688 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral to repress certain propensities ; but they cannot per- 



JMiilosophy. ce i ve this to be right. On the contrary, there can be 



^f~~" , 10 ( { i,bt that they grumble at the necessity which 



compels them. But the human mind recognises a law 



whose excellence it acknowledges ; and the human 



heart never feels such genuine satisfaction as when it 



sacrifices an evil propensity at the shrine of virtue and 



of wisdom. 



Instinct directs the lower animals not only to the 

 proper objects of gratification, but to the proper mea- 

 sure and degree of enjoyment. It performs no such 

 decided functions in the economy of human life; for 

 even when we know the objects of gratification, we are 

 under constant temptations to indulge in excess either 

 of desires or of enjoyment ; and by this means we never 

 fail to bring misery on ourselves and others. From this 

 source proceed all the moral evils which deform human 

 nature, and overwhelm the world with misery and 

 crimes. And yet it is the presence and pressure of 

 these evils that afford an opportunity of exercising the 

 most exalted virtues, and of advancing the moral dig- 

 nity of man. Jt is from our being made capable of 

 knowing good and evil, that we learn to appreciate vir- 

 tue; that we recognise an eternal source of excellence; 

 that we see the extent of moral obligation, and perceive 

 that the destinies of our nature point to something more 

 exalted than the gratifications of sense, or the enjoy- 

 ments of the present world. 



Man could not be a moral agent, if he could not do 

 wrong : his obedience in that case would not be more 

 valuable than that which proceeds from the instinctive 

 impulses of the lower animals. In his state of absolute 

 innocence, when there was nothing to seduce, when the 

 passions weie in absolute subjection, and the will had 

 no disposition to stray ; with all these advantages, he 

 could not have been a moral agent, if he had not had 

 an opportunity of doing wrong. Accordingly, we learn 

 from the short but interesting account of the original 

 state of man given in the sacred Scriptures, (an account 

 which appears to be perfectly consistent with the sound- 

 est philosophical opinions,) that such an opportunity 

 was afforded him. An arbitrary command was im- 

 posed ; a moral restraint, in a state of perfect inno- 

 cence, would have been absurd and unintelligible ; but 

 he could easily understand the impropriety of violating 

 a positive command, which he felt he had the power to 

 observe or to disobey. Yet still we may have some 

 difficulty in perceiving how he should have had an in- 

 clination, in his state of innocence, to break through 

 such a slight restraint. An evil agent is therefore in- 

 troduced, who suggests temptations and inducements 

 to sin ; and he appears to be no superfluous personage 

 in this fatal drama ; for though man could have no ex- 

 cuse for yielding, yet he appears a fitter object of mer- 

 cy, since he was seduced by the artful insinuations of 

 another. We do not know how far we are entitled to 

 lament this catastrophe. Without it human nature 

 would not have been what it is ; and as it is, we believe 

 it displays the wisdom and goodness of God more fully 

 than would have been done had man never gone astray. 

 But we must repress all farther speculations on this 

 subject: if they may be indulged at all, they fall more 

 properly under another department of this work. 



Appetites. It is only during the first stage of human life, that 

 the operations of instincts are particularly observable 

 in man : they seem afterwards to merge so completely 

 in reason and experience, that their influence is little 

 noticed. Hunger, thirst, and the sexual appetite, form 



another important class of active principles ; they are 

 common to man with the lower creatures, and are abso- 

 lutely necessary for the preservation and continuance 

 of animal life. The immediate object of these feelings 

 is bodily gratification. They originate in the body; 

 they terminate in the body ; and are attended with un- 

 easiness till the means of gratification are procured. 

 They are in their own nature perfectly indifferent as to 

 virtue or vice, but they are productive of most import- 

 ant moral consequences, from the pursuits to which 

 they stimulate, from the feelings which they inspire, 

 from the knowledge which they are the means of ac- 

 quiring, or from the temperance and self-denial which 

 they afford an opportunity of exercising. 



There is a remarkable difference between man and 

 the lower animals, with regard to the nature of the food 

 on which they subsist. The various tribes of animals 

 have each a particular species of food appropriated to 

 them. This is so very observable that it affords grounds 

 for their classification, under the various heads of Car- 

 nivorous, Frugivorous, Granivorous, Insectivorous, c. 

 &c. But man is Omnivorous : he eats every thing 

 that is eatable. This is a beneficent provision of the 

 Universal Parent, in favour of his rational offspring ; 

 for it affords them an opportunity of multiplying, far 

 beyond any animals of the same size, who depend sole- 

 ly on one species of food. Man lays every department 

 of nature under contribution ; and is thus enabled to 

 promote the multiplication and comfort of his species, 

 without trenching materially, if at all, on the numbers 

 or enjoyments of the lower creat jres. There is indeed 

 every reason to believe, that the lower animals, under 

 the dominion of man, are more numerous and more 

 comfortable than they could have been, had they had 

 the world wholly to themselves. 



But this is not the only advantage arising from the 

 universal voracity of man. He is perhaps not directed 

 instinctively to any species of food but his mother's 

 milk : beyolid this all is the result of labour and expe- 

 riment. He is forced to observe the qualities of the 

 different articles of food : he thus becomes acquainted 

 with their medicinal properties, and with their compa- 

 rative value, as means of subsistence. Those kinds 

 which he finds most serviceable, he cultivates with 

 care : this brings him acquainted with the properties 

 of the soil, and the various operations of agriculture ; 

 and thus whilst he seems to he solely intent on satisfy- 

 ing the importunate calls of hunger, he is insensibly 

 storing his mind with varied and extensive knowledge. 



And there are still more important results arising 

 from that law which gives to man for food, " every 

 herb bearing seed, and every tree bearing fruit, and 

 every moving thing that liveth.' 1 Being compelled to 

 seek what suits him best, when once he has discovered 

 it by his ingenuity or by his labour, he concludes, with 

 the most perfect conviction, that he has a right to the 

 fruits of his discovery. Hence the distinction of pro- 

 perty ; a distinction which could not exist were no 

 labour necessary, and did the earth produce spontane- 

 ously sufficient food to satisfy the appetite of hunger. 



On the distinction of property depend many of the 

 relative duties of life, and the greater part of the politi- 

 cal virtues. Indeed the maxim of swim cinque embraces 

 almost all the duties which we owe to society. Thus 

 our very wants tend to promote not only our intellec- 

 tual attainments, but to advrntv the moral dignity of 

 our nature. Does any one sigh f>r t!.e return of the 

 golden age, w Jen the earth produced spontaneously all 

 that was necessary for the life of man ? Such a change 

 1 



Moral 



