698 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Patriotism 

 not a pre- 

 judice. 



Moral happiness both of individuals and of society, as they 

 Philosophy, obviously impair general benevolence, and obstruct ge- 

 neral improvement. 



To love the country in which we are born better 

 than any other is not a prejudice : it is -a natural, irresist- 

 ible feeling: and the man who is a stranger to it, must 

 be unacquainted with all the finer sensibilities of our 

 nature. It is impossible to reflect on the scenes with 

 which our recollections of youthful happiness are inse- 

 parably associated, without the most decided partiality : 

 it is impossible to think of the place which contains 

 the graves of our fathers, and of the companions of our 

 early days, without feelings of the deepest interest : and 

 a general predilection for our native country must arise 

 in every well regulated mind, from a recollection of the 

 social, civil, and religious ties which have so intimately 

 connected our hearts with the country and communi-- 

 ty in which we have been brought up. Such feelings 

 as these are not prejudices: for they arise out of natu- 

 ral and unavoidable associations ; and there is a defect 

 in the heart of every man who is a stranger to them. 

 But if love to our country and connections leads us to 

 despise other communities, or to hate and dislike those 

 who differ from us in political institutions, in civil cus- 

 toms, or in national manners ; in that case, we are un- 

 der the dominion of the most narrow and hurtful pre- 

 judices, and will never be able to exhibit a single fea- 

 ture of general philanthropy, or of genuine Christian 

 spirit. 



Prejudices in the case of certain contracted minds, 

 and limited understandings, may be useful. They are 

 a sort of substitute for steady principles ; and we should 

 be afraid that, were a weak man to renounce his pre- 

 judices, he might never find any principles so likely to 

 secure consistency of conduct. On this ground, we are 

 not displeased sometimes to see an obstinate man re- 

 sisting enlargement of understanding, for he might lose 

 what he would never be able to replace ; and his mind 

 might be set afloat without a single light to direct him. 

 We have seen melancholy exemplifications of these ob- 

 servations, in the case of many who have been trained 

 up under the prejudices of religious education ; we say 

 prejudices ; for their impressions never rose to the rank 

 of rational principles. 



When once they have been laughed out of that ve- 

 neration which they had been accustomed to entertain 

 for sacred subjects, they become the most disgusting 

 profligates ; and by their nauseous licentiousness, rather 

 do good than harm, to the cause which they mean to 

 injure. 



But when we talk of the good effects of any preju- 

 dice, we must be understood to speak only of those 

 prejudices which lean to virtue's side. We have very 

 Often hurt- little fault to find with that prejudice which makes a 

 fat mother believe her own child the finest that ever was 



born ; but there are few prejudices so harmless as this ; 



Prejudices 

 sometimes 

 useful. 



they generally incline with preponderating bias to the Moral 

 wrong side ; and often present insuperable obstacles to Philosophy, 

 the dissemination of correct and enlightened princi- ^"Y"" 

 pies. Prejudice is, in many cases, more dangerous than 

 vice ; a man can never have the effrontery to vindicate 

 the latter ; and however much he may be attached to 

 it, he is generally ashamed to avow it. But the case 

 is wholly different when a man is under the dominion 

 of prejudice ; he then glories in his delusion, and is 

 ready to become a martyr to his error. 



If what we have said on the subject of habit be cor- 

 rect, we ought to reckon all our vices habits; our 

 virtues ought not to be accounted so, in our view of the 

 foundation of morals, except when particular circum- 

 stances have given unusual prominence to some parti- 

 cular branch of a general duty *. 



Few of the duties of life are indeed so obvious as to 

 spring up spontaneously in the human mind ; most of 

 them are the result of experience, instruction, or ex- 

 ample ; and so far they may be accounted habits ; as 

 we often understand by that term all acquired qualities. 

 But the general habits of right conduct, like the habits 

 of speaking or walking, are so familiar to the generality 

 of mankind, that we consider them as natural results ; 

 and, indeed, they may with propriety be reckoned so ; 

 for the leading truths of morality, though some of them 

 may not be palpable at first view, become more obvious 

 every time they are presented to the mind ; it sees their 

 bearings and connections more clearly, and perceives 

 them to be enforced by a thousand analogous circum- 

 stances and events in the general economy of provi- 

 dence. They then become axioms, instead of corolla- 

 ries ; and that which was originally the result of pain- 

 ful study, and patient investigation, assumes the place 

 of a first principle. 



But vice is always contrary to right reason, and to 

 the natural order of things ; it is persisted in to the ob- 

 vious detriment of our best interests ; and it is only in 

 consequence of a certain obliquity, introduced by habit 

 into the physical and moral constitution of man, that 

 it is enabled to hold its ground in the face of so many 

 discouragements and dissuasives. Bad habits, by long 

 indulgence, become almost irresistible ; the man who 

 has been accustomed to the stimulus of artificial excite- 

 ment, becomes languid when it is withheld, and would 

 as soon be deprived of meat and drink as denied the 

 gratification of his acquired appetites. The immediate 

 consequence of excess is languor ; a useful lesson to 

 prevent repetition of the same offence against nature. 

 But mankind have discovered artificial stimulants to 

 overcome constitutional depression ; and these will be 

 most readily resorted to in time of need ; where they 

 are found to answer the purpose, reason has little 

 chance in arguing against them ; they have two most 

 conclusive recommendations in their favour ; they pre- 

 eent a remedy for present uneasiness, and they are 



* We have here the authority of Aristotle against us. He says that virtue does not properly exist till it becomes the usual habit and 

 disposition of the mind. " Thus the action which proceeds from an occasional fit of generosity is undoubtedly a generous action, but the 

 man who performs it is not necessarily a generous person, because it may be the single action of the kind which he ever performed. The 

 motive and disposition of heart, from which this action was performed, may have been quite just and proper ; but as this happy mood seems 

 to have been the effect rather of accidental humour than of any thing steady or permanent in the character, it can reflect no great honaur on 

 the performer. When we denominate a character generous or charitable, or virtuous in any respect, we mean to signify that the disposi- 

 tion expressed by each of those appellations is the usual and customary disposition of the person. But single actions of any kind, how pro- 

 per and suitable soever, are of little consequence to show that this is the case. If a single action was sufficient to stamp the character of 

 any virtue upon the person who performed it, the most worthless of mankind might lay claim to all the virtues ; since there is no man who 

 has not, upon some occasions, acted with prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. But though single actions, how laudable soever, re- 

 flect very little praise on the person who performs them, a single vicious action performed by one whose conduct is usually very regular, 

 greatly diminishes, and sometimes destroys altogether our opinion of his virtue. A single action of this kind sufficiently shows that his ha- 

 bit* aie not perfect, and that he is less to be depended upon, than, from the usual train of his behaviour, we might have been apt to ima. 

 gine." Smith's Review ofSyttimt of Moral Philosophy. 



