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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



: 31 ORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science which treats of 

 PhiHopbr. the motives and the rules of human actions; and of 

 " the ends to which they ought to be directed. 



!** In contemplating the general history of animated 

 Great diver- B , ..". . . . ' , 



ity b. the nature . we make no heitation in setting down the ha- 

 monl n<xi. hits of an individual as characteristics of the species, on 

 nofrr.cn. the grounds that creatures similarly constituted, pos- 



fsessed of the same organs, and impelled by the same 

 instincts, must have the same dispositions and feelings. 

 The human race presents a remarkable exception to 

 this observation ; and the varieties which it exhibits in 

 external appearance, are not half so numerous or strik- 

 ing, as the contrasts which we observe in moral con- 

 duct and feeling. 



V.'i-re mankind placed in circumstances precisely si- 

 milar ; were they possessed of the same extent of men- 

 tal powers, and the same degree of natural feelin?. 

 we could scarcely conceive a diversity of sentiment or 

 conduct to be possible. But when we consider the in- 

 finite variety which prevails in the external circum- 

 stances, and undoubtedly also in the mental powers of 

 man, instead of wondering at the contrariety of views 

 and feelings, we have greater reason to be surprised at 

 their general harmony and agreement. The differences 

 seem to be only accidental ; ami even where they are 

 raott appaient, a principle of congruity may generally 

 be discerned, which leads to the same end, though by 

 the employment of different means ; and brings the 

 most anomalous appearances within the ordinary range 

 of human feelings. 



There muit, then, be some strong leading principles 

 in the constitution of man, or in the ordinary arrange- 

 ments of Providence, to preserve order amidst such 

 discordant materials, which, in many instances, seem 

 directed not only against the comfort, but against the 

 very exutencc of society. 



Vix nnc obuMur UJi. 



Quia Ucient miuuluiii. 



According to some, this object is accomplished by the 

 -ual interference of Providence, to rectify the dis- 

 orders which the paioni of men have produced. We 

 are nut much inclined to object to this doctrine. We 

 would receive it with this qualification, however, that 

 a wise arrangement, continually upheld liy the Being 

 who fir*t contrived it, is to be considered as a direct 

 iv of divine providence. But, admitting this, we 

 c intend, at the lame time, that a provision is made, in 

 the nslure of things, (not from any necessity of nature, 

 but bv the will of the Author of nature,) for maintain- 

 i<.e equilibrium of the moral world, and for re- 

 :ti vices, as well at influencing the feelings 

 ar. 1 the conduct of men. 



It cannot be a random principle which produces 

 uniform results ; nor can it be a very abstruse 

 tince its influence is universal, and is felt, with 

 various degrees of force, in every stage of human soci- 

 ety. But though the general complexion of human 

 manners bespeaks the operation of a principle common 

 t.i human nature, there it nothing with regard to which 

 men are less agreed than the name and nature of that 

 rferttf^iMM MM* *t*n*c effect*. Men 



VOL. XIV. PART IJ. 



differ both as to the object which constitutes the su- Moral 

 preme good, or chief felicity of their nature, and also Philosophy. 

 as to the means by which it is mo*t likely to be secured. """"V^ 

 They do not sufficiently extinguish between the prin- 

 ciples which impel to action, and the objects to which 

 they look for gratification. They are both indiscrimi- 

 nately called motives ; and, certainly, when any object 

 acquires paramount importance in the imagination, it 

 operates as a motive in regulating the whole conduct. 

 It is, however, in all probability only a confirmed pre- 

 judice, arising out of a perversion of the original im- 

 pelling principle, which is merely a vague appetency 

 of our nature, calling for gratification, but not directing 

 us, with infallible certainty, to a specific object, nor to 

 the mode and measure in which it ought to be enjoyed. 

 There is another thing, therefore, to be attended to 

 in moral discussions, besides our elementary feelings ; 

 for, after adopting the instincts, desires, and passions, 

 implanted in our nature, as the elements of action, we 

 must examine how far these principles have been legi- 

 timately exercised, and consider in what instances they 

 have been carried too far, or have fallen short of what 

 they might have fairly achieved. 



In investigating the principles of moral conduct, i mmu tble 

 then, the natural method is to begin with the simplest rules of mo- 

 elements of feeling : and then to proceed to the circum- rality, 

 stances which occur in the constitution of our bodies, 

 or in the powers of our minds, or in the order of exter- 

 nal nature, to modify, limit, and restrain our appetites 

 and feelings : and if this process is conducted judici- 

 ously, we shall probably find, that the Author of our 

 nature has established immutable rules in the ordina- 

 tions of his providence, to lead us to the high purposes 

 for which we are destined. 



If we shall succeed in establishing this point, it will 

 prove incontrovertibly that there is nothing arbitrary 

 or conventional in morals ; but that they result neces- 

 sarily from the powers and faculties which God has 

 given to man, and from the circumstances in which he 

 has placed him. Even the most exalted moral pre- 

 cept', derived from the light of revelation, will be illustrated 

 found not to controvert, but to confirm this position, and enforc- 

 It is a great mistake to suppose that Christianity un- ed, not first 

 folds moral precepts foreign to the nature of man, and diico*eri, 

 not cognizable by his reason. It is addressed to him '' J 

 as a perverted being, not as one destitute of the mate- 

 rials of knowledge : it shows that he neglects the riches , 

 which are among his hands, and that he fails to deduce 

 the inferences which are obviously presented in his 

 own nature, in the constitution of the external world, 

 and in the ordinary events of providence. It is doing 

 Christianity great injustice to suppose that its moral 

 precepts are such as never did ut could enter the mind 

 of man without it. Grotius takes up a very different 

 argument to prove the divine origin of the Christian 

 religion ; for he endeavours to show that it was so rea- 

 sonable, and so admirably adapted to the nature and 

 circumstances of man, that all its precepts might be 

 recognized in the scattered maxims diffused among the 

 human race; out, in all oases, deformed by impure 

 admixtures, and perverted from their original purpose 

 by the vices aex! psMcions of men. The grand object 



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