302 



MILITARY TACTICS. 



Fundamen. affords less activity and less impulse than that of co- 

 tal Prmci- lumns of attack, the latter appears preferable, becnuse 

 ^ tro P s wel l exercised, it is easy to form the square 



Miltary 



Cembina- ' n cacn battalion, by a simple conversion to the right 

 tions. and left of the centre division. The general's plan of 

 >-~Y""^ battle, the nature of the ground, the description of 

 troops, must determine the preference to be given to 

 these two orders. 



XII. If the art of war consists in concerting a su- 

 perior effort by a mass against weak parts, it is in- 

 controvertibly necessary to push a beaten army vigo- 

 rously. 



The force of an army consists in its organization, in 

 the whole resulting from the connection of all the parts 

 with the central point which sets them in motion. 

 After a defeat, this whole no longer exists ; the har- 

 mony between the head which combines, and the body 

 which ought to execute, is destroyed ; their relations 

 are suspended, and almost always dissolved. The 

 whole army is then a weak part ; to attack it is to 

 march to a certain victory. Abundant proofs of these 

 truths will be found in the march on Roveredo, and the 

 defiles of the Brenta, to complete the ruin of Wurm- 

 ser ; in the march from Ulm to Vienna, from Jena to 

 Wittemberg, Custrin, and Stettin, from Waterloo to 

 Paris. This maxim is often neglected by generals of 

 inferior talents. It would appear that the whole effort 

 of their genius, and the scope of their ambition, were 

 limited to gaining the field of battle. Such a vic- 

 tory is a mere displacing of troops, without any real 

 utility. 



XIII. In order to render the superior shock of a 

 mass decisive, the general must spare no pains in form- 

 ing the moral disposition of his army. To what pur- 

 pose should we place 50,000 men in order of battle 

 against 20,000, if they wanted that impulse which is 

 necessary to carry them forward, and to overwhelm 

 the enemy ? We do not allude merely to the soldier, 

 but still more particularly to those whose business it 

 is to lead. All troops are brave, when the chiefs shew 

 the example of a noble emulation and perfect devotion. 

 The soldier must not remain exposed to fire from the 

 mere dread of a rigorous discipline ; he must rush into 

 it by the desire of not being outdone by his officers in 

 honour and bravery, and above all by the confidence 

 with which he has been inspired in the wisdom of his 

 leaders and the courage of his companions in arms. 



In all his calculations, a general must be able to rec- 

 kon upon the zeal of his lieutenants ; he must be as- 

 sured that a vigorous attack will take place wherever 

 he orders it to be made. In order to attain this end, 

 he must render himself at once beloved, esteemed, and 

 feared ; and he ought to have the choice and the fate 

 of his lieutenants in his own hands. If they have ar- 

 rived at this rank by the right of seniority alone, we 

 may conclude beforehand that they will scarcely ever 

 possess the qualities necessary to enable them to ful- 

 fil their important functions. This circumstance 

 alone may cause the failure of the best-planned enter- 

 prises. 



It will be seen from this rapid sketch, that the 

 science of war is composed of three general combina- 

 tions, each of which presents but a small number of 

 subdivisions. The only perfect operations will be 

 those in which these three combinations shall be pro- 

 perly executed. 



The first of these combinations is the art of embrac- 

 ing lines of operations in the most advantageous man- 

 ner, or what is commonly called Ike plan of a cam* 



pain. We do not well understand, indeed, what is Fundamen. 

 meant by this term ; for it is impossible to lay down a ''' Pfinu- 

 general plan for a whole campaign, the first movement y^, 

 of which may overthrow the whole scaffolding, and in c om i,j na . 

 which it may be impossible to foresee beyond the se- ti ons . 

 cond movement. \^-y^*/ 



The second branch is the art of conducting our 

 masses in the most rapid manner possible to the deci- 

 sive point of the primitive or accidental line of opera- 

 tions. This is what we commonly unfVr-tand by stra- 

 tegy ; which is nothing else than the means of execut- 

 ing this second combination. 



The third branch is the art of combining the simul- 

 taneous employment of our greatest mass on the most 

 important point of a lield of battle ; or the art of bat 

 ties, which some authors have called the order of bat- 

 tle, while others have treated it under the name of 

 Tactics. 



See the works of Xenophon ; Arrian ; Polybius ; 

 Caesar; Vegetius ; Folard ; Montecuculi's Memoires, 

 avcc les commentaires du Comle Tnrpin de Cressl ; Tur- 

 pin, Essai sur FArt de la Guerre ; Puysegur, Art de 

 la Guerre, par principe.i el par regies ; Marechal de 

 Saxe, Lettres el Memoires, &c. Paris, 179*. The works 

 of the King of Prussia. Lloyd's History of the Seven 

 Years' War, with Tempelhoff's continuation. Gui- 

 chard, Memoires Militaires xur les Gtecs el les Remains. 

 Warnery, Remarques sur le Mililaire dts Tares el des 

 Russcs, Breslaw, 1771. Fjusd. Commentaires snr les 

 Commentaires du Comle de Tnrpin sur Monlecuculi, &c. 

 St. Marino, 1777. Ejusd. Remarques sur la Cavalrie, 



1781. Ejusd. Melanges de Remarques, sur tout sur Ccesar, 



1782. Ejusd. Campagnes de Frederic J I. Sir David 

 Dundas, Principles of Military Movements. London, 

 1788. Billow, Gcist des neiiern Kriegs Systems, Ham- 

 burgh, 1802. Guibert, Essai general de Tactique, Paris, 

 1 803. Muller's Elements of the Scien ce of War, London, 

 1811. Thomson's Military Memoirs. Caractere Mililaire 

 des Armees Enropecnne^'&c. London, 1802. Rogniat, 

 Considerations sur I' Art de la Guerre, and the German 

 translation by Major Decker, under the title : Ansich- 

 ien uber die Kriegfiihning im Geiste der Zeit, Berlin, 

 1817. Jomini, fraite des Grandes Operations Mill' 

 iaires, and Histoire Critique el Militaire des Campagnes 

 de la Revolution, (z) 



EXPLANATION OF THE PLATES. 



PLATE CCCLXXXI. 



Fig. 1. Represents a Battalion forming Front t 

 the Rear, by a Counter-march of the 

 whol. 



Fig 2. Forming Front to the Rear by a Counter- 

 march of Platoons. 



Fig. 3. A Battalion forming Front to the Rear by 

 wheeling about. 



Fig. 4. One half faced to the Right-about, pre- 

 vious to Wheeling. 



Fig. 5. Forming Front to the Flank, by facing te 

 the Right or Left, and marching up. 



Fig. 6. The same, by Deploying. 



Fig. 7. The same, by a single quarter Wheel. 



