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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral we worship. It is then that we perceive a pure and 



l|os P h y- adequate motive for the practice of the sublimest vir- 



"V"' tues, for we see that they are necessary to constitute 



our resemblance to the Parent of the universe, without 



which we cannot expect to be the objects of his love. 



It is true, indeed, that men are trained to the duties 

 of moral agents by the laws and institutions of the 

 country in which they live. But these can only pro- 

 duce external conformity ; the principle of obedience 

 is founded in a recognition of the wisdom of the divine 

 law, and in an admiration of the excellence of the di- 

 vine nature. When the laws of men correspond with 

 what we see so conspicuously displayed in the arrange- 

 ments of Providence, they have the force of a divine 

 sanction ; when they have a contrary tendency, we 

 pronounce them to be injudicious and oppressive, 

 though fear may enforce a reluctant submission. 



Human laws, then, borrow their influence, and de- 

 rive their sanction from their conformity to the visible 

 arrangements of heaven, and without connecting them 

 with these as their foundation, they never can train the 

 mind to moral feelings, nor inspire a love of the pul- 

 chrum et honestum, abstracted from temporal advanta- 

 ges. The conscience, indeed, may acquire a sort of ar- 

 tificial influence, from circumstances of education and 

 early associations. But it is then little better than a pre- 

 judice, useful, nodoubt, to the general interests of socie- 

 ty, but not yet exalted to the dignity of a moral prin- 

 ciple. 



Conscience. A well-informed conscience is unquestionably the 

 best safeguard to virtue; a conscience under the influ- 

 ence of superstition or ignorant prejudice, is the most 

 powerful instrument of mischief; a timid or a ticklish 

 conscience will render the life miserable, and the con- 

 duct vacillating and uncertain. Thus, though con- 

 science pronounces decisively on the subjects which 

 come under its cognizance, yet another principle is ne- 

 cessary to determine whether its decisions be correct. 

 On this account we have considered it, (see CON- 

 SCIENCE) only as a particular modification of the prin- 

 ciple of moral approbation or disapprobation, directed 

 solely to the examination of our own feelings and con- 

 duct, and increasing in an astonishing degree our hap- 

 piness or misery, according as it leads us to approve or 

 condemn our own actions. When its intimations coin- 

 cide with that amour propre which is natural to every 

 human being, it enhances our happiness in the highest 

 possible degree, as we then feel as if we had some good 

 grounds for that self-partiality which we are so much 

 inclined to indulge. But when, on the other hand, it 

 pronounces our condemnation, it sinks us in our own 

 esteem, and thus infuses a feeling of misery, such as all 

 the opposition and reproaches of the world will not 

 produce, whilst we stand well with our own conscien- 

 ces. 



The principle of conscience, then, we conceive, de- 

 rives its influence, not from being possessed of any 

 independent, autocratical power, but from a conviction 

 that we are continually in the presence of God, and 

 must be accountable to him for our actions. This is 

 unquestionably the ultimate and only safe foundation 

 of its operations : and, therefore, we conceive it to be 

 legitimate reasoning to infer the being of a God from 

 the operations of conscience, as we do not see any ra- 

 tional grounds for them apart from this consideration. 

 The ancient moralists, indeed, like many among the 

 moderns, held conscience to be an ultimate, and not 

 an inferential principle, and have given us most beau- 

 tiful illustrations of its power over the mind of man. 



There is not, perhaps, to be found in any language a Moral 



more powerful description of its effects, than occurs Philosophy. 



in the thirteenth satire of Juvenal : yet he never once s ~~Y~~ 



alludes either to the belief of a God, or of a future 



state, as lending to conscience its chief sanction and 



authority. This is quite consistent with the view 



which he took of the independent power of conscience: 



and we have no doubt that it does frequently operate 



most powerfully, without referring immediately to 



such considerations : But we have as little doubt, that 



when its operations come to be analysed, the terrors 



and strong emotions which it produces, will appear to 



be only superstitious bugbears and idle prejudices, if 



we separate it from the belief of a God, and a state of 



retribution. 



Besides our appetites, which are necessary for the The affec- 

 preservation of life, and the continuation of the spe- tion8 ' 

 cies, and the various desires which take their rise from 

 them, or from the bodily senses ; we are conscious of 

 other feelings, which have been called affections, and 

 which are supposed to be distinguished from the appe- 

 tites and desires by this circumstance, that our fellow- 

 creatures are always the objects of them. They are 

 called benevolent or malevolent affections, according as 

 we feel a desire to promote or obstruct the happiness 

 of others. 



As there are certain objects which offend or gratify Origin of 

 the external senses, so there are certain exhibitions of the ma]e - 



conduct and feelings peculiarly offensive to our moral J ole . nt af " 



, e , . r , * J .- f T vi lections. 



perceptions, and which produce a sensation or dislike 



or abhorrence infinitely stronger than can arise from 

 any affection of the senses. We believe this to be the 

 origin of the malevolent affections, although this moral 

 dislike and aversion does not absolutely amount to 

 malevolence, as it is possible to feel such dislike, with- 

 out hostility to the person who excites it. It is sel- 

 dom, however, that this is the case ; and the dislike 

 which we feel towards moral agents most commonly 

 produces in our minds hatred, and the whole train of 

 malevolent affections. 



Perhaps none of our natural feelings are directly Anger, En- 

 malevolent. Anger is undoubtedly an original feel- vy, Jeal- 

 ing, on which malevolence may be very easily engraft- "*?> * c - 

 ed ; but this is not a necessary consequence, otherwise 

 the injunction, Be angry and sin not, could never pro- 

 ceed from the religion of peace. Envy, jealousy, and 

 revenge are directly malevolent ; but they are super- 

 induced qualities, originating in the perversion or 

 abuse of innocent or indifferent natural feelings. But- 

 ler, in his first Sermon on Human Nature, observes, 

 that " as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so nei- 

 ther is there any such thing as ill-will in one man 

 towards another, emulation and resentment being away; 

 whereas there is plainly benevolence, or good-will : 

 there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, 

 treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such 

 and such external goods, which, according to a very 

 ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose 

 to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy and 

 as effectual to their end." 



We do not mean to vindicate human nature from 

 the charge of malevolence ; that such a quality exists, 

 is proved by fatal experience ; and we presume it will 

 not be difficult to shew that it rises necessarily out of 

 the circumstances of human nature. 



Though natural objects may excite our disgust, yet Inanimate 

 we never view them with malevolent feelings. We do onjecis n*- 

 not consider them as objects of blame, because we ver viewed 

 know that they are not answerable for the offensive V( J, tnee * 



