MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral be assented to by the most scrupulous moralists ; and 

 ilosophy. y e t j 8 jt no t perfectly convertible, and may we not say, 

 ""Y""" ' with equal propriety, that whatever is ultimately and 

 essentially expedient for men, must be right, and agree- 

 able to the will of heaven ? Would it not involve a 

 monstrous absurdity to say, " this is, in every respect, 

 most expedient for you, but it is wrong, you must 

 avoid it ?" For what can influence the conduct of any 

 human being, but a regard to his best interests? It is 

 true, indeed, that what is expedient for one particular 

 purpose, may be wrong ; but this is only because it 

 is inexpedient upon the whole. This was the case with 

 the plan of Themistocles for burning the combined 

 fleets of Greece, that the Athenians might be undis- 

 puted masters of the sea. He had stated publicly that 

 he had devised a measure of the utmost consequence 

 for increasing the power of Athens, but that it could 

 not be divulged without defeating the execution of it. 

 Aristides was ordered to communicate with him ; on 

 hearing the scheme, he instantly repaired to the assem- 

 bly of the people ; and without informing them what 

 the measure was, declared, that nothing could more ef- 

 fectually promote the superiority of the Athenians, but 

 that nothing could be more unjust. The feelings of the 

 people, on this occasion, acted with instinctive promp- 

 titude ; and, relying on the opinion of one whose name 

 was identified with that of justice, they ordered the 

 measure to be rejected without farther examination. 

 Had they acted differently, this illustrious Athenian 

 could easily have shewn them that mutual good faith 

 was essential to the peace and the intercourse of na- 

 tions ; and that, without this, they must be perpetu- 

 ally engaged in wars of extermination against each 

 other. 



After all, however, we are more anxious to rescue 

 the doctrine of expediency from the undeserved oblo- 

 quy to which it has been exposed, than to found on it 

 our system of morals. We consider it, particularly as 

 it is explained in the writings of Paley, as a beautiful 

 illustration of the wisdom and benevolence of the di- 

 vine government, in having made the duty of man, in 

 fluenceVb* everv res P ect > consistent with his best interests. But 

 principles' we conce ' ve tne principles of morals to rest on a still 

 of more simpler basis, and to be pointed out by circumstances 

 immediate and facts in the constitution of our nature, long before 

 efficacy w e have any idea of their general expediency, or unfi t- 

 than views ness< it j s on ]y a ft er the mind is enlightened by va- 

 >f exped - r ; e( j kri ow i e clg e) and the principles improved by pa- 

 tient culture, that we discover our real interests, and 

 discern the wisdom and goodness of the divine govern- 

 ment. Till we reach this point, we are pretty much 

 in the situation of children whose humours are crossed 

 by a parent's authority, and whose views of expedien- 

 cy are very different from his. They find, however, at 

 last, that he understood their interests much better 

 than they did themselves, and that obedience was both 

 their interest and their duty. There cannot be a doubt 

 that we will ultimately make the same discovery with 

 regard to the law of God : in the meantime, it is our 

 duty to listen to the plain intimations by which his 

 law is enforced ; in the confidence that, in the end, we 

 will find the result to be both profitable and expedient, 

 in what If, then, our duty as moral agents be perfectly coin- 



sense expe- cident with our best interests, we may safely assume ex- 

 ncy may p e( ji enc y ) j n the enlarged sense in which we have consi- 

 ed "twof dered >t, as a sure criterion of virtue : for it is impossi- 

 virtue.* ble but that which is most conducive to the temporal 

 and eternal interests of man, must also be agreeable to 



the will of God, who in all the arrangements of his pro- Moral 

 vidence, has obviously consulted our happiness. 



If we admit that this is a fair criterion, we may per- V "'i~*'* / 

 haps be able to throw some light on the much agitated 

 question, " To what principle in our nature we are to 

 ascribe the feeling of moral approbation." For the 

 question will then be reduced to this, What is the prin- 

 ciple which enables us to decide respecting our best 

 interests ? And this question will be answered by con- 

 sidering what principle, or principles, are employed in 

 comparing different actions, in anticipating consequen- 

 ces, in contrasting the effects of different gratifications, 

 and in taking into view the general interests of man, 

 as a social, rational, and accountable being. Lest we 

 should err in assigning to one principle what, in fact, 

 we consider to be the results of several, we say, in ge- 

 neral, that these operations are to ascribed to the intel- 

 lectual part of our nature : for we do not pretend to be 

 acquainted with any principle but reason, which can 

 shew us the obligation to obey any law. Where visi- 

 ble authority is interposed, fear would compel obedi- 

 ence, even when the law is unreasonable : yet even 

 here we cannot exclude the province of reason, which 

 compares the different results of obedience and diso- 

 bedience, and compels us to adopt the course most 

 likely to ensure the least injury, or the highest satis- 

 faction. 



Conscience is generally supposed to be the chief Conscience 

 agent in these decisions : and its power is indeed a mental 

 great; it acts with a force which is thought inconsis- hsbit - 

 tent with the nature of a secondary or factitious prin- 

 ciple, and is appealed to as a sovereign arbiter in all 

 discussions about right and wrong. It may always be 

 safely trusted when enlightened by knowledge and 

 guided by reason : but without their assistance, it is a 

 dangerous, and often a destructive adviser ; clearly 

 evincing that it has no independent jurisdiction, and is 

 possessed of no infallible certainty of decision. It is , 



merely a mental habit, arising out of the circumstances 

 of our nature, and strengthened by the most powerful 

 associations, and the most interesting recollections: 

 and disciplined by constant use, till it acts with a rapi- 

 dity and force which make us forget every thing but 

 the emotions which overwhelm us. 



Suppose we should wish to enforce any one of the 

 moral virtues, we can derive arguments both from the " tlon of 

 positive command of the Supreme law-giver, and also ^hid'soine 

 from many accessary circumstances which recommend O r t h e mo- 

 present obedience, independent of more remote views ral Virtue* 

 of advantage. Let us see, for example, how we would are en- 

 recommend the virtue of patience, from considerations forced 

 of a moral nature. In the first place, we feel that im- 

 patience renders us unhappy : this is a hint from our 

 own nature, to teach us to repress our headlong pas- 

 sions, and to wait patiently for the desired consumma- 

 tion. In the next place, we see that impatience does 

 not promote, but rather retard the accomplishment 

 of our wishes: here reason lends its suggestions in aid 

 of our feelings, to strengthen the great moral lesson of 

 patient endurance. But this is not all ; the game lesson 

 is enforced by the whole order of nature, and we are 

 actually trained to it by the usual economy of provi- 

 dence. No man expects to reap on the same day in 

 which he sows ; no man expects all the time to be an- 

 nihilated which lies between him and enjoyment : he is 

 compelled to wait ; and he cannot but see that it is best 

 to do it patiently. We perceive that a certain portion 

 of time, and a certain quantity of labour, are necessary 



