MILITARY TACTICS. 



301 



Fundimen. of battle, determined according to its adaptation to 

 til Pun- strategical purposes, and the nature of the ground, in 

 in order to await the enemy's attack, and to seize, during 

 the battle itself, the proper moment for assuming an 

 offensive attitude, anil to fall upon our adversary with 

 every chance of success. The combinations of Bona- 

 parte at Rivoli and Austerlitz, those of Wellington at 

 Waterloo, and in the greater part of his defensive bat- 

 tles in Spain, may be classed under this head. 



It would be difficult to lay down precise rules for 

 the employment of these two last systems, which are 

 the only ones that can be successfuly adopted. We 

 must always have view to the moral disposition of 

 the troop* of each party, to the peculiarities of the na 

 tional character, and to the nature of the ground ; and 

 these circumstances alone may direct the genius of 

 commander. We shall confine our remarks, therefore, 

 to the three following general observations. 1. With 

 experienced troops, and on open ground, the absolute 

 offensive, the initiattvr of attack, is always the best y- 

 tem. 4. In ground of difficult access, whether by na- 

 ture or from other causes, and with well-disciplined 

 troop*, it is perhapa better to allow the enemy to arrive 

 in a position which we have previously reconnoitred, 

 in order to take the lead of him when his troops shall 

 have been exhausted by their Hrt effort*. 



8. Nevertheless, the strategical situation of both par- 

 tie*, may sometimes require, that we should make a 

 lively attack upen the positions of our adversary, with- 

 out regard to local circumstance* ; for example, it' it 

 were of consequence to prevent the junction of two 

 hostile armies, to fall upon a detached part of an ar- 

 ray, or upon a corps isolated on the other aide of a 

 river, Ac. 



I \ The order* of battle, or the mo*t proper disposi- 

 tion* for conducting troop* into action, ought to have 

 for their object to give them, at once, activity and soli- 

 dity ; for they ought neither to be too extended nor too 

 crowded. A spare order is weak ; troop* crowded into 

 too dense an order, are in a great degree rurali-ed, be- 

 catue it is only the head that can be brought into ac- 

 tion, they are easily thrown into disorder ; and artillery 

 nuke* dreadful ravage* amongst them. It appear* to 

 u*. that in order to fulfil both condition*, troop* re- 

 maining on the defensive may be partly deployed, and 

 partly in column* by battalion*, like the Kmsian army 

 t the battle of Eylau ; but the corn* drawn up for the 

 attack of a decisive point, ought to be composed of two 

 line* of battalion*, each, instead of deploying, being 

 formed in column* by divisions, in the following man- 



6th. 



12th. 



5th. 



4th. 



llth. 10th. 



3d. 



9th. 



8th. 



7th. 



Fundamen- 

 tal Prin- 

 ciple in 

 Military 

 Combina- 

 tions. 



This order presents infinitely more solidity than a de- 

 ployed line, whose fluctuations prevent the impulse ne- 

 cessary tor such an attack, and put it out of the power 

 of the officers to carry on their troops. At the same 

 time, with a view to facilitate the march, to avoid the 

 too great depth of the mass, and, on the other hand, to 

 increase the front, without at all injuring its consisten- 

 cy, it would perhaps be more proper to place the in- 

 fantry in two ranks. The battalions would thus be 

 rendered more moveable ; for the march of the second 

 rank, pressed between the first and third, is always fa- 

 tiguing, fluctuating, and, consequently less firm and 

 lively. Besides, they will have all the requisite force, 

 ax the three divisions -ill present six ranks in depth, 

 which is more than sufficient Finally ; the front en- 

 larged to the extent of a third, will present more tire, 

 if it ahould come to firing ; and at the same time that 

 it appeared more fonnidable to the enemy, by shewing 

 him more men, it would be lew exposed to the fire ul' 

 artillery. 



X. In ground of difficult access, such as vineyards, 

 enclosure*, gardens, and walled heights, the drtiriiMM- 

 order af battle ought to be composed of battalions de- 

 ployed, and covered by numerous platoons of sharp- 

 shooter*. But the attacking troop, as well as the re- 

 serve, could INK be better drawn up than in columns 

 of attack by the centre, a* in the preceding observa- 

 tion ; lor the reserve must be ready to fall upon the 

 enemy at the decisive moment, and attack with force 

 and vivacity, that is to say, in columns, t Nevertlir- 

 less, this reserve may be left partly deployed until the 

 moment of charging, in order that the extent of it* 

 front may appear the more formidable to the enemv. 



XI. In a defensive battle on open ground, we may 

 substitute, for these columns, squares of battalions, by 

 doubling the lines of the two ranks, so as to form than 

 on a depth of four Each battalion would thus pre- 

 sent a sufficient masi, a* it would have only a front of 

 from forty to fitly file*. 



This order seem* advantageous, when we have to 

 fear grand attack* of cavalry ; for it give*, at once, se- 

 curity to the infantry, and shelter to the cannoneer* 

 and to the train of artillery. At the same time, a* it 



or U platoon*, will lure three dirUioni, 



A diriuon rand*!* of two pbloom; thai th battalion b*fcf competed of m tmaj 

 which, in fact, will cause it to form *n thre* line*. 



Thii remark, however, refer, to the French pntitutiflB of battalion* and regiment. ; but it i owriwM that th* idea could be eatily 

 > at to aply to our own, by forming our battailous into column* of four grand divinoM (utfpoaaf th* flank companies b- 



Thu: 



they might be made only of two (UJ dirwon* in rear of each other. 



that a victory would 

 dupotiuon of Ike troop, 

 r* mutt 



