MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



677 



Mot* 



IKuttra- 



!... ni re 

 effectual 

 ihin re. 

 uninf. 



Th law of 

 Cod writ- 

 Mao* llw 

 fac* of na- 

 lurr. 



in question is exactly conformable in spirit, design, and 

 circumstances, to what we observe and approve in other 

 cases, and then all opposition must appear unreason- 

 able, and we must stand condemned by our own 

 mouths, and our own consciences. In fact, it is not 

 demonstration that we so much stand in need of in 

 moral reasoning, as persuasion. The grand truths of 

 morality are sufficiently palpable to command the con- 

 viction of the conscience and reason ; but something 

 more is necessary to give them a firm hold on our feel- 

 gs. In subjects of pure science, where nothing but 

 reason is concerned, nothing but reason require* to be 

 satisfied ; and a demonstration silences for ever all 

 doubts and conjectures. But the case is wholly diffe- 

 rent in morals and religion : these sciences are inti- 

 mately blended with our feelings : and when they in- 

 culcate disagreeable truths, or unwelcome precepts, our 

 passions and prejudices will, most probably, be up in 

 arms to resist the convictions of reason. 



In all investigations, then, into subjects of morality 

 and religion, it is not enough that our own reason be sa- 

 tisfied ; the point to be enforced must be made familiar 

 to our senses ; must be reconciled to our prejudices, :md 

 shown to be consistent with those notions which we are 

 compelled to admit as primary ami incontrovertible 

 facts. Hence, we find, in general, that illustrations in 

 moral subjects are mare effectual than reasoning ; and 

 familiar views drawn from an induction of obvious 

 facts, are more satisfactory than the most elaborate ab- 

 stract speculations. 



In another part of this work, (see LOGIC,) we have 

 shown how much our intellectual perceptions are in- 

 fluenced by the order and course of nature ; and that 

 those mental features which appear most singular, are 

 iasprtsaed on the mind by that invariable order, which 

 the Almighty has established among his works. Thi- 

 regular order, both facilitates the acquisition of know- 

 ledge, and, by its frequent occurrence, stamps it, in in- 

 delible characters, on the human mind. '1 lie same ob- 

 servation applies to our moral feelings. The law of 

 God is, indeed, the ultimate rule; but that law is writ- 

 ten, to a certain decree, on our own hearts, because the 

 very instincts which he has given us compel us to ob- 

 i- it ; .mil our experience soon teaches us, tliat we 

 Jktrer can infringe, with impunity, those rules which 

 are indicated by the constitution of nature. God has 

 written his law, not only nn our luv.rt <, but on the face 

 of nature; and his revealed law i-t only the enforce- 

 ment and illustration of principle* which were always 

 in operation, and might always have been discovered. 

 had not the sins of man enfeebled and obscured hi- 



Moral 



Next to the revealed law of Cud, then, we would be 

 disposed to say, that nature is our sure-t guide ; we do 

 not mean arerjr the feelings of human nature, whch 

 are evidently under a corrupting influence, but the 

 narare of tli--.ii;-. that is. the arrangements oi' provi- 

 4enre, and the constitution of the external world. 

 These are the aids which the Almighty IMS given to 

 direct us to the knowledge of his will, and to strength- 

 en that revelation which our ignorance rendered neces- 

 sary. We conceive that this representation is confirmed 

 by Scripture. At the very time that God was giving 

 a positive revelation to Israel, he appealed to their own 

 interest, and told them that the lav. which he ordained 

 was for their own good. I>eut. vi. 84. 



And farther, that he might not seem to impose strange 

 and arbitrary precepts, having no foundation but in his ^losophy. 

 own despotic will, he told them that the law which "V" 

 they were commanded to observe, was perfectly con- 

 formable to the intimations of their conscience and 

 reason. This commandment which I command thee this 

 day, is not hidden from thec, neither is it far off: but 

 the word is very nigh tmto thec, in thy mouth, and in tliy 

 heart that thoti mayest do it. 



Our intellectual and moral faculties, though most Distinction 

 closely allied, admit nevertheless of an obvious distinc- between the 

 tion. It is the province of the intellectual faculties to intellectual 

 receive impressions, to perceive relations, to examine our * nd 

 attainments, and to see if they have been legitimately a 

 acquired : and if it shall be found that we have viewed 

 things as they are actually presented in nature, and 

 have combined them according to those analogies and 

 relations which the author of nature has established, 

 we have nearly exhausted the philosophy of the human 

 mind. The moral faculties have a farther, and most 

 important office to perform : for it is their province to 

 decide how far the things which are presented to our 

 senses, or suggested to our feelings, are conducive to 

 the general happiness of our nature, and to what ex- 

 tent we may enjoy them consistently with our duty as 

 moral agents. Those original impulses of our nature, 

 or those desires and feelings of want which are born 

 with us, put in motion the intellectual machinery of 

 the human mind ; they direct it to certain objects of 

 gratification ; and when these are obtained, it is a mat- 

 ter of feeling to decide on the degree of enjoyment 

 which has been received. If, instead of enjoyment, die 

 result has been pain, we are forced to conclude, that 

 the object which has produced this effect, is not intend- 

 ed for gratification ; or that we have not applied it 

 aright for the purposes of enjoyment. 



\Ve are thus impelled to fresh pursuits, and when, 

 at last, we discover, that which yields the desired en- 

 joyment to ourselves, without impairing the happiness 

 of others, and which is approved by our reason, whilst 

 it gr.-tities our feelings, we conclude that we have found 

 the right medium prescribed by the author of our ex- 

 istence. These experiments may go a considerable 

 length in ascertaining the rule of moral conduct; for 

 we are not left to grope at random ; nature and con- 

 science are always at hand to direct or to restrain us ; 

 and we are surrounded, from our very birth, by moral 

 relations, which train and discipline our minds in\ o- 

 luntarily and unconsciously, to the habits and duties 

 of moral agents. 



Hut here, we must observe, that those circumstances Origin of 

 which constitute the rule of moral action, do not by |ne ide of 

 any means, necessarily give us the idea of moral obliga- >*' ol) li- 

 tion. We can easily perceive, that we cannot exceed 8" on - 

 certain limits without destroying our own happiness; 

 a regard to our own comfort, therefore, will compel us 

 to respect those boundaries which nature has prescrib- 

 ed, as necessary to preserve us from the excesses which 

 ruin our respectability or enjoyment*. But there is no 

 more virtue in this than there is in avoiding the fire 

 which has burned us, or the food which has impaired 

 our health, or the person who has injured or betrayed 

 us. We are merely obeying a law which we dare not 

 violate, from apprehension of the coniequences ; and 

 which has the force of a statutory enactment, to secure 



Pro-ndc ,,r , 



! e, qua? * enu communi et nature jadicio mutuati docti homines gentiles ti- 

 IHUU. Neqae Ule ipee celettij pater pluris * nobu fieri eas leges Toluit, quas in 

 i quit in tpm uimorum nottrorum seunu imprttierit. Mclanchtlum. 



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