G84 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral cumstances to consider, before we win form a just esti- 

 J'luiuaophy. mate of the action subjected to investigation. Wedis- 

 v< "V^ cover at last, however, we shall suppose, that cruelty, 

 or injustice, lie at the root of the whole, and that every 

 part may be resolved into these principles : in these 

 circumstances, our earliest and most powerful associa- 

 tions lead us to pronounce a decided disapprobation of 

 those qualities which we have been trained to dislike, 

 which we hate when exercised towards ourselves, and 

 which we soon learn to hate with abstracted unmixed 

 dislike, in whatever circumstances they may appear. 

 Origin of Is not this the origin of that sympathy which forms 

 sympathy, such a remarkable feature in human conduct, and 

 whose influence on our moral perceptions Dr. Smith 

 has so beautifully illustrated? Taking sympathy in 

 its most ordinary sense, as a feeling extended towards 

 those who endure suffering, it obviously arises out of 

 our own private feelings. Suppose the suffering to 

 arise from cruelty or injustice, is not our sympathy for 

 the sufferer excited, primarily, by our antipathy to the 

 offence by which he suffers ? There is an ingenerated 

 abhorrence of the crime, and this elicits our affections 

 and exertions in behalf of the sufferer. We believe this 

 to be the real origin of our sympathy, in the sense in 

 which we have at present understood the word ; and 

 vie think it would not be difficult to show that it has a 

 cognate origin, in whatever acceptation the word can 

 be used. It is not, then, as Mr. Stewart alleges, a 

 principle superadded to our moral constitution, as an 

 auxiliary to the sense of duty ; sympathy is a name in- 

 vented to describe that particular effect which the sense 

 of our own injuries or sufferings produces on our feel- 

 ings, when we contemplate the injuries or sufferings of 

 others ; in which case our hatred of the injury makes 

 us espouse the cause of the sufferer, and teaches us to 

 adopt him as our ally in repelling the evils which be- 

 set humanity. We are perfectly sure of his concur- 

 rence, and rejoice to have found a person animated by 

 our own views and feelings, and bound to us by a 

 powerful common tie. 



We are aware that sympathy is generally considered 

 as a mysterious original power, which instinctively 

 prompts the heart to feel for the miserable. This no- 

 tion is disproved by the fact, that those who suffer 

 Not in- least, have always the least sympathy ; and were there 

 Minctive. any wholly exempted from suffering, we have reason 

 to conclude that they would be monsters of inhuman- 

 ity ; unless they were trained to a kind of artificial 

 benevolence, and thus taught to relieve sufferings which 

 they neither can sympathize with, nor comprehend. 

 They, on the other hand, who have suffered most, have 

 always most tenderness of heart, and feel the most an- 

 xious desire to relieve the afflicted. 



Ilaud ignara inali miseris succunerc disco. 



\Ve hold, then, that all those things which are morally 

 wrong, are either offensive to our feelings, or injurious 

 to our interests. This is a safeguard to our virtue, pro- 

 vided by the wisdom of Heaven ; and the very dislike 

 of cruelty or injustice, is tantamount to moral disappro- 

 bation : for though, in many cases, there may be dis- 

 like, without moral disapprobation, yet this is only 

 when irionl agents are not concerned. A voluntary 

 offence must always be viewed with tnirked dtssppro- 

 bation, as being an offence against the comfort and se- 

 curity of human nature, and against the general laws 

 which God has appointed to regulate our feelings. 



It is sometimes, indeed, extiemelv difficult to con- 

 vince men that certain species of moral evil are hurtful 



to their interests ; because perverted feelings counteract Moral 

 the influence -if conscience and reason, and keep the Philosophy. 

 mind in a state of toituring suspense between inclina- ( -^v^- / 

 tion and duty. These are moral Idola, which prevent Moral 

 the mind from recognizing the obligations of virtue, in idol!U 

 the same manner as the Idola tril'tu, &c. prevent it 

 from discerning the obvious conclusions of right rea- 

 son. But let the passioiu Ln: lulled asleep ; and let the 

 injurious tendency ot any practice to which we are ad- 

 dicted, be then demonstrated, and it will instantly be 

 viewed with moral disapprobation, or rather with com- 

 punction, because we feel that it is a voluntary injury 

 which we have inflictcfl on ourselves; and self-con- 

 demnation aggravates the unpleasant feelings which 

 always accompany moral disapprobation. There are 

 fewer obstacles to the exercise of a sound judgment in 

 estimating the conduct of others : we disapprove, with 

 instinctive readiness, of what is vicious, and commend, 

 with equal promptitude, what is salutary and useful ; 

 not from any selfish views of benefit or injury, but be- 

 cause we have actually acquired an abstract love or dis- 

 like of certain qualities which have affected us; and 

 that not accidentally, but by the constitution of our 

 nature, and the arrangements of Providence. 



But perhaps it may be thought that greater unifor- A general 

 mity in morals might be expected, if the principles uniformity 

 which lie at the foundation of them are thus general, of thinking 

 and fixed immutably in the constitution of things. In on moral 

 answer to this, we may observe, that though there are 8ub J ec ' 

 numberless circumstances which diversify the aspect ^-happ.,. 

 of moral conduct, yet we are acquainted with no in- rent diver* 

 stances in which the ordinary principles of morals are sity. 

 reversed. We know of no nation in which a mother 

 does not love her own child, cr in which a son does not, 

 in some way or other, honour his parent. We hear in- 

 deed of some tribes in which it is customary for chil- 

 dren to put their aged parents to death. Supposing 

 the fact to be fully ascertained, it would not militate 

 against our assumption of .filial duty as a general law ot 

 our nature. We may easily conceive that this unnatu- 

 ral practice arises from a mistaken sense of duty, and 

 that the son reckons it an act of piety to terminate or 

 prevent the sufferings of his aged parent We are told 

 that, in Sparta, theft was reckoned a virtue : No such 

 thing; but dexterity and adroitness were reckoned 

 useful qualifications, as being akin to the stratagems of 

 war, to which the whole policy of the state was made 

 subservient. Theft wag punished there, as it is in every 

 other place, where a distinction of property exists ; but 

 he who stole, not from necessity or inclination, but to 

 sharpen his powers of stratagem and cunning, was com- 

 mended, as these qualities were deemed useful to the 

 state. In many nations, the sexual intercourse is ex- 

 tremely loose ; yet we know of none in which the prin- 

 ciple of appropriation does not obtain, and in which the 

 relations of husband and wife are not recognized. 



If we consider the worship of God as a moral duty, 

 in which light it is undoubtedly to be viewed, we shall 

 see the most immense diversity of absurd rites, and 

 monstrous objects of superstition; yet, amid all these 

 aberrations of the human understanding, the leading 

 principle of religious worship is recognised, and the 

 duty of man to adore a supreme power is acknowledg- 

 ed. In short, amid ail the diversity of human con- 

 duct, we can always trace some leading connecting 

 principle, though infinitely varied according to the cir 

 cumstances of society, in regard to knowledge, educa- 

 tion, and refinement. In some instances this principle 



