MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



683 



Moral 



for the production of certain effects, and that cheerful 

 . application is the best antidote against the irksomeness 

 of labour, and the tedium of hope deferred. \Ve see 

 also that time is necessary for the evolution of the 

 plant, and for its advancement to strength and beauty ; 

 and that we should completely blast our hopes did we 

 not patiently wait for the process and period of fructi- 

 fication. How beneficent, then, is our law-giver, who 

 presents so many inducements to observe the precepts 

 which he has enjoined, and who in fact makes the sys- 

 tem of nature, and the arrangements of his providence, 

 monitors to point the way to happiness and duty. By 

 what arguments do we enforce temperance ? Does any 

 moral tense tell us how much we should eat and 

 drink ? No : but a rule no less certain is given us by 

 the author of our nature : for we feel excess to be hurt- 

 ful to our health, or we feel that it impairs our faculties, 

 and gives undue strength to our passions ; or we per- 

 ceive that it will ruin our fortune, and thus ultimately 

 destroy all our means of enjoyment. Any one of these 

 reasons is sufficient to enforce temperance, and to shew 

 us that it is a virtue sanctioned by the wisdom of the 

 supreme law-giver. Nor are we without arguments 

 for this virtue drawn from the constitution of nature : 

 for the earth produces enough for the temperate sub. 

 istence of its present inhabitants ; but were we to 

 double the consumption, one half must be starved, or 

 the whole be inadequately fed. 



All that we are anxious to establish at present is, 

 (hat we are trained, to a certain extent, in the practice 

 of morals by the very constitution of our nature, and 

 that of the external world, before reason shews the ex- 

 pediency of a moral rule ; and that a foundation is laid 

 for the ideas of moral approbation or disapprobation, in 

 the simple feelings of liking or aversion, which have 

 been produced in our minds by conformity or noncon- 

 formity to the laws imposed on us by the author of our 

 nature ; which laws, in the first instance, we blindly 

 obey, or heedlessly violate, till experience extends our 

 knowledge, and shews the immoveable basis on which 

 Cod ha* established the practice of virtue. 



We are far from -wishing to fritter down the moral 

 feelings, and reduce them to mere operations of intel- 

 lect : we are anxious, on the contrary, to preserve en- 

 tire the enthusiastic love of the pulchrum el liunatum ; 

 we wish to see it so firmly established in the bean, that 

 it may act with intuitive quickness, and instinctive ac- 

 curacy : and God has taken care that it shall do so, un- 

 less voluntarily and obstinately resisted : for we are 

 trained to it every day ; and the mind is as little sensi- 

 ble of any effort in distinguishing between the ordinary 

 principles of right and wrong, as when it distinguishes 

 by the ear the note* of a well known tune. Thus li.i- 

 bit acts as the auxiliary of reason, and supplies the 

 place of those instinctive principles which some con- 

 tend for as necessary to produce the idea of moral ap- 

 probation. This habit is neither the result of reason 

 nor of accident ; it arises out of the constitution of our 

 nature, and the circumstances in which we are placed : 

 and the office of reason is to ascertain whether it has 

 been legitimately formed, or has grown out of miscon- 

 ceptions of the human mind, and erroneous views of 

 the nature of things. Did not our passions exercise an 

 undue influence, and distort, as it were, the arrange- 

 ments of providence, our habits would all be regular, 

 and would be formed according to the law of nature, 

 which is the law of God. But since there are so many 



things to mislead us, reason must exercise an impartial :sf oral 

 scrutiny, and endeavour to distinguish between those Philosophy, 

 associations which are natural and those which are spu- ^"""Y"^"' 

 rious ; and between those habits which are accidental, 

 and those which are founded on the immutable order 

 of things. 



To favour the opinion that a moral sense is necessary 

 to give the idea of moral approbation, it has been al- 

 leged that the reasoning faculties cannot give us any 

 idea either of the beautiful or of the good *. To be 

 sure, reason does not produce the idea of the sublime or 

 beautiful, but it enables us to analyse the principles on 

 which it depends : and, in the same manner, goodness 

 and moral beauty are not the creatures of our reason ; 

 it only recognises them as established by the law of 

 heaven, as agreeable to the nature and circumstances of 

 man, and as founded on habits which these circum- 

 stances necessarily produce. 



But the fancy of some moralists is, that after reason 

 has shown a measure to be consistent with the general 

 good, and to harmonize with the general system, a 

 particular sense is further required to give the percep- 

 tion of moral beauty. This is similar to the whim 

 which we have 'endeavoured to explode from intellec- 

 tual philosophy ; (See CONCEPTION and LOGIC,) viz. 

 that after the reason, or whatever power it may be 

 called, has collected the parts of an idea, or conception, 

 into one whole, yet still a distinct faculty is required to 

 act as gentleman usher, and introduce this stranger to 

 the presence of the mind. We have shown that cer. 

 tain objects presented to the senses, are found at once 

 to be agreeable or disagreeable. Two well propor- 

 tioned pillars please the eye two distorted or irregu- 

 lar ones offend it harmonious sounds are agreeable to 

 the ear, discordant ones are displeasing. But it often 

 happens that the objects of perception are presented to 

 us in such a complicated form, that we can, at first, 

 discover neither beauty, nor regularity, nor harmony : 

 by a process of reasoning, ana patient investigation, 

 however, we discover at last beautiful arrangement, 

 and mutual subserviency, and adaptation of parts. 

 The mind is then enabled to take in the whole at one 

 glance, in consequence of the connection which reason 

 has established among the parts ; and can pronounce 

 on the beauty or deformity of the tout auwmt with as 

 much readiness as on simple proportion when present- 

 ed to the eye. 



The same thing, we believe, takes place in our judg- Our moral 

 ments respecting the merit or demerit of actions. We notions ac- 

 cannot but perceive, for instance, that cruelty is wrong ; l uire d in a 

 we dislike it when practised on ourselves, on our chil- ^^J,"^" 

 dren, on our relations, or our friends : and, with these i c u a i"!,' r l 

 feelings, it never can be an object of moral approbation Ce pij ns. 

 in any circumstances ; for we soon acquire a general 

 abstract dislike of any quality that is particularly offen- 

 sive to us. In consequence of this, our judgments are 

 often infected by prejudices which have arisen out of 

 our own particular circumstances, and which give an 

 undue bias to our opinions on general questions in mo- 

 rals. This, however, is only the abuse of that princi- 

 ple which leads us to decide with almost intuitive 

 readiness, on the merit or demerit of actions; and 

 which has its foundation in the liking or aversion 

 which -we feel when we ourselves are the objects of 

 these actions. But perhaps the character of actions is 

 not, at first sight, very apparent ; we have, perhaps, 

 complicated motives to examine, and a variety of cir. 



Phil, of Rbet ToL i. 



