MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



699 



Mori much more palatable than lessons of self-denial, the 



yhijjtophy. only cur (or the moral maladies of the human mind. 



"""V"* Hence w* every day tee attempts to reconcile lux- 

 ury with health, and excess with enjoyment ; and 

 every tuch attempt has a tendency to perpetuate and 

 strengthen the evil, and to render emancipation more 

 hopeless. The son of Dion, who had been corrupted 

 by Dionysius, chose to put an end to his own exist- 

 ence, rather than submit to the restraints which the 

 wisdom of his father attempted to impose ; and such 

 facu are perfectly familiar to our observation, for we 

 daily see men falling the voluntary victims of their 

 vices in tpite of the most powerful motives and in- 

 ducements to reformation of conduct. 

 < Bad babiu It has often been observed, that bad habits are more 



uortitet> steady and consistent in their operation than good one? ; 



tbMgood and it a not difficult to account for the fact. Our vir- 

 tue* carry us to the very verge of vice ; that is to say, 

 the slightest excess either in good or indifferent quali- 

 ties, constitutes * moral offence ; and how readily may 

 even good roan be betrayed by the warmth of his 

 feelings, by the influence of example, or of unexpected 

 "notation* ! But bad habits never can make any ap- 



only as means of happiness, but as securities for virtue ; Moral 

 and if vice is excluded, we shall not be much disposed Philosophy. 

 to find fault with human employments. With this re- """V*^ 

 serration , we would adopt the sentiment of Hesiod, 

 even in the sense in which Socrates's accusers charged 

 him with using it. 



Ji r >li3,-. 



of ***. 



tf to <h 

 formation 

 T habit*. 



proximation to the confine* of virtue ; the man who in- 

 dulges them, has turned hi* back upon it ; and even- 

 step that be advances carries him farther from the paths 

 of wisdom. 



In every judicious system of moral education, few 

 thing* are more deserving of attention than the forma- 

 tion of habits. The great object to be aimed at in 

 early culture, is the complete occupation of the mind 

 by some employment which may lay the foundation of 

 useful habits in after life ; or, at least, may prevent the 

 formation of such as are wrong. And where bad ha- 

 have been acquired, they are not to be conquered 

 by the power of argument or of demonstration ; they 

 are to be overcome only through the influence of some 

 counteracting practice, which must be made sufficient- 

 ly interesting to engage the feelings, and abstract the 

 attention from the hurtful habits which have engrossed 

 it. To effect a reformation in such circumstances, is a 

 work of extreme difficulty ; but it ought not to be aban- 

 doned in despair. The most pernicious habits have 

 often been acquired from the want of congenial em- 

 ployment ; for if a man is either idle or forced to do 

 what he dislikes, he ha* every chance to seek for plea- 

 sure from forbidden gratifications. We should think 

 it advisable to give every young person who is not 

 condemned to manual labour, as many securities a* 

 possible against the formation of evil habits ; and am- 

 ple resource* are furnished in cultivating the pleasures 

 of taste, or in the departments of the arts, or of elegant 

 accompluhmetiu, or of polite literature, or of scientific 

 i eat an h. or of harmless amusement. And we believe 

 it ha* often happened that, from injudicious restraints, 

 or from the mind being forced into an unnatural chan- 

 nel, the worst consequences have been produced ; and 

 the young have been led to seek from vice, that plea- 

 sure which might have been found more pure and am- 

 ple in congenial occupations, or in innocent recreations. 

 V> are for diminishing none of the natural resources 

 of human enjoyment ; we would recommend them not 



On the Origin of Evil. 



IT has often been asked, how there should be so Origin of 

 much sin and suffering, or so much vice and misery, Evilg 

 in a world created and governed by a God of infinite 

 wisdom and goodness. We do not know that a satis- 

 factory answer has ever been given to this most diffi- 

 cult question ; and in agitating the subject at present, 

 we are far from entertaining the hope that we shall be 

 able fully to resolve this nodiit in the divine economy. 

 The question, however, in one form or another, is in- 

 dispensable in all discussions on morals : and, though 

 much must necessarily remain unexplained, from the 

 present imperfection of our faculties, we do not despair 

 of removing tbe difficulty, at least some steps farther 

 back, or perhaps of carrying it to the point where ac- 

 quiescence in the inscrutable will of heaven must put 

 an end to our researches. 



The Manichtean notion of two eternal, independent Manichaan 

 principles, the one good, and the other evil, was very notion, 

 early and extensively received in the East. Accord- 

 ing to this notion, there was a continual contest be- 

 tween these two principles, and their power was so 

 equally balanced that neither of them could obtain 

 a decided superiority : hence resulted that mixed state 

 of vice and virtue, misery and happiness, so observable 

 in the history of the world, and particularly in the life 

 of man. They must have had very little philosophical 

 observation w'ho could rest satisfied with this clumsy 

 hypothesis ; for it is perfectly apparent, that all the 

 physical evils at least (and these were the evils chiefly 

 regarded in this scheme,) are not only reconcileabfe 

 with the perfections of a wise and good Being, but are 

 absolute indications of his wisdom and goodness in the 

 present state of man. 



A more modem hypothesis represents the existence The neces- 

 of evil as necessarily arising out of the intractableness ary imper- 

 and imperfection of matter ; from which qualities, some /ectionof 

 degree of imperfection and evil must be attached to ever y ere - 

 every created thing . This is intended as a vindica- ated hmg. 

 tion of the Creator : but, even granting the premises, 

 it does not answer the purpose; unless it could at 

 the same time be shewn, that God was under the ne- 

 cessity of acting, and of calling the world, as we now 

 find it, into existence. For if the Deity had free-will 

 and prescience, it would still remain to be shewn, why 

 he gave birth to creation, which must necessarily issue 

 in evil and misery. 



The only satisfactory answer to this is, that the evils 

 we deplore are productive of good on the whole, and 

 are essential to the moral discipline of man. 



Pope, in attempting to vindicate the ways of God Pope's 

 to man, has introduced a very gratuitous and inartifi- ^"-" 

 cial hypothesis into his celebrated essay. He takes it 



I art, aibfl quidem perfwlionu et realitatii pure positive cue in creaturis earumquc acttbus bonii malisque, quod non 

 r | nd impcrfectionon ictui in privatione conustere, et oriri ex original! limitationc creaturtrum, qiuuu jam turn in sum 

 (id c*t, in Mftatt Ttritatum stternaium MU idcu dirino intellect ui obvcrantibus) habent ex eisentu sua : rum quod 

 , (cd l)eu* forec Limiuu autein dicitur creature, quia limitei sou temiinot sun magnitudinis, potential, 

 It* fundamentum inali eit neceoarium, fed oruu tamen eontingens ; id at, necessarium eit ut 

 i c*t ul mU tint actualia : nun contingent, autem, per harmoniam rerum, a potentia transit ad actura ; 

 I com optina rcnun xhc cujui putem fariu Lcilmit-. Cauia Dti Aucrta, &c. 



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