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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral natural bonds of union, which are apt to be lost sight 

 isi)|ihy. o f m tne ujjjgt o f complicated political connections. 

 In such a state, men scarcely look beyond the artificial 

 regulations which apply to their immediate conduct, 

 and are apt to think that society is a work of human 

 invention, arranged and methodised by the wisdom of 

 some political sages. The hand of man may, indeed, 

 be seen in every well-regulated society : but it is only 

 to give strength and efficiency to those great natural 

 principles which have their origin in the contracted 

 sphere of family connection. All artificial and politi- 

 cal regulations depend on these principles, and derive 

 their obligatory sanctions from them ; in the same 

 manner as artificial signs in language derive their pow- 

 er and significancy from those which are natural. 

 " There is such a natural principle of attraction in 

 man towards man," says Butler, " that having trod 

 the same tract of land, having breathed in the same 

 climate, barely having been born in the same artificial 

 district or division, becomes the occasion of contract- 

 ing acquaintances and familiarities many years after ; 

 for any thing may serve the purpose. Thus, relations 

 merely nominal are sought and invented, not by go- 

 vernors, but by the lowest of the people ; which are 

 found sufficient to hold mankind together in little fra- 

 ternities and co-partnerships : weak ties, indeed, and 

 what may afford fund enough for ridicule, if they are 

 absurdly considered as the real principles of that 

 union : but they are, in truth, merely the occasions 

 upon which our nature carries us on according to its 

 own previous bent and bias : which occasions, there- 

 fore, would be nothing at all, were there not this prior 

 disposition and bias of nature." 



Desires. Besides the instincts and appetites common to man 



with the brute creation, and which are absolutely ne- 

 cessary for the preservation and continuance of the 

 species, we are conscious of desires of a more dignified 

 nature, which raise man far above the lower animals, 

 and carry him forward in the career of indefinite im- 

 provement. We do not think that the number of these 

 desires can be distinctly specified. Dr. Reid has men- 

 tioned the Desire of Power, the Desire of Esteem, and 

 the Desire of Knowledge ; to which Mr. Stewart has 

 added the Desire (if Society, and the Desire of Superi- 

 ority ; and we see nothing to hinder others from ex- 

 tending the enumeration. These philosophers consi- 

 der the desires which they have specified, as ultimate 

 and instinctive principles of our nature: to this we 

 cannot assent, without altering the usual acceptation 

 of language. We have already said that we do not 

 consider the desire of society as an instinctive princi- 

 ple, but as Arising necessarily out of the ordinary cir- 

 cumstances of human nature. That which is instinc- 

 tive cannot be counteracted. But we conceive it per- 

 fectly possible for a mother to fly from society, to train 

 her child in solitude, and teach him the arts of savage 

 independent man ; and we think there is every proba- 

 bility that a child thus trained would grow up in fear 

 and hatred of his own species, till perhaps the sexual 

 appetite drove him to desire a more intimate acquaint, 

 ance with them. But man born in society, and grow- 

 ing up amidst the extending ties which strengthen the 

 social union, is led, both by education and habit, and 

 feelings, to desire the company of his species. 

 The desire The desire of knowledge is generated in the progress 

 of know- of socic-ty, but we do not desire it till we find that we 

 ledge, &c. cannot do without it, and the majority of mankind are 

 not instinc- satisfied with a very moderate portion. When the sa- 

 live. 



vage has knowledge sufficient to manage his weapons, Moral 

 or to match his enemy in stratagem, he feels no violent Philosophy. 

 orcjris impelling him to farther acquisitions. We do S ~"V" 1 '' 

 not, therefore, regard the desire of knowledge as an in- 

 stinctive principle, we consider it rather as a rational 

 desire, recommended by its perceived utility; for though 

 a certain degree of knowledge is necessary in every 

 stage of society, and is, in fact, unavoidably acquired 

 by our intercourse with material objects, and by the 

 results of experience, yet the desire of knowledge, for 

 the sake of knowledge, operates only in an advanced 

 state of human improvement. 



That tha desire of power is a natural and universal 

 principle of our constitution, cannot be denied; never- 

 theless, we conceive it to be unphilosophic.il to consi- 

 der it as original and ultimate. It is quite evident that 

 man feels himself in want of many things ; and nothing 

 can be so welcome to him as the means of procuring 

 them. On this is founded the desire of power, the on- 

 ly object of which is to supply the wants and desires of 

 our nature. This desire of power, then, as it has been 

 called, is nothing more than a desire to have the means 

 of procuring the enjoyments which we think necessary 

 for happiness ; and, hence, it is manifested in a great 

 variety of ways, according to the views which men 

 have formed of enjoyment. If knowledge appears the 

 most likely means of advancing our character, or of 

 securing any desired pleasure, we eagerly seek know- 

 ledge. In this case, those who have never heard of the 

 name of Bacon, act under the influence of his maxim, 

 that knowledge is power. If sensual indulgence be the 

 prominent desire, the means of gratification are sought 

 with no less keenness ; and hence the desire of riches 

 is generated, as these seem to be the most convertible 

 means for procuring varied enjoyments. 



But, in the progress of mental improvement, some 

 may perceive that a man's happiness consists as much 

 in the limitation of his desires as in the extent of his 

 gratifications ; hence, they seek their security in self- 

 control, and in the government of their passions, adopt- 

 ing as a maxim, Non desiderarejucundiiisest quamfrui. 

 These persons, as Cicero observes, are animated by the 

 same principles which impel to the most arduous en- 

 terprise of ambition, the object of both being Ne qua 

 re egerenl. 



Such principles as these, however, can only operate 

 in a considerably advanced state f mental refinement. 

 In the first instance, the appetites are clamorous, and it 

 is the first desire of every man to gratify them in the 

 way which they seem to point out. This gives rise to 

 a thousand varied exertions, and to numberless experi- 

 ments and disappointments, which often produce much 

 misery, both to the individual, and to society. But the 

 result, upon the whole, is salutary ; the stock of know- 

 ledge is increased, the moral discipline of the species is 

 promoted, and a wise man will recognize an overruling 

 providence, when he sees the general order of the world 

 maintained inviolate amidst the confusion of human 

 passions. 



If any one of our desires could be entitled to rank as 

 an ultimate principle in our nature, we should think 

 the desire of esteem, or of being loved, might claim that 

 distinction. It operates powerfully and universally, 

 and yet it is easy to see how it is generated in the in- 

 fant mind by the caresses of the parent and the advan- 

 tages which accompany them. The child perceives 

 that his happiness depends on the good will of his pa- 

 rents, and therefore it is impossible for him not to de- 

 sire it. The feeling expands with advancing years, 



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