300 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



Funds- by multiplying uselessly the number of the means of 

 mental resistance which the enemy can oppose to its two de- 



' tachments. Such an extended and disunited move- 

 in Military 



Oombina- men t ma y even expose it to the enemy, who may coi- 

 tions, lect the mass of his force upon one point, and annihi- 

 \^-Y~~* late his adversary by the terrible effect of his superiori- 

 ty. Attacks multiplied in a greater number of co- 

 lumns are still more dangerous, and more contrary to 

 the great principles of the art ; especially when these 

 columns cannot be brought into action at the same in- 

 stant, and at the same point. As a consequence of 

 this maxim, it is proper, on the contrary, to make an 

 attack upon both extremities, when we have masses 

 greatly superior to those of the enemy ; we may thus 

 bring more troops into action upon each of his wings, 

 while by keeping very superior forces accumulated 

 upon a single point, our adversary might perhaps be 

 able to deploy and bring into action an equal number. 

 We must take care, in this case, to throw the great body 

 of our force upon that wing, where the attack promises 

 the most decisive success. 



IV. In order to operate a combined effort with a 

 great mass upon a single point, it is necessary, in stra- 

 tegical movements, to keep our forces collected upon a 

 space nearly square, in order that they may be more 

 disposable*. Large fronts are as contrary to good 

 principles, as scattered lines, large detachments, and 

 isolated divisions. 



V. One of the most efficacious means of applying 

 the general principle above laid down, is to make the 

 enemy commit faults contrary to that principle. We 

 may threaten him with some small corps of light troops 

 on several important points of his communications ; 

 and it is probable, that not knowing the force of these 

 corps, he may oppose them with numerous divisions, 

 and scatter his forces. These light troops, at the same 

 time, serve the essential purpose of collecting intelli- 

 gence for the army. 



V I. It is of great importance, when we originate any 

 decisive movement, to neglect no means of informing 

 ourselves respecting the enemy's positions, and themove- 

 ments which he may make. The system of espionnage 

 is very useful, and no pains should be spared to bring 

 it to perfection ; but it is still more essential to procure 

 accurate intelligence by means of partisans. A general 

 ought to scatter small parties in all directions, and to 

 multiply their number with as much care as he would 

 avoid such a system in great operations. For this pur- 

 pose, some divisions of light cavalry are organised, 

 whicl) are not admitted into the line of battle. To 

 operate without these precautions is to march in the 



Funda- 



mental 



Principle 



dark, and to expose oursel ves to all the disastrous chances 

 which a secret movement of the enemy might produce. 

 We have already observed, that these partisans would 

 contribute, at the same time, to alarm the enemy upon '" 

 some important points, and thus induce him to di- 

 vide his forces. These means are too much neglected ; 

 the system of espionnage is not sufficiently organised 

 before hand ; and the officers of the light troops have 

 not always the experience requisite to enable them to 

 conduct their detachmentst. 



VII. In conducting the operations of war, it is not 

 enough to carry our masses skilfully on the most im- 

 portant points ; we must also know how to bring them 

 into action. When we have established ourselves upon 

 these points, if we remain inactive, we have lost sight 

 of the principle entirely. The enemy may make coun- 

 ter-manoeuvres, and to deprive him of the means of 

 doing so, we must immediately engage him, as soon as 

 we have gained his communications or one of his ex- 

 tremities. It is at that moment especially that we 

 ought to combine a simultaneous effort of our forces. 

 Battles are not decided by the masses present, but by 

 the masses engaged. The former decide the prepara- 

 tory strategical movements ; the latter determine the 

 success of an action. In order to obtain this result, a 

 skilful general ought to seize the momefft when it is 

 necessary to carry the decisive position of the field of 

 battle, and he should combine the attack in such a 

 manner as to engage all his forces at the same time, 

 with the sole exception of the troops destined to form 

 the reserve. If an effort founded upon such principles 

 shall not be successful, we cannot hope to obtain the vic- 

 tory from any combination, and we shall have no other 

 resource but that of making another attempt with this 

 reserve, in concert with the troops already engaged. 



VIII. All the combinations of a battle may be re- 

 duced to three systems. 



The first, which is purely defensive, consists in a- 

 waiting the enemy's attack in a strong position, with- 

 out any other object than that of maintaining ourselves 

 in it. Such were the dispositions of Daun at Torgau, 

 and of Marsin at the lines of Turin. These two events 

 serve to demonstrate how vicious all such dispositions 

 are. 



The second system, on the contrary, is entirely of- 

 fensive. It consists in attacking the enemy wherever 

 we can find him ; as Frederic did at Leuthen and Tor- 

 gnu, Bonaparte at Jena and Ratisbon, and the allies at 

 Leipsic. 



The third system is in some degree a middle term 

 between the two others. It consists in choosing a field 



* By this is not meant a full square column, but that the battalions be disposed in such a manner as to be able to arrive, -with 

 the same promptitude, from all points, towards that which may be attacked. 



T The immense advantages whih the Russian armies derived from the services of the Cossacks, afford sufficient proof of the truth 

 f the above observations. Thee light troops, insignificant in the shock of a great battle, are terrible in a pursuit. They are the 

 most formidable enemy for all the combinations of a general, because he can never be certain of the safe arrival and execution of his 

 orders, and his convoys are always in danger and his operations uncertain. So long as an army had only a few regiments of these 

 partisans, the whole of their value was not known ; but when their number was increased to 15 or ?0 thousand, an idea could be 

 formed of their importance, especially in a country, the population of which was not unfavourable to them. 



For one convoy which they intercept, we must cause them all to be escorted ; and the escort must be numerous, in order to insure 

 safety. We are never certain of performing a march unmolested, because we know not where the enemy are. These incidental 

 duties require an immense force; and the regular cavalry are soon rendered totally unlit for service, in consequence of the fatigues 

 to which they are exposed. The Turkish militia produces nearly the same effect on the Russians, as the Cossacks on the other Ki> 

 ropean armies ; the convoys are not more secure in Bulgaria, than they were in Spain and in Poland. In other armies, perhaps. 

 ome thousands of volunteer hussars or lancers, levied at the commencement of a war, and directed by enterprising leaders, on well 

 chosen strategical points, would accomplish nearly the same object ; but we should always have to look upon them as detached and 

 independent troops, for if they wore to receive their orders from head-quarters, they would no longer be partisans. It is true, they 

 would not possess precisely the same qualities ; and in the long run, they could not contend with good Cossacks ; but, to an unavoid- 

 able evil, we must apply all the remedies in our power. 



