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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral independence and affluence, by those talents and attain- 

 Philosophy. m ents which secure an influence in society. Thus, in 

 1 every state of society, the principle of love has a pow- 

 erful influence in moulding the manners, and forming 

 the character of men. 



The operation of the feeling on the other sex is quite 

 reciprocal. The female naturally studies the qualifica- 

 tions most likely to recommend her to the object of 

 her choice ; and if at any time her pursuits should be 

 trifling or useless, we may rest assured that her choice 

 has originated in the frivolity of the men for it is their 

 taste, in every instance, which decides the nature and 

 character of female accomplishments. The woman who 

 wishes to please will not think it necessary that her 

 qualifications should exactly resemble those of the man 

 whom she loves. His strength, and courage, and en- 

 ergy, are acquired as compensations for her weakness ; 

 and, therefore, though she should be deficient in these 

 respects, she will not be the less endeared to the man 

 who glories in being called her protector, and who, 

 without any feelings of selfishness, is glad to be pos- 

 sessed of qualities of which she is destitute, that he may 

 the more decidedly prove the extent of his love. 



It is by no means necessary, then, that the pursuits 

 of the man and of the woman should be similar, in or- 

 der to secure mutual regard. They must indeed be ac- 

 tuated by the same grand moral feelings ; there must 

 be the same regard to truth, honour, and principle 

 the same anxious desire to promote each other's com- 

 fort ; and after this, it matters not how dissimilar their 

 occupations may be. They will rather injure then- in- 

 terests by attempting an approximation in any other 

 respect : and Hercules with the distaff of Omphale in 

 his hand, is not more ridiculous, and out of character, 

 than the virago who affects the manners and pursuits 

 appropriate to men. Qiicejltgit a sexu, vires amat. 



Nothing surely is better calculated to promote the 

 general improvement of the species than that principle 

 of love which leads the two sexes to desire and consult 

 the happiness of each other. In the rudest state of so- 

 ciety it has its influence. In such a state, indeed, wo- 

 man is comparatively disregarded: her weakness and 

 dependence render her completely subservient, and 

 make her the degraded drudge of her rough and unpo- 

 lished yoke-mate. In a state of ease, comfort, and af- 

 fluence, woman becomes an object of greater conse- 

 quence, but chiefly as an instrument of pleasure ; she 

 then studies the accomplishments which minister to 

 luxury, and, perhaps, acquires considerable influence 

 in society. But she is still in a state of moral degrada- 

 tion ; and her beauty and accomplishments are valued 

 by her lord as he values his plate, his equipage, and 

 his furniture ; that is, merely as the means of feeding 

 his vanity and promoting his pleasure. 



It is in the Christian system alone that woman as- 

 sumes her true rank in society : for whilst it unfolds 

 the virtues which confer the highest lustre on human 

 nature, it shows that woman is equally susceptible of 

 them with man, or rather, that her nature appears bet- 

 ter adapted than that of man for the reception of them. 

 Her feelings harmonize more readily with the mild and 

 benevolent spirit of this religion : and human excel- 

 lence being shewn to consist in the cultivation of vir- 

 tuous and pious affections, the female who is distin- 

 guished by these qualifications may justly aspire to the 

 highest estimation in Christian society ; and being, 

 equally with man, the sharer of immortal hopes, she is 



entitled to the same consideration in the ordinary re- Moral 

 lations of life. Phiiosophj 



From what has been said, we think it will evidently 

 appear that our duty as moral agents may be inferred 

 from the constitution of our nature, and the relations 

 in which we are placed. We may say, with safety, 

 that, to a certain extent, nature points out the line of 

 duty : for we have seen that our appetites, desires, af- 

 fections, &c. point most distinctly to certain ends, the 

 attainment of which is considered necessary for happi- 

 ness. But whilst our natural feelings impel us infallibly 

 and irresistibly to desire certain gratifications, they do not 

 point out, with precision, the means by which the end 

 may be attained. These means are learnt by instruction, R easoa 

 example, experience, and reason ; and after the mind is discovers 

 thus informed, it perceives that the means of obtaining the mean* 

 the enjoyments which we desire, though varied, arefe n jy- 

 yet perfectly defined, and that we cannot neglect or ment - 

 abuse them without compromising our own happiness. 



We may perceive, then, that the author of our na- Struggle 

 ture has fenced in the path of virtue by numberless between 

 safeguards and securities, and which way soever we inclinatior 

 turn ourselves we will find monitors of duty, and res- and duty ' 

 traints imposed on vicious indulgence. Yet with all 

 these advantages we need not be surprized at the 

 struggles which are so frequently felt between inclina- 

 tion and duty. Such struggles are absolutely unavoid- 

 able, for the appetite is blind, and indiscriminating ; it 

 may impel us to desire what we have no right to aspire 

 to, and which cannot be. ours without violating the 

 rights of another. To feel hunger, and desire food, is 

 perfectly natural, and, therefore, cannot be wrong : 

 but it is contrary to justice to gratify this desire at the 

 expence of another. To desire a beautiful woman may 

 be equally natural, but it is wrong to seek the gratifi- 

 cation of this desire if she is already become the pro- 

 perty of another. In short, our appetites, passions, 

 and desires, require to be corrected by a consideration 

 of the relations in which we stand to God and to socie- 

 ty ; and it is a considerable time before these are so 

 distinctly perceived as to operate surely and expediti- 

 ously in regulating the conduct. 



Man's moral character results chiefly from his social 

 connections, and these are not adventitious or fortuitous- 

 ly formed. Our analysis of some of the prominent 

 feelings and circumstances of human nature had for its 

 object to shew that society in its various forms, and 

 modifications, necessarily results from them ; that man 

 is made for social relations, and is gradually trained to 

 discharge the duties required in them by the moral 

 and intellectual perceptions arising from the constitu- 

 tion of his nature. 



Above all, the sense of religion, arising naturally at Religion 

 least, if not necessarily, out of the circumstances and the grand 

 constitution of man, tends to strengthen the power of sa 

 moral obligation, and to afford an intelligible and uni- 

 versally applicable rule of duty. That it isabsolutely ne- 

 cessary appears from this, that no nation has ever been 

 able to do without it ; and in every state of society reli- 

 gion has always been assumed as the sanction of morals. 

 That it is so must be admitted on every rational system 

 of morals ; for if there is a God who created all things, 

 and established those laws which we feel ourselves bound 

 to obev, we must evidently consider his will as the 

 sovereign rule by which we ought to regulate our con- 

 duct. And if we set such considerations aside, we 

 confess that we cannot perceive, by any powers of 



morals. 



