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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral 



Tliedoc- 



we can judge of the proper degree in which any appe- 

 tite or passion ought to be indulged, but by the expe- 

 diency of the results to which it leads ; and having 

 learned by experience and extended knowledge what 

 is most conducive to our own and the general good, we 

 henceforth conclude that this is an object of rational 

 pursuit; we studiously dismiss every motive that would 

 divert us from the attainment of it ; and the rule and 

 the motive are again brought to coincide, as must have 

 been the case in a state of perfect rectitude. 



Mankind act at first without minutely calculating 

 irine of ex- consequences, or having any regard to remote expedi- 

 Itaie'u Vnd enc ? ' f or t ' ley ore trainetl to action either by authori- 

 vindicated. '- v ' w ' 1 ' c ' 1 tnev J are not disobey, or by instinctive feel- 

 ings which they are not inclined to resist. In this 

 way, they often acquire habits which stick to them 

 through life, and which they seldom examine with a 

 view to ascertain whether they be founded in truth and 

 reason. When, however, they have been led to think, 

 they soon begin to perceive that the habits which they 

 have acquired, and the feelings which they have blind- 

 ly obeyed, are referable to a general law, whose utility 

 they are forced to recognise. 



This is the general situation of mankind ; they are, 

 from their infancy, moulded by education, and trained 

 to moral habits insensibly and involuntarily ; but not 

 accidentally, for every system of moral education has 

 a foundation in nature, though it may be strangely dis- 

 torted by circumstances, and scarcely reducible to the 

 ordinary habitudes of moral action. When once their 

 knowledge is extended, and they are able to examine 

 the foundation on which their actions rest, they either 

 find them, or endeavour to make them, consistent with 

 that general plan which reason compels them to recog- 

 nise, and to ascribe to an intelligent and benevolent 

 ruler, whose laws they feel themselves bound to obey. 



Those feelings, then, must be pronounced worthy of 

 moral approbation, which give rise to actions which are 

 salutary in their consequences, useful to ourselves, and 

 beneficial to society ; and calculated alike to promote 

 our present happiness and our immortal hopes. 



Tills is nearly, if not altogether, the doctrine of Ex- 

 pediency, as taught by Paley, which has been so ge- 

 nerally condemned and so little understood. It is the 

 very principle, however, which seems to regulate all 

 the proceedings of the Almighty ; the tendency of the 

 whole being to promote the general good ; and could 

 we detect any thing in the economy of Providence, de- 

 cidedly malignant in its aspect and tendency, we should 

 be forced to exclude benevolence from the list of the 

 divine perfections. But as we pronounce the ways of 

 God to be good, from perceiving that the result is be- 

 neficent, can we hesitate to pronounce our approval of 

 human actions when their tendency coincides with the 

 plans of Providence, and when their end is to pro- 

 mote the general good ? But there are some who seem 

 as if they never could be satisfied, unless virtue and 

 interest are set at variance, and happiness and duty 

 rendered inconsistent. They seem to be influenced by 

 the same principle as the Religionists, who seek for 

 merit by austerities abhorrent to nature; or as the wor- 

 thy Father, who wished he had been commanded to be- 

 lieve what was impossible, that he might have had 

 it in his power to give a satisfactory evidence of his 

 faith. Who can hesitate to explode such notions as 

 hurtful follies ? And we aver, that they do not 

 think more soundly, who imagine that virtue must be 

 inconsistent with their present interest and happiness. 

 In prosecuting a course of virtuous conduct, we may 



be compelled to forego some temporal advantages, Moral 

 which may fall to the lot of persons whose consciences 

 are less scrupulous than ours ; but this involves no for- 

 feiture even of present happiness, since we have more 

 satisfaction in the approbation of our consciences, or in 

 the hopes of future reward, than we could have enjoy- 

 ed from the gratifications which we voluntarily re- 

 nounce, after a due calculation of consequences. 



If, therefore, by what is expedient, we understand 

 not merely that which promotes our present interest, 

 and private gratification, but that which is most con- 

 ducive to the general happiness of ourselves and others, 

 for time and for eternity, we may certainly consider 

 this kind of expediency as a test of the virtue of hu- 

 man actions, unless it can be proved that God has given 

 some other rule inconsistent with these principles. But 

 this is impossible ; the Author of our nature is not such 

 an unreasonable task-master, as to command the per- 

 formance of duties from which we can derive neither 

 profit nor pleasure. His precepts are sanctioned not 

 only by the paramount authority by which they are en- 

 joined, but also by their own reasonableness ; by their 

 adaptation to our circumstances; and by their tendency 

 to promote our true happiness. We have thus every 

 conceivable inducement to virtuous conduct, since it is 

 found to be not only conformable to the will of heaven, 

 and to the law of conscience and of reason, but also 

 perfectly consistent with the best interests of man. To 

 suppose that what is expedient, in the extended sense 

 in which we have understood the term, can by any pos- 

 sibility be wrong, would be to subvert at once all our 

 ideas of the moral government of God, which can be 

 understood only by the perceived tendency of the plans 

 of Providence to promote some good and beneficent 

 end. We may surely, then, judge of the moral cha- 

 racter of human actions by their tendency to promote 

 the best interests of man ; and we may find the origin 

 of moral approbation, by applying to the actions of 

 men, the same criteria by which we judge of the wis- 

 dom and goodness of God. 



It cannot be denied that the doctrine of expediency 7 

 may be grossly abused ; it is the abuse of it that gives tr 

 rise to all the aberrations o/ human conduct ; for when- pc 

 ever any man deviates from the straight path of recti- r 

 tude, he proposes to himself some present or ultimate '* 

 advantage; but his views are limited to selfish and 

 temporal gratifications; and he forgets the duties which 

 he owes to society, and to himself as the heir of immortal 

 hopes. But the doctrine is not answerable for thest; 

 abuses and perversions of it ; these must be charged to 

 the account of the headlong passions of men, which, 

 for the sake of a little present gratification, make them 

 overlook their duty as rational, social, and immortal 

 beings. Nor can it be denied that we are exposed to 

 numberless temptations, which induce us to take very 

 short-sighted views of expediency, and to consult our 

 own comfort at the expence of the general good; .but 

 reason aud conscience are given us to combat these 

 temptations, and to raise us above narrow and contract- 

 ed feelings, to the rank and dignity of moral beings. 

 So powerfully do these principles operate, and so dis- 

 tinctiy do they proclaim that man is formed to take an 

 intere'st in the common welfare of his species, that there 

 is nothing of which he is so much ashamed as to be 

 convicted of selfishness and want of feeling for the dw- 

 tresses of others. 



It is observed by Dr. Smith, that the loss of a finger 

 will cause infinitely more uneasiness to an individual, 

 than to hear of the lo*s of trre whole empire of China ; 

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