MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



691 



Distinction 



Moral and, as we are formed to be dependent on each others' 

 Philosophy, exertion*, we perceive that we cannot be independent 

 """V^* of each others' esteem. Let it not, however, be sup- 

 posed, that we consider the desire of esteem as facti- 

 tious or accidental. We admit it to be a natural, uni- 

 versal principle, of our constitution, as much so, in- 

 deed, as the ideas of right and trrana, virtue and vice, 

 which, though not innate or instinctive, are, neverthe- 

 less, forced upon us, by the condition of our nature, 

 and by the circumstances in which we are placed. 



There are some philosophers who seem to think that 

 we detract from the dignity of human nature, unless we 

 allow to man a set of original instincts, and feelings, 

 totally distinct from those of the lower animals. We, 

 on the contrary, think that it is most for the honour of 

 man to make him almost wholly a rational being ; for, 

 in proportion as he is guided by instinct, he Is a neces- 

 sary agent ; it is only as a rational being, capable of 

 weighing motives, that he can be the subject of moral 

 discipline, or responsible for his actions. Others, again, 

 think it derogatory to the honour of the Creator, to 

 allow any influence to man in the fabrication of his for- 

 tune or the formation of his character. All that we 

 contend for is, that though God has established immu- 

 table laws, which no effort of man can alter, yet we are 

 permitted to resist them so far as to create a temporary 

 confusion, or local derangement, or even to ruin our 

 own happiness, whilst yet the general order of things 

 remains perfectly unaffected by our madness. 



Mr. Stewart distinguishes between the appetites and 

 desire*, by saying that the latter are not occasional like 

 the appetites, nor do they, like them, take their rise 

 aal4**ircf. from the body. Our desires are, no doubt, some de- 

 grees removed from the grosser elements of appetite, 

 but no small number of them originates in the ordinary 

 appetites of our nature, and there, too, with the bulk 

 of mankind, they terminate. Others of them originate 

 in our bodily senses, and have for their object the gra- 

 tification of feelings immediately connected with these 

 senses. 



We believe that Mr. Stewart, who seldom errs but 

 on the tide of excessive caution, was afraid lest some 

 dangerous consequences should be deduced, from re- 

 ferring the origin of our desires to the appetites and 

 tenses. For, as Locke's Theory' of Perception has been 

 adopted by materialists, who maintain, that if all our 

 knowledge be by sensation and reflection, there never 

 can be any thing in the mind but the ideas of sensible 

 objects, so it might be said, that if our deaires originate 

 in the appetites and lenses, the gratification of these 

 must constitute the ultimate and legitimate object of 

 human enjoyment. But as Mr. Stewart has qualified 

 Locke's doctrine, by saying, that though certain kinds 

 of knowledge cannot be referred immediately either to 

 sensation or reflection, yet these principles furnish the 

 occasions of acquiring all our knowledge, so he might 

 have said that the appetites and senses furnish the oc- 

 casions of exciting the various desires which actuate 

 human nature. Not that we would absolutely assent 

 to thi* doctrine, though it is evident that it must be 

 very generally applicable. 



Ue have already said, that the feeling of want creates 

 the desire of power ; and knowledge, riches, honours, 

 public applause, &c., are only modifications of power or 

 means of procuring what we desire. We might conceive 

 the desire of these things, therefore, to originate in the 

 bodily appetites, as these give rise to the pressing wants 

 01 our nature. But, besides this, an extensive class of 

 desire* has its origin in the gratifications required by 



different 



, . 



the different senses. The eye, the ear, the taste, the Moral 

 smell, and, in a smaller degree, the touch, have each Phil"''pl'T. 

 their specific gratifications ; and, hence, there is room " 1 "\~""' 

 for indefinite, or almost infinite, objects of desire. The 

 ear gives rise to the pleasures of harmony, it enables 

 us to appreciate the pathos of poetry, and of eloquence, 

 and all the delights of human converse : the eye gives 

 rise to painting, statuary, architecture, and all the imi- 

 tative arts. 



From the same source are derived our conceptions of 

 grandeur and sublimity in the works of nature, and al- 

 so those ideas of proportion and relation which give 

 rise to the mathematical sciences. The taste, and the 

 smell, do not give birth to any intellectual ideas, but 

 they suggest numberless objects of desire, to stimulate 

 the activity of rational beings, and thus to put them in 

 the way of requiring knowledge, when they are only 

 seeking 1 sensual gratification. 



But though it is quite evident that a very numerous Moral de- 

 class of our desires must be referred immediately to the sires - 

 body, as they have for their object the gratification of 

 the appetites or the senses, yet we admit most readily, 

 that what may be called the moral desires of our na- 

 ture, must have a different origin. The desires con- 

 nected with the senses, though they lead to the most 

 extensive knowledge, and to the most elegant and 

 wonderful attainments, yet do not constitute a single 

 element of moral feeling. They may, indeed, be ren- 

 dered highly subservient to morals, as means, or instru- 

 ments ; tor extended knowledge should make us better 

 acquainted with the laws, and the Lawgiver of the uni- 

 verse. But, in themselves, they are wholly indifferent 

 as to virtue or vice; they may be converted to either, 

 according as they are improved or perverted, and a man 

 who is an adept in all the attainments of science, or of 

 art, and nothing more, is yet a stranger to the noblest 

 feelings, and best hopes of our nature. 



We are, indeed, firmly persuaded, that nothing but 

 the idea of God, and the conviction of our accountable- 

 ness to him, can raise us above the importunities of ap- 

 petite and the gratifications of the senses, or teach us 

 to delight in feelings and contemplations, of which, 

 without this idea and conviction, we never could have 

 formed a conception. These impressions respecting 

 the government of God, do not originate in the senses, 

 yet they are not foreign to human nature. We have 

 ehown elsewhere, that the idea of power originates in 

 our own conscious energies ; (see Looic) after this, one 

 link only is necessary to connect our thoughts with 

 God, and we are compelled to admit his existence, his 

 power, and his government, as soon as we perceive 

 that the power of man could not make or sustain the 

 universe. Our ideas of God acquired in this way, 

 will, indeed, be very imperfect ; but they exhibit the 

 elements of that more perfect science which revelation 

 has made known. 



It is here, then, that our moral character commences, 

 for we now recognize our obligations to obey the laws 

 of the supreme Lawgiver, and perceive it to be our 

 paramount duty to seek to know his nature and his 

 will. In this investigation, we must soon discover that 

 he is totally free from the solicitations of sense and ap- 

 petite, that his goodness flows unconstrained, and un- 

 tainted by selfish feelings, to every thing that lives. 

 We see it to be our duty to imitate him, and perceive the 

 resemblance to be more complete, in proportion as we 

 emancipate our minds from sensual gratifications, and 

 raise them to the contemplation and love of that excel- 

 lence which is inherent in the nature of the God whom 



