MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



693 



Monl qualities which they possess. There is no volition in 

 Phi osophy. the injury which they inflict, and there is no mains 

 -.""' animus towards the sufferer: it is this which constitutes 

 the essence of an offence, and where this is wanting, 

 however much we may be injured, reason says that 

 we ought not to be offended. We view the hostility 

 of a tiger with nearly the same feelings ; we consider 

 -.nge as indiscriminate; and though we fly from 

 him with terror, yet we do not view him with malevo- 

 lence. If a dog, however, or other animal should sin- 

 gle out an individual, and direct all its fury against 

 him, whilst it is courteous to every other person, that 

 individual could not avoid feelings of irritation, hatred, 

 and malevolence: he would regard the animal as a 

 personal enemy, and would rejoice ir. its destruction. 

 This is nearly the form which malevolence assumes 

 when directed towards a human being ; and from the 

 circumstances and constitution of our nature, we be- 

 lieve it to be impossible to avoid every degree of this 

 feeling. It is impossible not to dislike those who have 

 injured us without provocation. But this feeling of 

 dislike doe* not amount to a moral offence. We may 

 even go farther than this without offence to good mo- 

 rals ; tor when we see a person anxiously seeking op- 

 portunities of hurtine us, and employing his power, 

 wealth, and influence to accomplish our ruin, we con- 

 ceive that we may rejoice without blame, when his 

 power, wealth, influence, and every mean* of annoy- 

 ance which he employed against us, are destroyed. 

 We cannot but feel ill-ajfecled towards such a person ; 

 yet we are not guilty of malevolence, considered in 

 the light of a moral offence, unless we feel a ranco- 

 rous and excessive desire for the destruction of our 

 enemy. 



Our dislike of objects naturally offensive or danger- 

 out never amounts to hatred : we only seek to avoid 

 them; and, therefore, carefully chun the situations 

 where they are likely to be found. But when we have 

 enemies in human shape, and in human society, this 

 cannot be done ; we can only fortify ourselves against 

 their arts by counteraction ; and we are compelled to 

 seek oar own security by exposing the malignity, hy- 

 pocrisy, and worthleasmss of our enemies. This has 

 all the appearance of malevolence ; and, in general, it 

 toon actually becomes so : for as lore begets love, so 

 there are few minds in which hatred does not produce 

 hatred, and offence, the desire of revenge. 



Fhe male. It has often been observed, that the malevolent pas. 

 imi feel- jjon, ire always accompanied with painful feelings to 

 '"*' those who indvlg* than. This has been considered as 

 IT^th'u''*- * wite "ng"' 1 *"* ^ Providence, to impose a restraint 

 y waii. on Tlit *> obviously injurious to the peace and 

 son i. happiness of society. The argument is not weakened 

 by snowing that malevolence must necessarily be ac- 

 companied with pun, if the account which we have 

 given of its origin be correct : for it evidently origi- 

 nates in J"ir. or in HiiU/te ; and whilst these qualities 

 are present to the mind, it would be as impossible to 

 feel comfortable, as it would be to remain pertettly 

 dhtarhnl in the presence of a wild beast which we 

 fear, or in the midst of noxious and offensive objects, 

 which our souls abhor. 



Whilst, then, we admit that there i? a vast deal of 

 malevolence n the world, yet we think that it is not 

 so much a native principle, an the corruption and 

 abuse of feelings naturally indifferent, and capable of 

 being applied to very different ends. At the same 

 time, w* do not imagine that there is the slightest 

 chance that this perversion can be avoided. We have 



the highest authority for stating that offences must come: 

 they are often unintentional on the part of the offen- f >hiloso P h 5 r - 

 der; they may arise from his ignorance of our feelings, 

 our characters, or our circumstances. We, on our 

 part, are perhaps equally ignorant of his feelings and 

 intentions : we are, therefore, always apt to confound 

 injury with injustice, and to ascribe the evils which 

 we suffer to bad motives, on the part of him who is 

 the cause of them ; and we believe it to be impossible, 

 in the ordinary circumstances of human nature, not to 

 feel ill-affected towards those who have caused us pain 

 and suffering. Opposite feelings may indeed be im- 

 planted, and high Christian principles may teach a 

 man to love his enemies, and to do good to them that 

 hate him. But the ordinary feeling of human nature 

 is, to hate them who hate us, 



Vmdicta bonum vita jucundis ipsa. 



The heathen moralists were not agreed on this sub- 

 ject. Some of them considered revenge not only as 

 allowable, but as praiseworthy. Of this number are 

 Aristotle and Cicero. The former says that it is the 

 property of a slave to put up with an injury. (Ad 

 Nicom. iv. 11.) 'And Cicero glories in cherishing the 

 feeling of revenge. Orfi hommem et odero, utinam ul~ 

 did nottem. (Ad Alt.) Some of the ancient moralists, 

 on the other hand, pointedly condemned revenge, 

 (See the authorities collected by Grotius, De Vent. 1. 

 iv. c. 12.) It is sufficiently evident, however, that they 

 were not possessed of any principle of sufficient efficacy 

 to enforce the doctrine of forgiveness. Juvenal de- 

 claims eloquently against revenge ; but his argument is 

 rather satirical than solid : it is because revenge is 

 chiefly the passion of a woman. 



Quippe minuti 



Semper et infirm! est animi exiguiquc voluptas 

 I'hio. Continue sic collige, quod vindicu 

 Nemo magis goudct quam femina. 



Sat. 13. 



Though we have expressed a doubt whether any of 

 our natural feelings be, in the first instance, decidedly 

 malevolent ; yet we have pointed out a fertile source 

 from which malevolent affections may, and, in the or- 

 dinary circumstances of our nature, must proceed. For 

 the purposes of partenetical exhortation, it may be 

 most useful to take the passions in their matured state, 

 and, without attempting to trace their origin, to point 

 out their consequences. But as our object is analysis, 

 rather than moral suasion, we have all along deemed 

 it necessary to mount as far as possible to first princi- 

 ples, and to show the steps through which the feelings 

 pass, till they reach their decided character of virtuous 

 or vicious habits or affections. It is the same thing as 

 to the practical result, whether malevolence be con- 

 sidered as an original feeling, or as resulting necessa- 

 rily from the circumstances in which we are placed : 

 but it is not the same thing as to arrangement ; that 

 being always the beat which approaches nearest to ele- 

 mentary principles, as it enables us to trace more com- 

 pletely the progress of the vicious affections, and to 

 detect the circumstances which have nourished and 

 matured them. 



The benevolent affections are original feelings, flow- The tent- 

 ing immediately from principles implanted in our relent f- 

 nature. The benevolent affections enumerated by Dr. factions. 

 Reid, are parental affection, gratitude, pity, esteem of 

 the wise and good, friendship, love, and public spirit : 

 to which Mr. Stewart adds filial affection, and affection 

 of kindred. It is obvious, that, on this plan, the enu. 



