MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



687 



to lower 



young ; it is by this that the beasts of the forest know 

 their accustomed lair ; and it is by this that they learn 

 to know the places most favourable for prey, and the 

 reasons best adapted for its capture. A wild beast at- 

 tempting to ford a stream where he has been carried 

 down, and his life endangered, will not try it at the 

 tame place again. In these instances, the lower ani- 

 mals are guided by memory, and not by instinct ; and 

 memory to this extent is absolutely necessary for the 

 preservation of their existence. To the same source 

 we must ascribe all the attainments of the elephant, in 

 so far as they are not instinctive, and all the tricks 

 which the more sagacious animals learn in consequence 

 of a species of education. 



We believe this to be the only encroachment which 

 the lower animals ever have made, or ever can make, 

 j*i * . on the province of human reason. The comparison of 

 two ideas in the memory, and the perception of their 

 relation constitute the first link in a process of reason- 

 ing ; but even this simplest of all intellectual opera- 

 tion*, the brutes seldom, or perhaps never employ. 

 Whilst the infallibility of their instincts, and the libe- 

 rality of heaven leave them nothing to desire, they cut 

 off the possibility of ulterior improvement. They have 

 no need to labour for clothing ; it is abundantly sup- 

 plied by nature ; they ton not, neither do they reap, nor 

 gather into bartu ; became their heavenly father feedeth 

 them ; they seek no defensive armour ; they fabricate 

 no offensive weapons, because nature has amply sup- 

 plied them with both. They have no need even to tax 

 their memory, as to the food most convenient for them ; 

 for here, instinct it their guide, and tells them at once 

 what i- most proper and most agreeable. 



For what purpose then, should the inferior animals 

 be possessed of reasoning powers ? They never could 

 be celled to exercise them ; for they gain their object 

 with certainty without them ; man himself would not 

 exercise his reason, were he not stimulated by his 

 wants, and destitute of any instinct which might guide 

 him with infallible certainty to the attainment of hi* 

 wishes. The nature of man is possessed of indefinite 

 capabilities from the very circumstance of his not 

 baring definite instinct* adapted to every demand of 

 his desires. In consequence of this defect, he is forced 

 to recollect, to compare, and arrange ; and this exer- 

 cise compels him to discern the beautiful order and 

 wise disposition of the visible creation ; and thus to 

 recognise an eternal source of excellence, and an Al- 

 mighty Being to whom he owes allegiance, and to whom 

 he perceives he must be accountable for his actions. 



But a brute is incapable of any researches ; iiiopem co- 

 fia jecit. Why should he compare, abstract, or gene- 

 ralize ? Man does so only from necessity ; in the case 

 of the brute, this necessity does not exist ; for instinct 

 direct* him at once to the object best suited to gratify 

 his desire* ; and beyond this he cannot form a concep- 

 tion or a wish. 



A few instance* have been adduced of variable in- 

 stinct, with a view to prove that human reason is no- 

 thing else but instinct capable of indefinite variations. 

 It has been said, and we are not able to contradict it, 

 that certain birds which build their nests among the 



I branches of trees in ordinary circumstances, are accus- 



tomed to far to vary their plan, as to form pensile nests, 

 hanging from the branches, in countries infested by 

 monkies. But we have the strongest reason to suspect 

 variety of species in this instance. It is certain, how- 

 ever, that a monkey exhibits considerable variety of ac- 

 and when be cannot crack a nut with his teeth, 



he takes a stone to assist him. We have also heard Moral 

 that a crow has been known to take a shell-fish up into Philosophy, 

 the air, and drop it among rocks in order to obtain "" ~~V* 

 the meat within. These instances, in so far as they are 

 well authenticated, evidently advance a step beyond the 

 precincts of instinct. In the case of the monkey, how- 

 ever, it may have proceeded from imitation, for a mon- 

 key is the most imitative of animals ; and if he had 

 ever seen a human being have recourse to such an ex- 

 pedient, it would be readily imitated. Besides, the 

 hands of a monkey are such important organs, and so 

 constantly employed, that such a discovery as cracking 

 a nut by mechanical means, must have occurred ; and 

 if it occurred once, it would be remembered. In the 

 case of the crow, also, it might naturally happen, that 

 she would accidentally drop a shell, and descending to 

 recover it, she might find it broken, and the meat ac- 

 cessible ; and we see no reason to doubt that the expe- 

 riment might be repeated, on the same principle as an 

 animal will repair a second time to the place which has 

 yielded him the most agreeable food. We can see little 

 more semblance of reasoning in the case of the crow, 

 than there would, be in that of a horse, who having 

 strayed accidentally into a field aifording comfortable 

 pasture, should repair to it again next day, and should 

 seek out the very gap through which he had accident- 

 ally gained admission. There is nothing in all this 

 but a simple exercise of memory, without which ani- 

 mals could not exist, or be rendered subservient to the 

 use of man. Had they no power of locomotion, so as 

 never to be put in the way of danger, or did every 

 place afford subsistence, and other gratifications, with 

 equal facility, in that case, even memory would not be 

 necessary; and being unnecessary, it would not be im. 

 parted, for nature bestows no superfluous gifts; but 

 needing it, as they obviously do, for their preservation 

 and their comfort, it is bountifully conferred ; and be- 

 ing modified by the different habits of different ani- 

 mals, it exhibits many singular and surprising pheno- 

 mena. * 



This much, then, we allow to the lower animals ; and 

 we cannot but be filled with astonishment when we see 

 them unconsciously accomplishing works which reason 

 can scarcely comprehend, and which require the acut- 

 est researches of man to discern the important pur- 

 poses indicated by their structures and their plans. We 

 are forced to subscribe to the maxim, Densest brutonim 

 aiiimn, in so far, at least, as to perceive that the wis- 

 dom and goodness of the Almighty Parent are most 

 distinctly displayed in the unconscious instinctive ope- 

 rations of the lower creatures. 



Instinct goes a very short way in regulating human I" linct 

 conduct: it is useful to man chiefly as regulating the B oes f 8horl 

 functions necessary to vitality ; but in so far as his con- luting 1 "" 

 duct is guided by instinct, he is a necessary, and not a con duct. 

 moral agent To make man accountable, it is necessary 

 that good and evil should be set before him, and that 

 he should have the liberty of choosing between them. 

 The choice is often difficult ; because inclination draws 

 one way, and reason and conscience another ; and our 

 strongest feelings are frequently opposed to the most 

 obvious calculations of prudence and duty. Moral vir- 

 tue consists in a man's preferring the latter ; for it is 

 then that he gains a victory over himself, and resists 

 the propensities that would lead him astray. The low- 

 er animals are altogether incapable of forming such 

 conclusions, or of being influenced by such motives. 

 The prospect of immediate punishment may teach them 



