086 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral those moral evils which desolate the world, which in* 

 Philosophy, troduce guilt into the conscience, and misery into the 

 *~ Y ~ abodes of men. To obviate these inconveniences, is 

 the object both of moral studies, and religious instruc- 

 tions, though these frequently prove ineffectual to cor- 

 rect the inveterate habits arising out of vicious indul- 

 gence. There is, however, no natural impossibility of 

 doing so. Any vicious habit may be corrected, if mo- 

 tives sufficiently powerful are suggested. Let a man 

 be convinced of the odiousness and criminality of vice ; 

 let him be persuaded that its evil consequences do not 

 terminate in the present life, but shall be continued in 

 the world to come, and show him at the same time a 

 practicable method of escaping these evils, and it is im- 

 possible to doubt that he will readily embrace it. Men 

 continue the slaves of sin, only because they do not see 

 its enormity, or because they reckon their emancipation 

 hopeless. We conceive that moral reasoning may be 

 highly useful in enlightening the mind with regard to 

 the first of these errors. It is more peculiarly the busi- 

 ness of religion to remove the second ; and although it 

 does not fall within the province of this article to dwell 

 particularly on the sanctions of religion, yet as we think 

 that they are most powerfully enforced by the judicious 

 application of moral reasoning, we shall be happy if 

 our speculations can in any degree be made subservient 

 to this important end. 



After the general view which has been given, we 

 proceed to consider more particularly the various prin- 

 ciples which impel the mind to action, or which influ- 

 ence its determinations ; and in this investigation we 

 shall necessarily be called to attend to the moral esti- 

 mate of the actions which result from these principles. 



Principles We have seen, that though an invariable rule is point- 

 er moral ed out by the constitution of our nature, and the ar- 

 action. rangements of providence, yet there is no principle in 

 our nature which directs us to the invariable observ- 

 ance of this rule. If there were such a principle which 

 inclined us irresistibly to the performance of duty, we 

 should cease to be moral agents, and accountable 

 beings. The very idea of a moral action implies that 

 there is a choice between motives, and the greater the 

 struggle, the more glorious is the victory when good 

 principles prevail. There is even among the lower 

 animals, a sort of balancing of motives arising from ex- 

 perience and education. A lion, for example, has al- 

 ways a disposition to eat a man when he is hungry ; 

 in situations however, where he has an opportunity of 

 being acquainted with the power and resources of man, 

 he rather wishes to avoid him ; and we have heard of 

 a single Moor putting a lion to flight with a stick. The 

 natural propensities of the animal are, in this instance, 

 repressed by fear ; and he, no doubt, reckons the risk 

 more than sufficient to counterbalance the expected 

 advantage. A dog has a natural propensity to worry a 

 cat ; but a few whippings will restrain him, and teach 

 him to live with the animal, for which he seems to have 

 a natural antipathy, on amicable terms. But this spe- 

 cies of discipline does not, in the smallest degree, ap- 

 proach to moral culture. Punishment is associated 

 with the action, and this induces a fear of committing 

 it ; but we have no grounds whatever to suppose, that 

 the animal can see any thing like moral impropriety in 

 the action ; or that there is any thing resembling con- 

 science to restrain him. 



We grant that there is just as little moral worth in 

 human conduct, when it is disciplined solely by fear, 

 2 



or any other principle distinct from the perception and Moral 

 love of virtue. No action proceeding from any other Philosophy. 

 source can ever be the object of moral approbation ; < """Y-" P ' 

 and this forces us again to refer to the will of God as 

 the great standard of moral action, and to the idea of 

 our accountableness to him, as the grand sanction by 

 which moral obligation is enforced ; for we hold it to 

 be utterly impossible to perceive the beauty and obli- 

 gation of virtue, without perceiving that the Being who 

 has established this fair order of things is entitled to 

 our obedience, and that we must be accountable to him 

 for our actions. 



Of the simple principles which impel the mind to Instinct. 

 action, the first which demands our attention is instinct ; 

 which directs to certain actions, antecedently to all ex- 

 perience, and, probably, in most cases without any 

 knowledge of the end to be produced. The term is, in 

 general, not used with sufficient precision. It is often 

 confounded with our natural appetites and desires. We 

 would distinguish them in this way, that the appetites 

 are certain feelings of want ; whilst instinct is the prin- 

 ciple which directs to the means of their gratification. 

 Thus hunger and thirst in a child, are not instincts ; 

 but suction and deglutition are. This distinction, how- 

 ever, is seldom rigorously attended to. Nothing can 

 be more unphilosophical than the theory which sup- 

 poses the human mind to be merely a bundle of in- 

 stincts ; and which endeavours to account for the su- 

 periority of man, by assigning him a particular instinct 

 adapted to all the emergencies of his circumstances. In 

 this notion, there is a complete confusion both of lan- 

 guage and ideas ; for if we consider instinct as the prin- 

 ciple which, prior to experience, directs with invari- 

 able certainty to the gratification of our wants, it is evi- 

 dent that man is of all other creatures the least indebt- 

 ed to this principle for the comforts which he enjoys, 

 and for the feelings which exalt his nature. 



In order to understand this subject more thoroughly, 

 let us consider the operation of-pure instinct in the case 

 of the lower animals, who are guided by it to all the 

 ends for which providence has designed them. With 

 them, instinct is all in all. They are directed instinc- 

 tively to the food which is most proper for them ; they 

 construct their nests or their habitations without the 

 aid of a teacher; and no one ever thinks of deviating 

 from the general form adopted by the species. The 

 young are soon as accomplished as their parents ; and 

 the only acquisition which they gain by experience, is 

 some knowledge of the enemies whom they have most 

 reason to dread. This they have not by instinct ; for 

 we see the young birds after they are fairly fledged, 

 and capable of flying, yet allowing themselves to be 

 approached by boys, whom, however, they soon learn 

 to consider as their greatest enemies. In some of the 

 South Sea islands, which have been seldom visited, the 

 larger species of pftocce, as well as several kinds of aqua- 

 tic birds, are perfectly fearless; experience will soon 

 teach them to lay aside their confidence in man. This 

 may seem to make some approach to human reason ; 

 but it is merely an exertion of memory which they pos- 

 sess in a considerable degree ; and without which they 

 could neither avoid the dangers to which they are ex- 

 posed, nor be susceptible of that degree of education 

 which renders them subservient to the use of man. 

 Their acquirements, however, seem to be entirely ac- 

 cidental, and to depend solely on the simplest modifi- 

 cation of memory ; a faculty necessary for their exist- 

 ence ; for it is by this that the mother must know her 



