MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



679 



Man) far as our particular opinions are concerned, this alarm 

 *' is entirely groundless ; for we most zealously contend 

 " for the eternal unalterable distinction between right 

 and wrong ; l>ut, we contend, that the mind does not 

 possess in itself any particular power or faculty which 

 decides iui} jure, on the moral fitness of actions ; and 

 that its decisions on this important point must be set- 

 tled by showing the conformity, or non-conformity of 

 any iction with the general order of nature, to which 

 our feelings, faculties, and powers, are adapted. By 

 this means, we perceive that the distinction between 

 right and wrong is not fanciful, nor casual, but fixed 

 and permanent, having its foundation in the ordina- 

 tions of providence, which God has made us capable of 

 observing, and which are presented to us every day and 

 every hour, that we may be trained to the functions of 

 moral beings. 



What use is there, then, for a moral sense to perceive 

 what is every moment of our lives pressed on our no- 

 tice, and rendered familiar to our understanding by a 

 thousand instances ? Is it a moral sense which teaches 

 parents the duty of loving their children ? No, it is an 

 instinctive feeling; it is exactly the ssme with that 

 which regulate* the lower animals, who might, with at 

 good reason, urge their pretensions to a moral sense, 

 on the ground of parental affect isn? Is it a moral 

 tense which enforces the duty of conjugal fidelity, and 

 ibowt the beauty of this virtue ? No, this duty results 

 from perceived necessity and expediency. Is there a 

 moral tense which tells us that polygamy is improper ? 

 N'o, but we soon perceive it to be so from the burden 

 ami inconvenience, the jarring and discomfort which 

 necessarily arise from double or divided family. We 

 should like to see how the impropriety of this practice 

 could be evinced on the principle of a moral sense. On 

 our principles there is no difficulty; for besides the 

 personal inconvenience which it produces, we can show 

 that the order of nature is in favour of monogamy ; 

 the birds of the air, and the beast* of the field separate 

 into pair*, and during the season of their loves remain 

 faithful to each other ; and the tame lesson is inculcated 

 on the human specie* by the proportion between the 

 sexe* ; an argument which . the author of our religion 

 did not disdain to employ, when he said, he (hat made 

 tkem at the beginning made them a male and a female. 

 I* it a moral sense which proclaims the virtue of patrio- 

 tism ? No; we are trained to it from our infancy, in 

 consequence of those powerful associations which arise 

 from common laws, and common religious feelings, 

 and common protection, and common interest, all which 

 cement the population into one body, and knit the soul 

 of the community into one common feeling. Does any 

 moral sense teach us our duty to God ? No, our feelings 

 often revolt from this duty, whiM our reason can point 

 out a thousand arguments to enforce it. 



Our readers will perceive that we have been arguing 

 against a moral tenie, only in the light in which it ha* 

 been viewed by several eminent modern philosophers, 

 such as Butler, Reid, Stewart, &c. a* a distinct power 

 of the mind, enabling it to perceive the moral beauty 

 or turpitude of action* ; and whilst we dismiss it, in 

 U> '* i * nie> ** tou "y unnecessary, we have endeavoured 

 to shew that there is a radical and essential distinction 

 between right and wrong, fixed by an unalterable law, 

 which we are compelled to recognise, because we can- 

 not recede far from it without ruining our happiness. 



\\'e are not to seek, then, for the law of moral ac- 

 t * on *' e 'y '" tbe ro'id itself; this would carry us back 

 to tb* innate 'Je of Descartes ; the mind collects it 



raii- 



partly from its own feelings and faculties, partly from **fr.-.I 

 the bodily capacities and functions, and partly from Pbiksoptj. 

 the order of nature, or the circumstances by which we "V 

 are surrounded, which are ordered and disposed by the 

 author of our nature, and influence materially our feel- 

 ing?, our opinions, and our actions. By comparing all 

 these things together, we learn to distinguish between 

 what is local or accidental, and what is fixed and per- 

 manent ; and we perceive distinctly that the line of 

 conduct resulting from the knowledge thus acquired, 

 is not only consistent with the will of heaven, as inti- 

 mated by the course of Providence, but is also perfect- 

 ly consistent with our own happiness. It is only by 

 this enlarged view of the subject, that we learn to cor- 

 rect the narrowness of private feeling, and to consider 

 our own happiness as identified with the public good. 

 An individual who looks not beyond himself, would bs 

 disposed to view many things that befal him as exceed- 

 ingly wrong, and to regard them with the strongest 

 disapprobation ; but when he considers these things as 

 happening by the fixed ordinations of Providence, and 

 that, of course, they must be useful in their general 

 tendency, though disastrous to him, he then views 

 himself as a fellow,subject under the same moral govern- 

 ment, and learns to approve whatever promotes the 

 plan* of the Supreme Legislator. He then learns that 

 true self-love and social are the same; and he learns, 

 moreover, that to be virtuous, and to consult his own in- 

 icreit, are, in fact, synonymou? expressions. Partial 

 views of expediency, or limited conceptions of God's 

 moral government, or turbulent and ungovernable 

 passions, may often make these expressions appear, not 

 only different, but opposite ; but they are identified by 

 the nature of things, and the appointments of heaven. 

 And we are inclined to think, with King, that the dis- 

 agreement of authors respecting the criterion of virtue, 

 is rather apparent than real ; and that " acting agreeably 

 to nature or reason, when rightly understood, would per- 

 fectly coincide with the fonztt of things ; the fitness of 

 things, as far as these words have any meaning, with 

 truth; truth, with the common goad ; and the common 

 good with the u-ill of God." 



It follows, from what we have already advanced. The rules 

 that whatever tends to promote the best interests of f morl 

 man, must be right, and conformable to the will of du iy' w< T 

 heaven ; and that in searching for a rule of moral con- c ?["' 

 duct, we will always find it to coincide exactly with that j ntercl . 

 which promotes the real happiness of man. Much 

 misconception has arisen on this subject, from con- 

 founding the motives with the rules of action. Were 

 there no sinful bias in human nature, and no tendency 

 to excess in its original passions, the motives and the 

 rule would always coincide : in that case, whatever 

 man willed would be right, and his own inclinations 

 would be an infallible rule of right conduct. But as it 

 is evident that the passions often act with undue vio- 

 lence, and are directed to improper and illegitimate 

 ends, the only rule that we can have for the manage- 

 ment of them is, to consider the consequences which 

 they produce, in their various bearings, on our charac- 

 ter, our present happiness, and our future hopes. If 

 they contradict any intimation which we have received 

 from the word of God, or the light of nature, we have 

 reason to feel alarm ; but if these are not contradicted, 

 whilst our present happiness and respectability are pro- 

 moted, we have the concurrence of every species of 

 evidence to prove that the passions, or appetites, or de- 

 sires, have been legitimately indulged, and directed to 

 proper ends. We do not see any rule, then, by which 



