MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



697 



Tb power 

 of hb i <- 

 eouuicd lor. 



reason that we possess, any principle that will make a 

 man forego evident advantages, and submit to serious 

 privations, merely from a sense of duty: and we are more 

 and more convinced that the sense of duty is an unin- 

 telligible phrase, or a principle without foundation, un- 

 less it be resolved into obedience to the divine law. A 

 sense of interest may make a man avoid certain vices, 

 such as glutton}', intemperance and the like; but to 

 discharge the relative duties a man must love his neigh- 

 bour at himfflf; and we know nothing that can pro- 

 duce this feeling but the conviction that God is the 

 common father, governor, and judge of all. 



The moral duties are alike binding on all, and no 

 rank or condition can claim exemption from laws 

 which, being founded on the nature of man, and the 

 will of God, must necessarily be of universal obliga- 

 tion. The circumstances of individuals, however, are 

 extremely various, and almost every man, from his 

 particular situation and relations in society, will be 

 called more frequently to the exercise of some moral 

 duties than others. For these he acquires a fondness, 

 and often display a peculiar proneness to the perform- 

 ance of them. This is said to be the effect ot habit, a 

 quality which, whilst it gives additional security and 

 facility to virtue, is not without some tendencies of an 

 opposite character, against which we would do well to 

 be on our guard. 



The man who has been trained by habit to the exer- 

 cise of a particular virtue, is very apt to view it with 

 overweening fondness ; and to be harsh and uncharit- 

 able in judging of others who do not shew the same 

 read i new and facility in the performance of it. The 

 man who is distinguished by any virtue not exactly in 

 the common line of practice, is always sure of an ample 

 share of admiration. We think liim something above 

 the ordinary level of mortals, because he seems to do 

 with ease and pleasure what would cost others much 

 difficulty snd pain to accomplish. 



It <hc estimation of the world, in this respect, be 

 not altogether correct, it is at least salutary in its influ- 

 ence, and we are more anxious to prevent undue ela- 

 tion in those who are thus distinguished, than to teach 

 men to withhold the mead of praise from any thing that 

 l>ears the appearance of virtue. In a rigid estimation 

 of the subject, however, a man cannot reckon himself 

 i milled to very high praise for the performance of du- 

 ties to which he has been trained by a long course of 

 discipline, or by powerful associations. 



Dr. Reid has assigned some mysterious influence to 

 htliit, and has exalted it into an original principle of 

 our nature. ' It appears evident," says he, " that as, 

 without instinct, the infant could not live to become a 

 man, so without habit, man would remain an infant 

 through life, and would be as helpless, as unhandy, as 

 tpeecflleas, and as much a child in understanding at 

 threescore, as at three." He afterwards observes, " no 

 man can shew a reason why our doing a thing (re- 

 ouently should produce either facility, or inclination to 

 do it." 



This ii certainly putting habit out of its place, and 

 making it usurp the province of a more important prin- 

 ciple. How is it possible for this ingenious author to 

 make out hit position, that without habit, a man would 

 be as much a child in understanding at threescore as 

 at three ? Would not the memory retain the impressions 

 which it had received, the knowledge which it had 

 pained, and the facts which had passed in review he- 

 lure it, without any dependence on the power of habit ? 



VOL. XIV. PART IL 



And, as we think habit not absolutely indispensable Moral 

 for the acquisition of knowledge, neither do we think Philosophy, 

 that its influence over the human mind is absolutely 1 "T'~ 

 unaccountable ; at least, we think it may easily be re- 

 ferred to an ulterior principle. 



In fact, we consider Itabit merely as one of the ordi- 

 nary phenomena connected with memory and the as- 

 sociation of ideas ; and on this principle we think its 

 power may easily be accounted for. Whatever has, 

 been once before the mind, will find a readier admission 

 when presented a second time ; for this plain reason, 

 that it was at first a stranger, but is now recognized as 

 an acquaintance. We might have had some difficulty 

 at first, in understanding it, and it might have cost us 

 a good deal of trouble to discover all its bearings and 

 tendencies ; but these difficulties being once removed, 

 never recur ; and the fact, or the feeling, or whatever 

 it may be called, being treasured up in the memory, is 

 added to the general stock of knowledge, and becomes, 

 as it were, a new point from which we start in search 

 of ulterior improvement. 



But the recurrence of an idea or practice, however Natural 

 frequent, does not necessarily constitute habit. Though habits. 

 we wash our face every morning, or, every morning say 

 our prayers, this is not habit. It is a regular custom 

 founded on expediency or reason. Neither do we ap- 

 ply the name of habit to any of those practices which 

 result from the general constitution of our nature, and 

 are observed by all mankind. We do not say that a 

 man has a habit of taking his breakfast, or dinner, 

 though lie does so every day of his life, and has a most 

 decided inclination to the practice. By a habit of eat- 

 ing, we would understand gluttony ; as a habit of 

 drinking always implies drunkenness. A man may 

 have a habit of sleeping in his chair after dinner : we 

 never talk of the regular repose of sleep as a habit. 

 Perhaps there is as much of habit in the art of walk- 

 ing, as in most things; yet, walking appears so natu- 

 ral, that we never consider it as a habit ; but if a man 

 limps without being lame, or slouches, or swaggers in 

 his walk, we say he has acquired habits. 



It is evident, then, that we apply the term hnbils to 

 certain practices a little out of the ordinary way, when 

 they obtain a very prominent influence ; or to natural 

 practices when carried to habitual excess. Our mo. Moral ha. 

 ral habits may be explained in the same way. Parti- bits. 

 cular circumstances give more importance in our ima- 

 gination to one duty than to another. It has, for in- 

 stance, been particularly enforced by the friend whom 

 we admire ; it has been recommended by some very 

 interesting concomitants, or by some powerful consi. 

 derations of public or private advantage : from these, 

 and similar circumstances, it appears of paramount im- 

 portance ; and in our situation it may, in fact, be so ; 

 but \\e ought not to denounce, as deficient in moral 

 sensibility, those who do not view it with the same 

 rapturous feelings. 



All prejudices are habits arising out of contracted edu- Prejudices. 

 cation, illiberal society, or the example of those who 

 have more influence than sense. All prejudices have 

 a certain degree of moral obliquity attached to them: 

 but, as the defect originates chiefly in the understand- 

 ing, they may be called bnd intellectual habits. We do 

 not, in general, view such habits with much moral dis- 

 approbation. We are rather amused in tracing their 

 origin ; and regard them as the subject of ridicule, ra- 

 ther than of rigid censure. They have, however, a 

 very extensive, and very pernicious influence on the v 

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