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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Mora! 

 Philosophy, 



the submission even of those who may dislike the in- 

 junction. We cannot conceive how it is possible that 

 there should be any idea of moral obligation, without 

 the idea of accountableness to that Being who created 

 the universe, who implanted in our nature those facul- 

 ties which enable us to act, and to judge ; and who has 

 established that order of nature which we are compell- 

 ed to respect. Take away the conviction of this ac- 

 countableness, and there is no distinction between vir- 

 tue and vice ; and nothing is left but a sordid calcula- 

 tion of the consequences which may affect our present 

 comfort. A man's visible interest would then be his 

 only rule, and there would be none of those high-toned 

 principles which make the nil conscire sibi, the proud- 

 est distinction of human nature : the object would then 

 be, to preserve a good name rather than a clear con- 

 science ; the most profligate would be sensible of no 

 baseness ; and the most abandoned wretch would lift 

 his head erect, so long as he could conceal his turpi- 

 tude from the world. 



In order, then, to obtain a moral principle of suffi- 

 cient efficacy, man must consider himself as amenable 

 to the laws of the supreme governor ; and he must 

 seek to know his will by all the means by which he 

 has been pleased to make it known to men : he cught 

 gratefully to avail himself of the light of revelation, 

 and he ought not to diregnrd those intimations which 

 are presented in the order and course of nature ; he 

 ought to consider them as so many auxiliary hints to 

 strengthen the obligations of virtue ; and even as use- 

 ful to ascertain many points of importance, wliich are 

 not settled by a positive rule, but may easily be re- 

 duced to a general law. 



Holding these views, we cannot subscribe to the 

 opinions, of Butler and Mr. Stewart, (who is very much 

 influenced by him,) that nothing farther is necessary to 

 show the obligation of the law of morals than the bare 

 recognition of its existence. " Your obligation to obey 

 this law," says Butler, " is its being the law of your na- 

 ture." But, according to the usual conceptions of 

 men, wherever there is a law, there is a lawgiver ; and 

 it is not the law itself, but the power and authority of 

 the lawgiver which enforce its obligations. Allowing, 

 then, that the law of our nature were ever so clearly 

 recognised, it could not be viewed as an object of moral 

 approbation, were we persuaded that it was the result 

 of fate, or of accident. It is only as proceeding from 

 an intelligent cause, and from a being who has willed 

 and planned our happiness, that we can admire and 

 love the law under which we act ; for it is then only 

 that we consider it as an intimation of the will of a 

 being who is the sovereign arbiter of our fate, and who 

 will undoubtedly, some time or other, give full efficacy 

 to the laws which he has established. 



" Every being," says Mr. Stewart, " who is consci- 

 ous of the distinction between right and wrong, car- 

 ries about with him a law which he is bound to ob- 

 serve ; notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance 

 of a future state." This is the same idea as Butler's ; 

 and we apprehend it brings consequences after it which 

 neither of these writers would have been very ready to 

 admit ; for, on their principles, it may be equally af- 

 firmed, that a person totally ignorant of the being of 

 God, or one who denies his existence, may feel all the 

 obligations of virtue ; and that an atheist may be the 

 most virtuous person in the world. This must be the 

 natural consequence of making virtue the result of a 

 moral sense; for such a faculty should convey its inti- 

 mations to the mind as infallibly as perception ; and 



the atheist and the believer should equally feel its Moral 

 power. Philosophy. 



The common sense and experience of mankind revolt ~~~^~~~ 

 at such an idea ; and, till modern times, neither mora- 

 lists nor legislators have ever imagined that there is a 

 moral sense in man of sufficient efficacy to regulate his 

 conduct, independent of the belief of a God, and of a 

 future state. The practice has always been to impress 

 on the minds of men a conviction, that the moral pre- 

 cepts which they were required to obey were the laws 

 of the gods, and that they must be accountable at their 

 tribunal for the neglect of them. This appears to us to 

 be not only good policy, but sound philosophy ; and to 

 lay the only sure foundation on which we can ulti- 

 mately rest the feeling of moral obligation. 



A man who has no idea of a God or of a future state, 

 may, nevertheless, be trained to a certain course of con- 

 duct conformable to the general views of the society in 

 which he lives. If he acts in opposition to these 

 views, he will be blamed or punished ; for he then 

 breaks through the rules of the confederacy ; and he 

 may be expelled from the community, as we are told 

 the rooks do with their pilfering companions, when 

 they are detected in the act of carrying off the materi- 

 als of their neighbours' nests. To avoid punishment or 

 shame, then, is sufficient to induce conformity to es- 

 tablished rules and customs ; another motive will be 

 furnished in the praise which attends every man who 

 respects public opinion ; and he who is forward in de- 

 fending the rights of the community, will be courted 

 and applauded for the protection which he affords. 

 Here, then, is a standard of approbation and disappro- 

 bation, founded in public opinion, which is often ini- 

 quitous and absurd when considered in reference to 

 higher principles, or the rights and interests of other 

 communities ; and we have thus a moral condition, if 

 it can be so called, of human nature without any refe- 

 rence to a moral governor. We believe that many 

 large communities exist in this state, fettered by inve- 

 terate prejudices, and referring to them with prompti- 

 tude as the laws of their nature. 



But there are many laws of our nature which are 

 not moral laws at all. It is a law of our nature to eat 

 when we are hungry; it is a moral law which says, 

 Thou shall not steal. In this view, the law of our na- 

 ture is totally distinct from the law of moral obligation. 

 The former arises from instinct or appetite, or from 

 prejudice, to which custom has given the force of a 

 law. The law of nature is limited by the moral law, 

 which defines the boundaries of our enjoyments. This 

 moral law is neither instinctive nor intuitive; it can 

 only be discovered by reference to revelation, to expe- 

 rience, or to observation of the obvious designs of pro- 

 vidence. It is true that moral laws are also laws of 

 our nature, that is, they are framed by the author of 

 our nature for our happiness and improvement ; but 

 they become obligatory on our conscience, only in con- 

 sequence of our referring them to the will of a superi- 

 or to whom we owe allegiance, and who is entitled to 

 it from his uniform kindness and benevolence, as well 

 as from his sovereign power and authority. 



The ideas of right and wrong are acquired at such an Moral p- 

 early period, and confirmed by such a course of con- probation 

 stant discipline, that we are apt to consider them as in- or 

 stinctive feelings, or as original independent intimations JJ 1 ^ " 

 of conscience ; and the opinions which tend to modify s " ltlaf \' 

 or controvert this doctrine are generally viewed with moral 

 some suspicion, as being conceived to have a tendency Mote, 

 to shake the eternal foundation of moral virtue. In so 



