the communications of the enemy, with the 

 basis of his operations, and to throw him back upon an 

 insurmountable obstacle, such as a lake, a large river 

 without a bridge, or a great neutral power. 



In double and scattered lines of operations, our at- 

 tacks will be most appropriately directed on the central 

 points. In carrying the mass of our forces to that 

 quarter, we overwhelm the isolated divisions which 

 guard them ; the scattered corps to the right and left 

 can no longer operate in concert, and are forced to 

 make those ruinous eccentric retreats, from which the 

 armies of Wurmser, of Mack, and of the Duke ot'Hnm- 

 swick experienced such terrible effects. In simple lines 

 of operations, and in contiguous lines of battle, the 

 weak points, on the contrary, are the extremities of the 

 line. Indeed, the centre is more within re.-.ch 01 !>eing 

 sustained, at the same moment, by die right ami the 

 left ; while an extremity attacked would be over- 

 whelmed before the arrival of sufficient means from the 

 other wings to sustain it, for these means would be 

 much more remote, and could only be. employed one 

 after the other. 



A deep column, attacked on its head, is in the same 

 situation with a line attacked on its extremity ; the 

 one and the other will be engaged and beaten MI 

 sively, as has been demonstrated bj th- defeats of Ross- 

 bach and Auerstadt. At the same time, it is ea-iir to 

 make new dispositions with a column in depth, than 

 with a line of battle attacked on an extremity. 



In executing a general strategical movement on the 

 extremity of an enemy's line of operations, we not only 

 bring a mass into action again-t a weak part, but from 

 this extremity we may easily gain the rear and the 

 communications, either with the basis, or with the se- 

 condary lines. Thus, Bonaparte, when, in 1805, he 

 gained Donauwerth and the line of the Lech, had esta- 

 blished the mass of his force on the communications of 

 Mack with Vienna, which was the basis of this general 

 in respect of Bohemia, and rendered it impossible for 

 him to unite with the Russian army, which was his 

 most important secondary line. The same operation 

 took place in 1 806, on the extreme left of the Prussians 

 by Saalfeld and Gera. It was repeated in 18 12, by 

 the Russian army in its movements on Kaluga and 

 Kra-noi; and again in 1813, by Bohemia on Dresden 

 and Leipsic against the right of Bonaparte. 



III. The result of the preceding truths prove*, that 

 if we ought to prefer an attack on the- extremity of a 

 line, we should also beware of attacking the two extre- 

 mities at once, unless indeed our forces arc greatly su- 

 perior. An army of 60,000 men, which forms two 

 corps of about 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking 

 the two extremities of an army equal in number*, de- 

 prives itself of the means of striking a decisive blow., 



Funda- 

 m "' 

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